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Articles
Carter, Reagan, and Khomeini:
Presidential Transitions and
International Law
by
NANCY AMOURY COMBS*

Introduction
Marbury v. Madison is justifiably famous for establishing judicial
review; however, the case also provides the first glimpse in American
political history of the power struggle between a lame-duck President
who hurriedly advances the goals of his administration during the
waning hours of his presidency and an incoming President who is just
as intent on reversing his predecessor's eleventh-hour deeds. After
the Republicans swept the elections of 1800,2 President John Adams,
along with the outgoing Federalists in the lame-duck Congress,
enraged President-elect Thomas Jefferson by expanding the federal
judiciary and packing it with loyal Federalists. 3
After the
* Legal Adviser, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, The Hague, The Netherlands.
J.D., University of California at Berkeley, Boalt Hall, 1994. I am grateful to George H.
Aldrich, Warren Christopher, Bruce Combs, Heather Gerken, Thomas Ginsburg, Jack
Goldsmith, Sam Hirsch, Roberts Owen, and Olivia Swaak-Goldman for their helpful
comments. The opinions expressed and any resulting errors are those of the author.
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. The Republican presidential candidate Thomas Jefferson defeated the incumbent,
Federalist John Adams, and the Republicans won a majority of the seats in Congress. See
GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, 2 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES: FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-1815, at
138-39 (1981); JAMES ROGER SHARP, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC:

THE NEW NATION IN CRISIS 243-49 (1993).
3. During the two weeks before incoming President Jefferson's inauguration, Adams
and the lame-duck Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 1801, Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4,
[3031
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Inauguration, Jefferson and his Republican Congress set about to
reverse course, 4 repealing the Judiciary Act of 1801, 5 which had

created numerous new judgeships, and abolishing the 1802 Term of
the Supreme Court 6 to prevent a constitutional challenge to that
repeal. 7 At the same time, they unsheathed impeachment as an even

more potent weapon to rid the judiciary of Federalists. 8 The House
impeached Federalist District Judge John Pickering in early 1802, 9
and the Senate removed him. 10 The House then turned its attention

2 Stat. 89, 90, 98 (repealed 1802), which created circuit courts and thereby created
numerous new federal judgeships and minor magistrate positions, and the Organic Act for
the District of Columbia, ch. 15, 2 Stat. 103 (1801); ch. 24, 2 Stat. 115 (1801) (supplement
to the Act), which authorized the President to name justices of the peace for the District
of Columbia. President Adams allegedly stayed up until midnight the night before
Jefferson's inauguration signing commissions for these new judicial officials, who, as a
result, were pejoratively known as "midnight judges." See HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra
note 2, at 134-35; William H. Rehnquist, Thomas Jefferson and His Contemporaries, 9 J.
LAW & POL. 595, 600 (1993). Adams signed and sealed the commissions of the petitioners
in Marbury v. Madison, but the commissions were not delivered by the end of the day, and
the newly inaugurated President Jefferson refused to deliver the commissions. 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) at 155. It was this refusal that gave rise to Marbury v. Madison.
4. As Jefferson wrote to a friend, the Federalists "have retired into the judiciary as a
stronghold... and from that battery all the works of republicanism are to be beaten down
and erased." Letter to John Dickinson, December 19, 1801, in 10 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 302 (Memorial ed. 1903); see HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 2, at
108.
5. Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132. See also III ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE
LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 57-92 (1919) (describing the lengthy Senate and House
debates); HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 163-64 (noting that the repeal passed
both Houses of Congress "on almost strictly partisan lines"); FELIX FRANKFURTER &
JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL

JUDICIAL SYSTEM 24-30 (1928); David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Most
EndangeredBranch 1801-1805, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 219, 222-33 (1998).
6. Act to Amend the Judicial System of the United States, Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 1,2
Stat. 156. The Court eventually upheld the repeal in Stuart v. Laird,5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299
(1803).
7. See III BEVERIDGE, supra note 5, at 94-97; Currie, supra note 5, at 233-34.
8. See III BEVERIDGE, supra note 5, at 157-60.
9. See 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 641-42 (1803).
10. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 367-68 (1803). See generally III BEVERIDGE, supra
note 5, at 164-67; Lynn W. Turner, The Impeachment of John Pickering, 54 AM. HIST.
REV. 485 (1949).
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to the Supreme Court, impeaching Associate Justice Samuel Chase,'

12
but the Senate acquitted Chase on all eight articles of impeachment.
Subsequent changes of administration have by and large proved
less acrimonious; yet, during the many intervening years, it has been
by no means rare for lame-duck officeholders to push through
partisan laws and policies only to see them limited or eliminated by
their successors.1 3 What has been rare, however, has been for this
phenomenon to occur in the realm of foreign affairs. Political
weakness typically characterizes an administration's final year in
office, and by the time the election has passed and the President has
become a lame duck, 14 his ability to conduct foreign affairs in
particular is at its lowest ebb.' 5 Consequently, lame-duck Presidents
usually steer clear of significant or controversial international issues;
or, at the least, they seek their successors' concurrence or
6
commitment as to the course to pursue.'

11. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 272 (1804); see also III BEVERIDGE, supra note 5, at
169-74. See generally WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC
IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 15134 (1992). Chase's impeachment was widely viewed as a precursor to that of Chief
Justice John Marshall. III BEVERIDGE, supra note 5, at 160-63.
12. REHNQUIST, supra note 11, at 104-05; see also III BEVERIDGE, supra note 5, at
171,174-219.
13. As Alexander Hamilton said, "To reverse and undo what has been done by a
predecessor, is very often considered by a successor as the best proof he can give of his
own capacity and desert ... ." LAURIN L. HENRY, PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS 125
(1960).
14. Office holders who are serving their final terms in office are also known as "lame
ducks," but for purposes of this article, the term "lame duck" describes an office holder's
status during the period between the election and the inauguration of his successor.
15. FREDERICK C. MOSHER ET AL., PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 132 (1987); HENRY, supra note 13, at 457.
16. For example, when the repayment of European war debts to the United States
became a critical issue soon after the 1932 election, lame-duck President Hoover
repeatedly sought consultations with President-elect Roosevelt. HENRY, supra note 13, at
284-310. Likewise, lame-duck President Truman sought President-elect Eisenhower's
commitment to support Truman's position on the forced repatriation of prisoners in the
ongoing Korean War armistice negotiations. It at 480-86. Lame-duck President Johnson
and President-elect Nixon also consulted on pending Vietnam War issues. CARL M.
BRAUER, PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS: EISENHOWER THROUGH REAGAN 152-53
(1986); see also MOSHER ET AL., supra note 15, at 131-32. In December 1992, lame-duck
President George Bush committed United States ground troops as part of a multinational
force to ensure delivery of humanitarian aid to war-tom Somalia, see Michael R. Gordon,
U.N. Backs a Somalia Force as Bush Vows a Swift Exit; PentagonSees Longer Stay, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 1992, at Al, an action that incoming President Bill Clinton approved and
expanded, see John C. Yoo, Kosovo, War Powers,and the MultilateralFuture, 148 U. PA.
L. REV. 1673,1673 (2000).
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This Article examines one of those very rare instances in which a

lame-duck President was able and chose, during the final hours of his
Administration, to bind the United States to significant international

commitments without the concurrence of the President-elect. The
lame duck was Jimmy Carter; the President-elect was Ronald Reagan;
and the issue was the most dramatic foreign policy controversy since
the end of the Vietnam War.
On November 4, 1979, militant Iranian students seized the
United States Embassy in Tehran and held fifty-two American
citizens hostage. Despite the Carter Administration's extraordinary
diplomatic efforts, it was unable to secure the hostages' release until
President Carter's last full day in office. On that day, the United
States, pursuant to President Carter's orders, adhered to the Algiers
Declarations, 17 an international treaty18 that secured the release of the
hostages while committing the United States and Iran to numerous
obligations designed to resolve the issues that had arisen as a
consequence of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the hostagetaking. Throughout the United States' presidential campaign and
17. The Algiers Declarations comprise the following five documents: The Declaration
of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Jan. 19, 1981, 81
DEP'T ST. BULL., No. 2047 1. 1 (1981) [hereinafter General Declaration], reprinted in 1
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3; the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and
Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of
the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Jan.
19, 1981, 81 DEP'T ST. BULL., No. 2047, at 3 [hereinafter Claims Settlement Declaration],
reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. 9; Undertakings of the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran with Respect to
the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria,
19 Jan. 1981, 81 DEP'T ST. BULL., No. 2047, at 4 [hereinafter Undertakings], reprinted in 1
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 13; Escrow Agreement Among the United States, the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York (as fiscal agent of the United States), Bank Markazi Iran, and
the Banque Centrale d'Alg~rie (escrow agent) Jan. 20, 1981, 81 DEP'T ST. BULL., No.
2047, at 6, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 16; and the Technical Arrangement
Between Banque Centrale d'Alg6rie and the Governor and Company of the Bank of
England and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Jan. 20, 1981, 81 DEP'T ST. BULL.,
No. 2047, at 14, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 20. For purposes of this article,
however, the term "Algiers Declarations" will refer to the General Declaration and the
Claims Settlement Declaration.
18. The Algiers Declarations constitute a treaty for purposes of international law, see
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333,
but in American law parlance, they are termed an "executive agreement" because they
were not submitted to the Senate for consent. An international agreement can be termed
a "treaty" for purposes of American law only if a two-thirds' majority of the Senate has
given advice and consent for ratification. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 (1986); see
also infra note 160.
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transition, Reagan had made clear his opposition to negotiating with
terrorists 19 and to many of the treaty terms then under
consideration. 20 Not surprisingly, then, upon taking office, he
considered repudiating the Declarations to the extent they had not
already been performed; in the end, however, he decided to

'21
implement them, but only "in strict accordance with the[ir] terms."

It soon became clear that the Reagan Administration's interpretation
of the Declarations' terms differed in certain key respects from that of
Thus, at first glance, the Algiers
the Carter Administration.
Declarations, as applied by the new Administration, appear to be just
one more example of lame-duck lawmaking that met subsequent

limitation.
It became much more than that, however, because the
"lawmaking" occurred in the international realm. Had President
Reagan been confronted with a piece of unwanted domestic
legislation, he would have had to consider only the domestic political
ramifications of the course he took. By contrast, in adhering to the
Algiers Declarations, President Carter had bound the United States
to international obligations that thereby rendered the United States

19. See The Iran Agreements: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on ForeignRelations,
97th Cong. 182 (1981) [hereinafter Senate Foreign Relations Hearings] (testimony of
Walter Stoessel, Reagan Administration's Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs)
(stating that not negotiating for the release of the hostages "is a strongly held view of the
President; that is, that it was a mistake to become involved in such prolonged
negotiations;... we should insist, rather on the release of hostages taken and should use
the full range of instruments available to us to effect that result"); Frank J. Smist, Jr. &
John P. Meiers, Ronald Reagan and Iran-Contra: The Consequences of Breaking
Campaign Promises, in PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THE WORLD 301, 302-03 (Eric J.
Schmertz et al. eds., 1997) (reporting on candidate Reagan's pledge of a "get tough" policy
concerning terrorists: "During the presidential debate between Carter and Reagan on
October 28, 1980, Reagan stated, 'There will be no negotiation with terrorists of any
kind."'); Negotiation of the Algiers Accords, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS: THE IRAN
HOSTAGE CRISIS AND THE HAGUE CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: A LOOK BACK 49, 59 (Andreas
F. Lowenfeld et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter REVOLUTIONARY DAYS] (comments of
Roberts Owen) (describing Reagan's advisors' view that "just the act of talking or
negotiating with a terrorist government was totally unacceptable").
20. See, e.g., Steven R. Weisman, Reagan Calls Iran's New Demands A 'Ransom'
Sought by 'Barbarians, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1980, at Al; see also David Newsom,
PresidentialTransitions and the Handling of Foreign Policy Crises: The IranianHostage
Crisisfrom Carter to Reagan, in PAPERS ON PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS AND FOREIGN
POLICY, VOL. II: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 121,131 (Kenneth W. Thompson ed., 1986)
("Many in the transition team of the [Reagan] administration came to Washington largely
convinced that in Algeria we were negotiating ransom for the hostages.").
21. Implementation of Hostage Agreements the Settlement with Iran, 81 DEP'T ST.
BULL. No. 2048, at 17 (1981).
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accountable to the international community. Further, in contrast to
many treaties which contain obligations but do not contain clear
provisions as to remedies for violations of those obligations, the
Algiers Declarations expressly created an enforcement mechanism:
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal ("Tribunal") -with the power
to resolve disputes over the interpretation and performance of any
provision of the Declarations. 22 Thus, the Reagan Administration
knew from the outset that its stringent implementation of the

Declarations could be passed upon by an international tribunal. But
the composition, rules, and substantive precedents of that tribunal
were as yet unknown.
In the intervening years, the United States has had the
opportunity to learn more than it might have cared to about the
Tribunal because Iran, unhappy with virtually every aspect of the

Reagan Administration's implementation of the Declarations, has
repeatedly hauled the United States before the Tribunal, claiming

myriad treaty violations. The Tribunal has now passed judgment on

virtually all of those claims, 23 making this the first opportunity to take
stock of the long-term consequences that flowed from the widely
divergent treaty interpretations espoused by the Governments of

Carter, Reagan, and Khomeini.

This examination paints an

informative picture of the varied, competing interests at the
intersection of domestic law, international law, and partisan politics.
This
Article
systematically
examines
the
Reagan
Administration's implementation of the Algiers Declarations against
the background of the negotiations between the Carter

Administration and the Ayatollah's Islamic Republic and in light of
well-established rules of treaty interpretation. This examination
reveals that the Reagan Administration's implementation of the

22. General Declaration, supra note 17, para. 17, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. at 8; see also Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 17, at art. VI, para. 4,
reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 11; id. at art. II, para. 3, reprintedin 1 Iran-U.S.
Cl. Trib. Rep. at 10.
23. Only one case involving the Reagan Administration's implementation of the
Declarations remains to be decided: Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No.
B61 (including Case Nos. A/3, A/8, A/9, and A/14) (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.). The Tribunal has
determined liability but not damages in the Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case
Nos. A15 II:A and II:B, Award No. 529-A15-FT, 28 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 112 (May 6,
1992); Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case Nos. A15(IV) & A24, Award No.
590-A15(IV)/A24-FT, 1998 WL 930565 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Dec. 28, 1998); and Islamic
Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No. All, Award No. 597-All-FT, 2000 WL
394260 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Apr. 7,2000).
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Declarations was, in many respects, grudging, ideological, and, at
times, very sloppy. Rather than conforming to the conventional
norms of treaty interpretation which require states to interpret
treaties "in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its
object and purpose," 24 the Reagan Administration called all doubtful
issues and some not-so-doubtful issues in the United States' favor. Be
that as it may, the Article seeks to enhance the understanding of the
choices the Reagan Administration made by placing them in the
context of the domestic-law constraints, the external political
pressures, the internal Administration ideology, and the myriad
uncertainties regarding the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, the
body that would ultimately pass on the treaty's interpretation. By
analyzing as a whole the claims Iran brought and the conclusions the
Tribunal reached, the Article also illuminates the consequencesfinancial as well as diplomatic-of the Reagan Administration's
narrow interpretation of certain provisions of the Declarations, and
then evaluates those consequences in light of the domestic costs the
Reagan Administration would likely have incurred had it adopted a
more balanced interpretation. No similar analysis has ever been
undertaken, and the conclusions that emerge about lame-duck
lawmaking in international affairs provide much-needed insights into
pressing current issues, such as President Clinton's recent attempts to
amend the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and his signing of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court a few weeks before the
end of his term.25
Part I describes the events leading up to the hostage crisis and
the Carter Administration's negotiation of the Algiers Declarations
to resolve that crisis. It also provides a summary description of the
obligations the United States assumed in adhering to the Algiers
Declarations. Part II presents an overview of lame-duck lawmaking
and then describes the Reagan Administration's response to the
Algiers Declarations, particularly highlighting the interaction
24. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 340. The Vienna Convention is understood to have codified customary
international law on treaty interpretation, see Eduardo Jim6nez de Ar6chaga,
InternationalLaw in the Past Third of a Century, 159 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 42 (1978),
and the Tribunal has followed the Vienna Convention's rules in interpreting the Algiers
Declarations. See Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No. A21, Decision No.
62-A21-FT, 14 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 324,328 para. 8 (May 4,1987).
25. Steven Lee Myers, Clinton Approves War Crimes Court,INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE,
Jan. 2,2001, at 1.
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between the Reagan Administration and the United States nationals
who had claims against Iran and who therefore pressed the
Administration to interpret the Declarations in ways favorable to
their interests. Although the Declarations can be said to follow in the
long line of controversial actions taken by outgoing Presidents in their
waning days in office, they also diverge markedly and for a variety of
reasons, reasons which complicated the Reagan Administration's
already-difficult task of implementing the Declarations. Part III
examines Iran's claims before the Tribunal and the Tribunal's recent
decisions with regard to those claims.
It details the Reagan
Administration's implementation of the specific provisions that gave
rise to Iran's claims and, in particular, focuses on the context in which
the Reagan Administration operated and the myriad pressures that it
faced. Whatever weight those considerations might carry in other
settings, they have done little to prevent the Tribunal, which operates
in the realm of international law, from repeatedly finding the United
States in breach of the Algiers Declarations. Part IV concludes by
independently assessing the Reagan Administration's decisions in
light of the above considerations and, retrospectively, in light of the
long-term consequences.
It. The Hostage Crisis and the Algiers Declarations

During the years following World War II, Iran and the United
States forged what was believed to be a stable and satisfying alliance.
The United States recognized the strategic importance of Iran's
location in the Persian Gulf2 6 and consequently sought to strengthen
27
Iran after World War II as a means of preventing a Soviet takeover.
26. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 6 (prepared testimony of
Edmund Muskie, Secretary of State, Carter Administration) ("American foreign policy
since World War II has consistently recognized the strategic, political, and economic
importance of Iran.").
27. Harold H. Saunders, The Crisis Begins, in AMERICAN HOSTAGES INIRAN 35, 54
(Paul H. Kreisberg ed., 1985) [hereinafter Saunders, The Crisis Begins]; CHARLESPHILIPPE DAVID ET AL., FOREIGN POLICY FAILURE IN THE WHITE HOUSE:
REAPPRAISING THE FALL OF THE SHAH AND THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 52 (1993).

Iran itself was not unaware of its own geographical significance. As the Shah of Iran
himself put it in a 1977 interview:
If you didn't have.., a strong Iran capable of securing its own security and
providing security in the region and eventually the Indian Ocean how will you
replace that? With the presence of one million American troops? Do you want
several more Vietnams? In Vietnam, you had only 550,000 American boys. But
the Persian armed forces have more than that. And they are not smoking grass.
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To that end, the United States for years supplied Iran with vast
quantities of military equipment, 28 and its willingness, indeed desire,
to meet Iran's military needs only increased as the Cold War wore on.
By 1972, the Nixon Administration was permitting the Shah of Iran to
purchase virtually any non-nuclear armament he wanted from the

United States' arsenal.2 9
Iran's non-military economic ties with the United States also
increased in the years following World War II and increased
dramatically during the 1970s. During that decade, Iran's income
from oil skyrocketed,30 so that at the same time the Shah was

acquiring more and more American military equipment, he was also
spending vast sums on domestic modernization. 31

He seemed

determined to transform Iran into an industrialized nation in short
order,32 and as a result, he spent large portions of Iran's oil profits on

Newsweek, Jan. 24, 1977, at 48, quoted in SANDRA MACKEY, THE IRANIANS: PERSIA,
ISLAM AND THE SOUL OF A NATION 250 (1996). Concerns about a Soviet invasion also
played a role in the decision not to close the American Embassy in Tehran during or after
the Islamic Revolution in Iran which will be discussed infra. See Saunders, The Crisis
Begins, supra, at 54.
28. For instance, between 1953 and 1960, the United States provided Iran with $450
million worth of military assistance and $1.3 billion in new weapons systems. See Philip F.
Napoli, A HistoricalOverview, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19,1,3.
29. JOHN W. LIMBERT, IRAN: AT WAR WITH HISTORY 100 (1987); CYRUS VANCE,
HARD CHOICES: CRITICAL YEARS IN AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY 315 (1983); see Philip
F. Napoli, A HistoricalOverview, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at 4; see also
A Staff Report to the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, United States Senate: United States Military Sales to Iran July 1976, in THE
UNITED STATES AND IRAN: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 406 (Yonah Alexander & Allan
Nanes eds., 1980) [hereinafter A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] (stating that "Iran is the
largest single purchaser of U.S. military equipment... [and] an extremely important
country to the U.S. and its allies because of its geographical location and oil"); MACKEY,
supra note 27, at 244 (1996) (noting that in 1973 alone the Shah invested $3 billion in
military hardware).
30. LIMBERT, supra note 29, at 103 ("Between the beginning of 1971 and the end of
1973, the average posted price for a barrel of crude rose from $1.79 to $11.65, and the
government's oil revenues rose from $2.3 billion in 1972 to $18.5 billion in 1974.").
31. Statement of State Department Under Secretary for Political Affairs (Joseph J.
Sisco) Before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on
International Relations (June 10, 1975), in A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 29, at
400-01; ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS 542 (2d ed.

1983) [hereinafter LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS].
32. See DAVID D. CARON, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCESS 27-28 (1990).
Still the Shah's ambitions multiplied. In successive interviews given at the time,
Muhammad Reza Shah's imagination moved Iran from an industrialized country
on par with Switzerland to competing with France economically and militarily by
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infrastructure projects such as road construction, factory
modernization, and communication systems. 33 In these endeavors, he
sought Western -particularly
American- technology, equipment,
advisers, and investment,34 so that by the late 1970s, Iran was home to
a vast number of American business interests, ranging from largescale construction projects to offshore oil drilling to major product
lines such as Pepsi-Cola and Revlon. Hundreds of American
corporations were involved in these lucrative projects, and some
45,000 American citizens were living in Iran. 35 In all, between 1973

and 1977, Iran signed agreements to purchase more than $12
billion
36
of United States military and non-military goods and services.
A. The Islamic Revolution and the Hostage-Taking

Much has been written about the causes and events leading to
the Islamic Revolution in Iran, 37 and that discussion need not be
repeated here. Suffice it to say that most date the commencement of
the Revolution to January 1978, when the publication of an anticlerical diatribe led to a demonstration and strike in the Holy City of

the year 1993 to reaching parity with Germany in 1996 to becoming the second
Japan by the end of the century.
MACKEY, supra note 27, at 244; see also RYSZARD KAPUSCINSKI, SHAH OF SHAHS 52-53
(1982) (reporting on a 1973 press conference in which the Shah claimed that within one
generation he would make Iran into the fifth greatest power on Earth and a Der Spiegel
interview in which he claimed that within ten years Iran would have the same living
standard as Germany, France, and England).
33. See GEORGE H. ALDRICH, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES
CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 2-3 (1996); LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS,
supra note 31, at 542; Philip F. Napoli, A HistoricalOverview, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS,

supra note 19, at 5.
34. See Office of Legal Counsel, Introduction and Summary to Opinions of the Office
of Legal Counsel Relating to the Iranian Hostage Crisis, 4A U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel
71, 72 (1984); see also Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Law and the Hostage
Agreement, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 1981, reprinted in Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,
supra note 19, at 292, 293.
35. LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS, supra note 31, at 542;
STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG.,

1ST SESS., IRAN: THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE HOSTAGE SETrLEMENT AGREEMENT
2 (Comm. Print 1981); see also LIMBERT, supra note 29, at 104-05.

36. LIMBERT, supra note 29, at 104.
37. See, e.g., DAVID, supra note 27, at 52-57; LIMBERT, supra note 29, at 103-14;
MACKEY, supra note 27, at 271-93; VANCE, supra note 29, at 345-48; Daniel Barstow
Magraw, The Tribunal in JurisprudentialPerspective, in THE IRAN-UNITED STATES
CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 1, 2-4,

38-46 (Richard B. Lillich & Vance B. McGraw eds., 1998). See generally KAPUSCINSKI,
supra note 32.
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Qom 3 s Riots followed in other cities throughout the spring and
summer of 1978,39 and with them came a virulent strain of antiAmerican rhetoric. 4°

By the end of 1978, the anti-American

virtually all Americans living in
sentiment was so widespread that
41
Iran had left and had left rapidly.
January, 1979 saw the departure of the Shah, while February 1 of

that year brought the return from exile of the Ayatollah Khomeini42
and with him the establishment of a new provisional government in
Iran.43 During the spring and summer of 1979, the new government
began instituting numerous "reforms" that would have severe
consequences for the American companies that had been doing
business in Iran. For instance, the new government nationalized the

38. See LIMBERT, supra note 29, at 111-12; Philip F. Napoli, A HistoricalOverview, in
REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at 5; see also KAPUSCINSKI, supra note 32, at 10615.
39. See DAVID ET AL., supra note 27, at 54-55; KAPUsCINSKI, supra note 32, at 114.
40. CARON, supra note 32, at 29. For a good discussion of the background underlying
Iranians' antipathy for the United States, see MACKEY, supra note 27, at 250-53. See also
Iran'sSeizure of the United States Embassy: HearingsBefore the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 97th Cong. 29 (1981) [hereinafter House ForeignAffairs Hearings] (statement of
Harold H. Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs, Carter Administration) (Iran's new leaders "charged that the United States had
imposed on Iran since 1953 a government that was oppressive and corrupt, that
consistently violated human rights, and that was insensitive to the traditional values of
Iran's Islamic society"); AMIR TAHERi, NEST OF SPIES: AMERICA'S JOURNEY TO

DISASTER IN IRAN 73-91 (1988).
41. CARON, supra note 32, at 29 (1990); See JIMMY CARTER, KEEPING FArrH 451
(1982); LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLrICAL ENDS, supra note 31, at 543
(reporting that "most American civilian employees and dependents of U.S. embassy
personnel had been recalled in the period October 1978-January 1979, and soon after
Khomeini returned, the U.S. Government recommended that all remaining Americans
leave the country").
42. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS,
97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., IRAN: THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE HOSTAGE SETTLEMENT

AGREEMENT 2-3 (Comm. Print 1981); GADDIS SMITH, MORALITY, REASON AND
POWER: AMERICAN DIPLOMACY IN THE CARTER YEARS 187-94 (1986). For a critical
view of the United States' handling of the Iranian Revolution, see ZBIGNIEW
BRZEZINSKI, POWER AND PRINCIPLE: MEMOIRS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER
1977-81, at 354-98 (1983).
43. Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No. All, Award No. 597-All-FT,
para. 7, 2000 WL 394260 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Apr. 7, 2000); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON
BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., IRAN: THE
FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE HOSTAGE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 2-3 (Comm. Print
1981); see Philip F. Napoli, A Historical Overview, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note
19, at 6.
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banking 4 and insurance industries45 and effected a de facto
nationalization of the oil and gas industries. 46 Further, in the spring
of 1979, the Islamic Revolutionary Courts began expropriating the
property of American and other foreign corporations and of alleged
supporters of the Shah.47 Several confiscatory laws were enacted
during this period, including the "Law Concerning the Appointment
of Provisional Managers," enacted in June 1979, 48 and the "The Law
on Protection and Development of Industries in Iran," enacted in
July of that year.49 In addition, various Iranian governmental
50
agencies cancelled their contracts with American companies.
44. See Khosrowshahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. 178, Award No. 558-178-2,
para. 61, 1994 WL 1095557 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. June 30, 1994) ("On 7 June 1979, the
Iranian Government passed the Banks Nationalization Law, which immediately
nationalized all banks in Iran and authorized the Government to 'take steps to appoint
directors of all banks.'").
45. See American Int'l Group v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. 2, Award No. 93-23, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 96, 98 (Dec. 19, 1983) ("On 25 June 1979, all insurance
companies operating in Iran ... were proclaimed nationalized by the Law of
Nationalization of Insurance Corporations.").
46. See Amoco Int'l Finance Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. 56, Award
No. 310-56-3, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189, 228-29 para. 131, 233-34 para. 146 (July 14,
1987); ALDRICH, supra note 33, at 171.
47. Roberts Owen, The Final Negotiation and Release in Algiers, in AMERICAN
HOSTAGES IN IRAN 297, 299 (Paul H. Kreisberg ed., 1985); See Kate Gillespie, U.S.

Corporationsand Iran at The Hague, 44 MIDDLE EAST J. 18, 20 (1990) ("The government
also admitted to confiscating shareholdings of Iranians closely tied to the Shah, which left
Americans who were in joint-venture enterprises with such persons unclear as to their own
standing."). See, e.g., Aram Sabet v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 593-815/816/8172, para. 95, 2000 WL 1809124 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. June 30, 1999) (describing Decree of the
Revolutionary Prosecutor, No. 203, Apr. 11, 1979).
48. The law authorized the Iranian government to appoint directors, managers, and
supervisors for companies whose owners had "deserted the [corporation] or [we]re not
accessible for any reason whatsoever." Law Concerning the Appointment of Provisional
Managers, No. 6738 (approved by the Islamic Revolutionary Council June 16, 1979 (26
Khordad 1358)). At the same time, however, the law stripped the former directors of their
competence and precluded shareholders from "appoint[ing] directors in their stead." Idt;
see also Shahin Shaine Ebrahimi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Case Nos. 44, 46, and 47,
Award No. 560-44/46/47-3, para. 62, 1994 WL 1095559 (Iran-U.S. Cl Trib. Oct. 12, 1994).
Thus, the law authorized the Iranian government effectively to seize control of companies
owned by foreigners who had been forced to leave Iran.
49. The "Law on Protection and Development of Industries in Iran" confiscated the
companies and assets of fifty-one persons who allegedly had attained enormous wealth
through their "illegal relationship with the past regime, illegitimate use of facilities, and
violation of public rights." The Law on Protection and Development of Iranian
Industries, approved by the Islamic Revolutionary Council. July 1, 1979, published in
Official Gazette No. 10031-9/5/1358. The law also confiscated companies that were
heavily indebted to the newly nationalized Iranian banks. Id. See also Carlson v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, Case No. 248, Award No. 509-248-1, 26 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 216, 222
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The final blow, however, came on November 4, 1979, when
militant Iranian students stormed the United States Embassy in
51
Tehran and held hostage the American nationals there present.
Nine months earlier, the Embassy had been seized and occupied, but
at that time Iran's Revolutionary Guards had immediately obtained
the release of the Embassy personnel 5 2 After the November 4th
seizure, the United States expected the Revolutionary Guards to
again come to the rescue, but it soon became apparent that no help
and the
would be forthcoming and that, to the contrary, the Ayatollah
53
detention.
hostages'
the
supported
Iranian government
para. 13 (May 1, 1991) (Holtzmann, J., dissenting) (noting the effect of the law on the
Irvani family); Peter D. Trooboff, Implementation of the IranianSettlement AgreementsStatus, Issues, and Lessons: View from the Private Sector's Perspective, in PRIVATE
INVESTORS ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN
1981 103,113 (Martha L. Landwehr ed., 1981).
50. Owen, supra note 47, at 297, 299. See also Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,
supra note 19, at 87 (prepared testimony of Richard D. Harza, President of Harza
Engineering Co.) (describing $10 million in unpaid invoices due to Harza Engineering
Company and "equipment and other property seized or detained in Iran"); id. at 224-25
(prepared statement of John F. Olson, lawyer for claimants against Iran) (describing the
breached contracts and expropriated properties giving rise to claims against Iran); Robert
Carswell, Economic Sanctions and the Iran Experience, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 247, 256 (1981)
(describing disputes between United States corporations and Iran regarding "incomplete
construction projects, expropriation or nationalization of oil, gas and mineral properties,
seizure of equipment and plants, and uncompleted contracts for both military and civilian
goods"); Gillespie, supra note 47, at 18 ("The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and its
aftermath were credited-through expropriations, nonpayment of goods delivered, and
breaches of contracts-with causing U.S. business losses totaling billions of dollars.").
51. See Saunders, The Crisis Begins, supra note 27, at 35. The United States had
permitted the former Shah to come to New York for medical treatment in October 1979,
see CARTER, supra note 41, at 456, and it was widely believed that his arrival in the United
States had precipitated the hostage taking, see Saunders, The CrisisBegins, supranote 27,
at 58-60. See also House Foreign Affairs Hearings, supra note 40, at 230 (statement of
Bruce Laingen, Charg6 D'Affaires, U.S. Embassy in Tehran) ("We did counsel in
messages, both in July and in the latter days of September, against admission of the Shah
at that time .... [I]t was my view, that until we had a regular government in place, a
constitution adopted, the provisional government no longer provisional... that it would
be unwise to admit the Shah."); BRZEZINSKI, supra note 42, at 471-75 (discussing Carter
Administration's decision to admit the Shah).
52. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 7 (prepared testimony of
Edmund Muskie); Saunders, The Crisis Begins, supra note 27, at 41; VANCE, supra note
29, at 342. See also House ForeignAffairs Hearings,supra note 40, at 10-11 (statement of
Harold H. Saunders) (explaining United States' decision to maintain skeletal embassy
force in Iran after the February 1979 takeover); SMrrH, supra note 42, at 194.
53. See Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S.
v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 33-34, reprintedin 19 I.L.M. 553, 569; CARON, supra note 32, at 33;
CARTER, supra note 41, at 457-58; Harold H. Saunders, Diplomacy and Pressure,
November 1979-May 1980, in AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN, supra note 27, at 72, 72
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Once President Carter recognized that the hostages would not be

quickly released, he began imposing economic sanctions on Iran. On
November 8, the United States halted shipments of military spare
parts ordered by Iran, and on November 12, President Carter blocked
all oil purchases from Iran for delivery in the United States.5 4 But the

most important action, and the one that eventually proved the key to
resolving the crisis.55 occurred on November 14 when President
Carter-responding to an Iranian threat to withdraw assets from
United States banks-signed an order blocking the transfer of all
Iranian funds in American banks, both in the United States and

abroad.5

6

President Carter's action blocked more than $12 billion,57 money
58
that Iran would later desperately need to finance its war with Iraq.

[hereinafter Saunders, Diplomacy and Pressure];Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra
note 19, at 9 (prepared testimony of Edmund Muskie) ("Ayatollah Khomeini ... endorsed
the taking of the Embassy by the militants.").
Very soon after the taking of the embassy, the Iranian Foreign Ministry issued a
statement saying: "Today's move by a group of our compatriots is a natural reaction to the
U.S. Government's indifference to the hurt feelings of the Iranian people about the
presence of the deposed Shah, who is in the United States under the pretext of illness."
Teheran Students Seize U.S. Embassy and Hold Hostages, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1979, at Al
(quoting the official Pars News Agency).
54. Office of Legal Counsel, Introduction and Summary to Opinions of the Office of
Legal Counsel Relating to the Iranian Hostage Crisis, 4A U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 71,
74 (1984); CARTER, supra note 41, at 457-58; see also Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,
supra note 19, at 12 (prepared testimony of Edmund Muskie); Saunders, Diplomacy and
Pressure,supra note 53, at 93 (describing steps taken to systematize pressure on Iran).
55. Carswell, supra note 50, at 259; Richard J. Davis, The Decision to Freeze Iranian
Assets, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at 10, 21 (comments of Lloyd Cutler,
Counsel to President Carter).
56. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 3 C.F.R. 457 (1980). The Treasury Department
implemented the asset freeze by promulgating the Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 31
C.F.R. § 535 (1981). See also CARTER, supra note 41, at 462-64; Robert Carswell &
Richard J. Davis, The Economic and Financial Pressures: Freeze and Sanctions, in
AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN, supra note 27, at 173, 173-79. For a discussion of the
dangers of an asset freeze, see Negotiation of the Algiers Accords, in REVOLUTIONARY
DAYS, supra note 19, at 84-85 (comments of Ernest T. Patrikis, officer of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York).
57. See LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS, supra note 31, at 548;
Carswell, supra note 50, at 247-48. President Carter's freeze constituted "the largest
blocking of assets in U.S. history, and by far the most successful." Carswell, supra note 50,
at 248.
58. See Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra note 19, at 20 (prepared testimony of
Edmund Muskie). By August 1980, one month before the outbreak of hostilities between
Iran and Iraq, Iran's President Bani-Sadr acknowledged that the United States assets
freeze, along with its other sanctions, had added 25% or more to Iran's high rate of
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The freeze also led to numerous financial complexities59 -interrupted
commercial transactions, banks seeking set-offs, and, as will be
discussed in more detail60 below, numerous problems associated with
standby letters of credit.
Although most American citizens and companies involved in
Iran had suffered the deleterious effects of the Revolution before
November 1979, it was not until President Carter froze Iran's assets
that many of these Americans began bringing to the courts their
breach-of-contract and expropriation claims and seeking attachment
of Iran's frozen assets. 61 Concerned that these lawsuits might
antagonize Iran, and thereby jeopardize the tenuous negotiations
then underway, the Carter Administration considered barring all
litigation against Iran; however, the Administration decided instead
to issue a regulation authorizing preliminary litigation-including the
filing of prejudgment attachments-but prohibiting the entry of final
judgments. 62 By the time the hostage crisis was finally resolved, more
inflation and had contributed to a 30% drop in Iran's industrial output. Id. at 19; see also
Carswell, supra note 50,at 247.
59. See John E. Hoffman, Jr., The Iranian Asset Negotiations, 17 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 47, 49 (1984) (President Carter's asset freeze "led to an immediate
disruption of the immense financial and commercial relationships between Iran and the
rest of the world"); Negotiation of the Algiers Accords, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra
note 19, at 83 (comments of James H. Oltman, officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York).
60. See Carswell & Davis, supra note 56, at 182-89.
61. See Richard J. Davis, The Decision to Freeze IranianAssets, in REVOLUTIONARY
DAYS, supra note 19, at 29-30 (comments by Thomas Shack, Jr., a lawyer who represented
Iran in U.S. litigation during the hostage crisis); Lawrence W. Newman, A Personal
History of Claims Arising out of the IranianRevolution, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 631,
633 (1995) ("In the wake of the executive order [freezing Iranian assets], there ensued a
flood of lawsuits against Iran in the New York courts."); The U.S.liranian Hostage
Settlement, Remarks by Andreas F. Lowenfeld, 75 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 236, 239
(1981) (describing "an almost 'obscene' rush to the courthouse between November 14 and
Thanksgiving Day, 1979"). See also Carswell & Davis, supra note 56, at 205-06 (listing
blocked assets relating to claims).
62. 31 C.F.R. § 535.203(e) (1980) (declaring "null and void" "any attachment,
judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment, or other judicial process" that had not
been licensed by the Secretary); 31 C.F.R. § 535.504(a), (b) (1980) (codifying 44 Fed. Reg.
67,617 (1979)) (authorizing certain judicial proceedings with respect to property in which
Iran has an interest, but prohibiting "[tihe entry of any judgment" or "the payment or
delivery out of a blocked account based upon a judicial proceeding"). See also Iranian
Asset Settlement: Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 [hereinafter Senate Banking Comm. Hearing] (statement
of Robert Carswell, Deputy Treasury Secretary, Carter Administration); Carswell &
Davis, supra note 56, at 185-86 (describing policy behind regulations); Davis, supra note
61, at 16-17; Trooboff, supra note 49, at 147 (arguing that the decision to permit claimants
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than 400 suits against Iran were pending in American courts, 6 3 with
approximately $4 billion of Iranian assets the subject of pre-judgment
attachments. 64 It is from these early actions that the resolution of the
crisis eventually ensued.
B. The Negotiations and the Algiers Declarations
Matters changed little over the next twelve months, despite the

Carter Administration's ardent attempts to negotiate a settlement.
President Carter imposed more economic sanctions against Iran in
April of 198065 when negotiations appeared to be at a standstill, but
to proceed with litigation and obtain attachments enhanced the United States' bargaining
power).
Despite this authorization, in the summer of 1980 the United States filed Suggestions
of Interest in hundreds of pending cases, asking the courts to stay all further proceedings
involving Iranian entities. See, e.g., Introduction and Summary to Opinions of the Office
of Legal Counsel Relating to the Iranian Hostage Crisis, 4A U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel
71, 93 (1984). These requests were accompanied by affidavits from State and Treasury
Department officials, which warned that court judgments could send Iran unintended
signals and jeopardize ongoing negotiations for the release of the hostages. While a
number of those requests were granted, a significant number were also denied. Compare
In re Related Iranian Cases, No. C-79-3542-RFP (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 1980) (granting stays
in 20 cases after viewing classified affidavits of Secretary of State Edmund Muskie and
Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher), with New England Merch. Nat'l Bank v.
Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co., 502 F. Supp. 120, 133-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(confirming plaintiffs' attachments and denying United States requests for stays in 96
consolidated cases).
63. See Introduction and Summary to Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel
Relating to the Iranian Hostage Crisis, 4A U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 71, 92 (1984);
STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG.,
1ST SESS., IRAN: THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE HOSTAGE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

57 (Comm. Print 1981); Statement of Interest of the United States, reprinted in
Symposium, The Settlement with Iran, 13 U. MIAMI J. INT'L L. A109, All1 n.3 (1981).
64. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 88 (prepared testimony of
Richard D. Harza); see also IranianAsset Controls: Hearing Before the House Subcomms.
on Europe and the Middle East and on International Economic Policy and Trade, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1980) (testimony of Richard J. Davis, Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for Enforcement and Operations, Carter Administration) (supplying
information that by May 30, 1980, attachments totalled approximately $2.6 billion).
65. On April 7, 1980, President Carter banned all exports to Iran by any person
subject to United States jurisdiction and banned new service contracts and certain
financial transactions. Exec. Order No. 12,205, 45 Fed. Reg. 24099 (Apr. 9, 1980),
reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. V 1981). He also announced that the United States
was breaking diplomatic ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran. See Saunders, Diplomacy
and Pressure,supra note 53, at 140-41. Among other things, President Carter informed
Iran that its embassy and consulates in the United States were to be closed immediately;
he declared all Iranian diplomatic and consular officials to be persona non grata; and he
required those officials to leave the country by midnight the following day. Id. On April
17, President Carter issued Executive Order 12,211, 45 Fed. Reg. 26,685 (1980), reprinted
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these were not expected to, nor did they, have considerable effect.
Despair over the fruitlessness of those negotiations also led the

United States in April 1980 to launch a military rescue attempt in
which eight Americans died.66 The break in the crisis did not occur

until a new government in Iran was established in the late summer of
1980. On September 12, 1980, the Ayatollah Khomeini publicly
announced four conditions for releasing the hostages. 67 Negotiating
channels were established at that time, but negotiations did not begin
in earnest until November 1980, when Ronald Reagan defeated
Jimmy Carter in the presidential election.

During the campaign, Reagan had repeatedly ridiculed Carter
for his inability to bring the hostages home. Reagan accused Carter
of coddling Iran and made clear that he-Reagan-would be less
reluctant to use military force.68 These comments were not lost on
in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (Supp. V 1981), which amended the export ban issued 10 days
earlier to ban Iranian imports. For more details as to these and other sanctions, see Senate
Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 16-17 (prepared testimony of Edmund
Muskie); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 97TH
CONG., 1sT SESS., IRAN: THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE HOSTAGE SETTLEMENT

AGREEMENT 16 (Comm. Print 1981). See also CARTER, supra note 41, at 505-06
(describing events surrounding the sanctions); Carswell & Davis, supra note 56, at 195-99
(describing the policy issues behind the sanctions).
66. See generally PAUL B. RYAN, THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSION: WHY IT FAILED
(1985); Gary Sick, Military Options and Constraints, in AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN
supra note 27, at 144, 151-164 (describing military options available in policymaking
process). See also BRZEZINSKI, supra note 42, at 487-500 (describing the rescue mission);
CARTER, supra note 41, at 506-19 (relating Carter's views on negotiations and the

military).
67. House Foreign Affairs Hearings, supra note 40, at 70 (testimony of Harold H.
Saunders); Senate ForeignRelations Hearings,supra note 19, at 20 (prepared testimony of
Edmund Muskie).
68. As a candidate, Reagan "repeatedly criticized the Carter administration's handling
of the Iranian hostage taking, using the incident as a symbol of all that had gone wrong
with American foreign relations. Reagan appealed to battered American pride as he
insisted upon a more forceful, unyielding response to terrorism such as Iran's." DAVID E.
KYVIG, REAGAN AND THE WORLD 5 (1990); see also id. at 70 ("Reagan had devoted a
good portion of his 1980 election campaign to attacking Carter's failure to secure the
release of the American hostages ... ."); Senate ForeignRelations Hearings,supra note 19,
at 182 (testimony of Walter Stoessel, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,
Reagan Administration) ("During the campaign, [Reagan] expressed the view that our
policy should have been that we would not negotiate until our citizens are released.");
GARLAND A. HAAS, JIMMY CARTER AND THE POLITICS OF FRUSTRATION 155 (1992)
(Reagan "pointed to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian hostage
situation to criticize the foreign policy of the Carter administration and to urge greater
expenditures for defense"); Douglas E. Kneeland, Reagan and Carter Attack Each Other
over the Hostages, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1980, at Al (Reagan charged that the long
imprisonment of hostages was "'a humiliation and a disgrace"' to the United States).
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Iran. As early as June 5, 1980, one of Iran's lawyers predicted that
most, if not all, of the hostages would be released before the United

States elections because "Iran did not want to see a change of
administration in the U.S. government. ' 69 While that prediction was
not to be realized, Iranian leaders spoke in more positive terms of the
hostages' release with increasing frequency as the United States
elections drew near.70 Indeed, they engaged in what has been

described as an "almost frantic rush" to have Iran's parliament-the
Majlis-complete formal action to restart the negotiations before
71
Election Day.
Reagan's hard-line rhetoric continued after the election. For

instance, upon learning certain details of the negotiations in late
December 1980, he labeled Iran's leaders as "barbarians" and
'72
characterized Iran's negotiating position as a demand for "ransom.
Statements such as these caused Iran justifiable concern73 and,
consequently, enabled the Carter Administration to impose a credible

deadline on negotiations and to wring concessions from Iran.74 The
69. John E. Hoffman, Jr., The Bankers' Channel, in AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN,
supra note 27, at 250. See also Negotiation of the Algiers Accords, in REVOLUTIONARY
DAYS, supra note 19, at 75 (comments of John Hoffman) (because "[tjhe Reagan
campaign was making noises that [the Iranians] didn't like," the Iranians were anxious to
bring the crisis to resolution).
70. See Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra note 19, at 21 (prepared testimony of
Edmund Muskie).
71. Sick, supra note 66, at 170.
72. Steven R. Weisman, Reagan Calls Iran's New Demands a 'Ransom' Sought by
'Barbarians"N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1980, at Al; Carswell & Davis, supra note 56, at 215;
See also Carswell, supra note 50, at 248. In a statement a few days earlier, Reagan
described the Iranians as "nothing better than criminals and kidnappers." Steven R.
Weisman, Reagan is Angered at Teheran's Stand in Hostage Release, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25,
1980, at Al. In a like vein, Edwin Meese III, the head of Reagan's transition team,
warned Iran "that Mr. Reagan might take a tougher line in his dealings on the captives"
and that "a delay in releasing the hostages would lead to the new President's 'taking
appropriate action when the time comes."' Reagan Aide Warns Iranians, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 29, 1980, at All.
73. Iran also worried about statements that President-elect Reagan may not have
made. For example, a Tehran radio commentator reported on January 2, 1981 that
"President-elect Reagan stated that he would give Iran 72 hours after his inauguration to
free the hostages or Reagan would launch a military attack against Iran," though the
report also stated that "Reagan later retracted the remark." FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
NATIONAL DEFENSE DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., THE IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS: A CHRONOLOGY OF
DAILY DEVELOPMENTS, JANUARY 1-25, 1981 1 (Comm. Print 1981).

74. According to the Carter Administration's Deputy Secretary of State and lead
negotiator, Warren Christopher, the Iranians "plainly wanted to resolve the crisis prior to
the change in administrations."
Warren Christopher, Introduction to AMERICAN
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Carter Administration's Deputy Treasury Secretary Robert Carswell
described one of the final American responses to Iranian demands by
noting that "perhaps more important than any of the details, the
response made it clear that unless there was an acceptance by January
16, 1981, the whole proposal was withdrawn, and Iran could deal with
President-elect Reagan." 75

Thus, it was no coincidence that the

governments reached agreement and adhered to the Algiers
Declarations on President Carter's last full day in office.
Turning back to the negotiations, on November 2, 1980, the
Iranian Majlis confirmed and elaborated on the Ayatollah
Khomeini's four conditions for releasing the hostages.76 Further,
because Iran refused to negotiate with the United States directly, the

Majlis designated the government of Algeria as the official
intermediary through which all further negotiations would be
conducted.77

There followed a series of responses and counter-

responses, all channelled through the Algerian intermediaries.
Because Iran would not sign an "agreement" with "the Great Satan,"
the United States negotiators drafted two "declarations," to be issued
HOSTAGES IN IRAN, supra note 27, at 1, 4. "President-elect Ronald Reagan had used
some blunt language in referring to the crisis, which we did not hesitate to highlight as an
added incentive for the Iranians to come to terms." I- at 6. Such tactics have been
described as "playing... the so-called Reagan Card." STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON
BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., IRAN: THE

FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE HOSTAGE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT vi (Comm. Print
1981). See also House ForeignAffairs Hearings,supra note 40, at 79 (statement of Harold
H. Saunders) (noting that "[t]he Iranians made very plain their desire to end the crisis
before the expiration of President Carter's term of office by proposing on January 12 to
the Parliament on an urgent basis a bill" authorizing certain actions necessary to conclude
agreement with the United States. The consideration of a second bill that was not
essential to conclude the agreement was deferred); JOHN ORMAN, COMPARING
PRESIDENTIAL BEHAVIOR: CARTER, REAGAN AND THE MACHO PRESIDENTIAL STYLE
104-05 (1987) ("With the election of Ronald Reagan in November 1980, the negotiations
began to get back on track presumably because the Iranian militants worried about what
kind of rescue attempts the macho Reagan would attempt."); Symposium, The Settlement
with Iran, 13 U. MIAMI J. INT'L L. 1, 14 (1981) (statement of Robert Mundheim, the
Carter Administration's Treasury Department General Counsel, that January 20, 1981
provided Iran with a "real deadline" because no one "would have been sufficiently bold to
say that the Reagan Administration would pick up the negotiations and carry them
through. Nor is it clear that without the deadline the Iranians would have been moved to
negotiate and to conclude a settlement in a short period of time.").
75. Carswell & Davis, supra note 56, at 215. See also, CARTER, supra note 41, at 581
("[W]e decided to let the Iranians know that this was our last proposal, and that if they
rejected it, they would have to start all over again with the new administration sometime
next year.").
76. Owen, supra note 47, at 307.
77. Id.
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by the government of Algeria and to be "adhered to" by both Iran
and the United States. 78 The United States negotiators conveyed

drafts of these Declarations to the Algerian intermediaries, who then
conveyed them to the Iranian negotiators. The Iranian negotiators
would respond with various comments and demands, and the United
States negotiators would revise the Declarations in light of those

demands.
The

79

result-the

Algiers

Declarations - consists

of

the

Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular
Republic of Algeria ("General Declaration") 80 and the Declaration of
the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the

United States of America and the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran ("Claims Settlement Declaration"). 81 The brevity
and simplicity of these documents is striking and did not result from
careless drafting. Rather, the United States negotiators began by
drafting more lengthy, technical documents but quickly learned that

they needed to resolve the very complex issues that had arisen
between the two countries in terms sufficiently simple to allow the

documents to survive translation into French (for the Algerians) and
Persian and to be clearly understood by lay people and others who

are

not well-versed in

the Anglo-American

legal

system. 82

78. Id. at 311.
79. Id. at 314-15.
80. General Declaration, supra note 17.
81. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 17.
82. Owen, supra note 47, at 312. As Roberts Owen, one of the lead negotiators,
described it:
[I]t became apparent to us over time that some of the decision-makers in Tehran
were fairly primitive in their understanding of these issues.... Here we were
trying to deal with a host of extremely complicated problems, including the lifting
of the President's freeze on a wide variety of assets in the U.S. and abroad, the
lifting of judicial attachments, the suspension of litigation in the U.S. courts, the
whole question of managing litigation relating to the assets of the Shah, the
entire problem of setting up a claims program for U.S. nationals, and so on and
so on. I think it would have been simply hopeless to try to deal with them
through the kind of elaborate sort of fine print documentation which is usually
generated by sophisticated U.S. transaction lawyers.
Instead, we decided that we had to write the world's simplest papers, and... we
were able to put together a basic set of agreements and get them into eleven or
twelve very short typewritten pages.... [O]ne of the largest financial
transactions in history was accomplished through some remarkably simple
documentation.
Negotiation of the Algiers Accords, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at 61; see
also id. at 99 (comments of Mark B. Feldman); Symposium, The Settlement with Iran, 13
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Consequently, they drafted what one negotiator described as "the
world's simplest papers." 83 The initial draft of the Claims Settlement

Declaration, for instance, was twenty-five pages long, yet the United
States negotiators eventually pared it down to about three-and-a-half

pages. 84 This brevity, while necessary under the circumstances, would
have important implications for the parties' and the Tribunal's

subsequent interpretation of the Declarations.
As to their substance, the Algiers Declarations responded to the
Majlis' four conditions. 85 In summary form, the Majlis demanded that
the United States: (1) pledge not to interfere in Iran's internal affairs;
(2) unfreeze Iranian assets and put all those assets at Iran's disposal;
(3) cancel all legal claims against Iran, assume financial responsibility
for those claims, and lift all economic sanctions against Iran; and86(4)
return to Iran the assets of the former Shah and his close relatives.
The United States had no difficulty agreeing to the first

condition,87 and Point I of the General Declaration bears the United
States' pledge "not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or
militarily, in Iran's internal affairs." 88 By contrast, the remaining
three conditions touched upon a multiplicity of interests and
U. MIAMI J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1981) (statement of Roberts Owen) (the Iranians "had a lot of
trouble, from both a technical and bureaucratic point of view, coping with the flood of
paper we sent over there. They just wanted to have some very basic principles."). See also
Negotiationof the Algiers Accords, supra at 79 (comments of John E. Hoffman); Hoffman,
supra note 59, at 271 (as the bankers drafted the payment order, "the notion grew that this
increasingly complicated legal document would be difficult, if not impossible, for the
Iranians to understand and accept in the few hours remaining.").
83. Negotiation of the Algiers Accords, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at
61 (comments of Roberts Owen).
84. Owen, supra note 47, at 312.
85. See Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No. B1, Award No. 382-B1-FT,
19 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 273,288 (Aug. 31 1988).
86. House ForeignAffairs Hearings,supra note 40, at 72.
87. Owen, supra note 47, at 302.
88. General Declaration, supra note 17, para. 1, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
at 4. Interestingly, however, in 1996 Iran filed suit in the Tribunal claiming that the
United States breached its obligation not to interfere in Iran's internal affairs by enacting
the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541, codified at 50
U.S.C. § 1701, which requires the President to impose sanctions on persons who make
investments of $40 million or more in any 12-month period that directly or significantly
contributed to the enhancement of Iran's ability to develop petroleum resources in Iran
and by, according to Iran, adopting "a covert operations act authorizing the spending of up
to $20 million for secret operations against... Iran" in the Fiscal Year 1996 Defense
Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 104-106, 110 Stat. 186. Statement of Claim, Islamic
Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No. A30, Doc. 1 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Aug. 12,
1996) (on file with author).
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therefore required careful negotiation. 89 In the end, Iran was willing
to accept far less than that which it had originally demanded on each
of these points, as will be discussed in detail below.
At the last minute, however, after the drafting of the Algiers
Declarations was complete, Iran insisted on the inclusion of certain
"General Principles" that would address in broad language Iran's
demands for a return of its assets and for the cancellation of legal
claims against it. The United States negotiators assumed that by
seeking these General Principles, Iran wished to create the public
impression within Iran that it had achieved its originally stated goals,
even though it had actually achieved far less under the Declarations'
specific provisions. 90 The United States negotiators were concerned,
however, that such General Principles could be interpreted so as to
negate all of the concessions that Iran had made in the specific
provisions. 91 Consequently, according to Roberts Owen, the Carter
Administration's Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State and a
principal drafter of the Algiers Declarations, the United States
negotiators quickly drafted General Principles A and B but stated
them in such a way as to make clear that they were to be applied only
"within the framework and pursuant to the provisions of the two"
declarations. 92 The Administration "thus provided the Iranians with
some of the rhetoric they apparently thought they needed while at the
same time making clear that no substantive change in the
contemplated transaction was intended." 93
General Principle A addresses the return of Iran's assets and
provides that "[w]ithin the framework of and pursuant to the
provisions of" the General Declaration and the Claims Settlement
Declaration, "the United States will restore the financial position of
Iran, in so far as possible, to that which existed prior to November 14,
1979." The General Declaration includes a detailed set of provisions
directing the return of Iran's assets. The assets themselves fell into
four groups: $2.5 billion in gold bullion and securities held in the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York; $5.5 billion in interest-bearing
deposit accounts in overseas branches of United States banks; $2.2
89. See generally Owen, supra note 47, at 297-324 (describing 4-month negotiation
process).
90. Id. at 318.
91. Id.
92. General Declaration, supra note 17, General Principal B, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S.
CI. Trib. Rep. at 3.
93. Owen, supra note 47, at 318.
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billion in deposits and securities held in various United States
branches of United States banks; and approximately $1 to $1.5 billion
of other Iranian assets in the United States. 94 The United States
agreed in the General Declaration to transfer immediately into an
escrow account the Iranian assets that had been held in the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York and the overseas branches of United
States banks.95 These assets totalled just under $8 billion. Of that
almost $8 billion, Iran received only $2.88 billion, while $3.667 billion
of the remainder was transferred to the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York to pay the principle and interest on all of Iran's loans held
by a syndicate of banking institutions of which a United States bank
was a member, and $1.418 billion of the remainder was retained in the
escrow account pending resolution of disputes about the settlement of
these and other loans.96 Thus, the General Declaration provided
payment in full to the United States banks that had made loans to
Iran.
The General Declaration further obliges the United States to
transfer the Iranian assets located in United States banks within six
months of the signing of the Declarations. 97 But not all of the assets
were to be transferred to Iran. As discussed below, the Claims
Settlement Declaration established the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal to arbitrate, among other things, the claims of United States
nationals against Iran, and the General Declaration requires that $1
billion of the $2.2 billion located in the United States branches of
United States banks be deposited into an interest-bearing Security

94. Senate Banking Comm. Hearing, supra note 62, at 12 (prepared statement of
Harold Saunders); see also id. at 20-27 (prepared statement of Robert Carswell)
(describing in more detail the four categories of assets and the complications involved in
providing for their return to Iran).
95. General Declaration, supra note 17, paras. 4-5, reprintedin 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. at 5; see Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 535.221-222 (1981).
96. Undertakings, supra note 17, para. 1, reprintedin 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 13;
Senate Banking Comm. Hearing, supra note 62, at 13 (prepared statement of Harold
Saunders).
97. General Declaration, supra note 17, para. 6, reprintedin 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
at 5; see 31 C.F.R. § 535.213 (1981). These categories of assets could not be transferred
immediately because they had been subject to judicial attachment. In executive orders
which he issued simultaneously with his signing of the Algiers Declarations, President
Carter voided the attachments, Exec. Order No. 12,279, 46 Fed. Reg. 7919 (Jan. 19, 1981);
Exec. Order No. 12,280, 46 Fed. Reg. 7921 (Jan. 19, 1981), but he recognized that
continued judicial proceedings might delay transfer of the assets. President's Summary
Statement to the Congress (Jan. 19, 1981), reprinted in Symposium, The Settlement with
Iran, 13 U. MIAMI J. INT'L L. A-56, A-58 (1981).
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Account which would be used to fund the awards rendered against

Iran by the Tribunal. 98
Turning next to the legal claims against Iran, as noted above,
Iran originally demanded that the United States cancel all claims
pending against it in United States courts. The United States had
refused, 99 and instead agreed to terminate the claims only if the two
countries would establish an international arbitral tribunal to hear
them. Consequently, the Claims Settlement Declaration establishes

the Tribunal1°° and includes specific provisions as to the Tribunal's
jurisdiction.101 The Claims Settlement Declaration further provides
that a third of the Tribunal's arbitrators would be appointed by Iran,
another third would be appointed by the United States, and these
10 2
party-appointed arbitrators would appoint the final third.

General Principle B of the General Declaration addresses the
claims pending in United States courts. It states that it is the purpose
of both countries, within the framework of and pursuant to the
98. General Declaration, supra note 17, para. 7, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
at 5-6. Specifically, paragraph 7 provides that as assets are transferred from the United
States branches of United States banks, one half of the funds would be deposited into the
Security Account while the other half would be transferred to Iran. When the Security
Account reached $1 billion, the balance of the bank deposits would then be transferred to
Iran.
99. The United States explained that its courts were not likely to lift their judicial
attachments unless some alternative remedy had been provided for the claimants. Owen,
supra note 47, at 303; see Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case Nos. A15(IV) &
A24, Award No. 590-A15(IV)/A24-FT, para. 24, 1998 WL 930565 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Dec.
28, 1998). Even if the executive branch had possessed the power to effect a wholesale
cancellation of claims, it would never have considered doing so "because cancellation of
valuable commercial claims by the U.S. government would surely have been regarded as a
payment of ransom, conferring a multimillion-dollar financial benefit on Iran at the
expense of U.S. nationals." Owen, supra note 47, at 303; Negotiation of the Algiers
Accords, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at 59 (comments of Roberts Owen).
In addition, such a cancellation of claims might well have given rise to United States
liability pursuant to the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See generally
Symposium, The Settlement with Iran,13 U. MIAMI J. INT'L L. 1, 94-137 (1981); Note, The
U.S.-Iran Accords and the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 68 VA. L. REV. 1537
(1982).
100. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 17, at art. II, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. at 9-10. Specifically, the Claims Settlement Declaration obligates the two
countries first to promote the settlement of claims and then provides for arbitration in the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal for those claims not settled within six months of the
signing of the Declarations. Id. at arts. I and II, reprintedin 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 910.
101. Id. at art. II, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 9-10.
102. Id. at art. III, para. 1, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 10. For an
insightful, first-hand description of the appointment process, see ALDRICH, supra note 33,
at 6-9.

January 2001]

CARTER, REAGAN, AND KHOMEINI

provisions of the General Declaration and the Claims Settlement
Declaration "to terminate all litigation as between the government of
each party and the nationals of the other, and to bring about the
settlement of all such claims through binding arbitration." In light of
that purpose and through the procedures provided in the Claims
Settlement Declaration, the United States agreed in General
Principle B to terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts
involving claims of United States persons and institutions against
Iran, "to nullify all attachments and judgments obtained therein, to
prohibit all further litigation based on such claims, and to bring about
the termination of such claims through binding arbitration."' 03
Finally, the General Declaration includes four paragraphs
responding to Iran's demand for the return of the assets of the former
Shah and his relatives. Iran wanted the United States simply to
confiscate the Shah's assets and return them to Iran. The United
States could not agree to this demand because, among other reasons,
the United States Constitution prohibits the government from
1°4
confiscating property without providing due process of law.
However, recognizing the great political importance of the issue to
Iran, the United States encouraged Iran to bring lawsuits in United
States courts seeking the return of the relevant assets, and in the
General Declaration, the United States promised, among other
things, to assist Iran in that litigation by freezing the assets of persons
served as defendants in such litigation and by requiring all persons
within United States jurisdiction to report all information known to
them about the defendants' assets, with such reports to be transferred
to Iran.105
In short, Iran asked the United States to return all of Iran's
assets, to cancel all legal claims against Iran in United States courts,
and to return the assets of the Shah and his family. Through hard and
careful bargaining, however, the Carter Administration obligated the
United States to do considerably less: (1) to transfer to Iran less than
half of its assets, with the remainder to be used to pay Iran's loans
and its liabilities to United States claimants; (2) to terminate claims
against Iran in United States courts but only insofar as they would be
103. General Declaration, supra note 17, at General Principle B, reprinted in 1 IranU.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 3.
104. See Owen, supra note 47, at 304.
105. General Declaration, supra note 17, paras. 12-13, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. C1. Trib.
Rep. at 7. See also id. paras. 14-15 for the additional obligations the United States
undertook in regards to the assets of the Shah and his close relatives.
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heard by an international arbitral Tribunal also established by the

Algiers Declarations; and (3) to take certain, limited steps to help
Iran recover, through litigation in United States courts, those assets of

the former Shah and his close relatives located in the United States.
For these reasons, among others, many commentators have
labeled the Algiers Declarations a stunning negotiating success for
the United States. 10 6 However, regardless of how favorable the
Algiers Declarations as a whole might have been to the United States,

they nonetheless placed on the United States numerous obligations
that had to be fulfilled in the coming months by a new administration.

106. Many of these commentators, not surprisingly, are former Carter Administration
officials, some of whom themselves participated in the negotiations. For example, Harold
H. Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs for
the Carter Administration noted that
U.S. national interests were preserved, no ransom was paid, and most if not all
U.S. economic interests were protected. In fact, at the time of the seizure, no
Iranian assets in the United States were frozen and many U.S. citizens were
facing potential economic losses with little prospect of being compensated. In
contrast, today all U.S. personnel have been returned safely, some Iranian assets
are still frozen, some U.S. economic interests have been fully paid, and the
remaining claimants have the prospect of receiving recompense in the next year
or so.
House ForeignAffairs Hearings,supra note 40, at 2; see also Carswell & Davis, supra note
56, at 231 ("Our personal judgment then was and remains that the financial settlement
overall, and in historical perspective, was favorable to U.S. claimants against Iran.");
Christopher, supra note 74, at 13-14 (stating that Iran was made to suffer significant costs
and indignities, yet "the professed aims of the embassy occupiers went unrealized. No one
was tried. The United States made no apology and confessed to no crimes. Neither the
Shah nor his assets were returned to Iran."); Lloyd Cutler, Address at the University of
Miami School of Law, in 13 U. Miami J. Int'l L. xv, xix (1981) (opining that the Algiers
Declarations will "be of net benefit to the American claimants"); Owen, supra note 47, at
323-24 (arguing that the U.S. "achieved all of our negotiating objectives, over and above
the basic threshold of achieving the hostages release" and "gave away nothing of value
that was ours"). Even Iran's Lawyer agreed. See Richard J. Davis, The Decision to Freeze
Iranian Assets, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at 32 (comments of Thomas
Shack, lawyer representing Iran in U.S. litigation during the hostage crisis) ("The Algiers
Accords were in our view as lawyers and also as participants, an extraordinarily successful
agreement.").
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H. Lame-Duck Lawmaking and Foreign Affairs: President
Reagan's Response
A. Lame-Duck Lawmaking

Unlike many countries, where a change of executive
administration is accomplished in a very short period of time,107 in the
United States, more than two months elapse between the election of a
new president and his actual taking of office. 08 So, for a relatively
lengthy period of time, the lame-duck president continues to exercise
the powers of the presidency but in anticipation of a new, possibly
very different, administration. The manner in which the lame duck is
to conduct business during the transition is open to question. Some
lame ducks, such as President Carter, announce their intention to
carry out all the functions of the presidency until the very day the
President-elect takes office. 10 9 While that might be their right, many
107. See MOSHER ET AL., supra note 15, at 38 (describing short transitions in the
United Kingdom and France). See also William Bundy, The Postwar History of
Transitions and Foreign Policy, in PAPERS ON PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS AND
FOREIGN POLICY, VOL. I: HISTORY AND CURRENT ISSUES 1, 3-4 (Kenneth W.
Thompson ed., 1986) (noting that transitions in Britain are less dramatic than in the
United States because Britain has an "extremely strong career service" such that "only a
handful of people come in to new jobs in the administration" and as a result of "the
practice of shadow cabinets" by which the opposition party designates in advance the
holders of Cabinet positions who then serve as spokespeople for the party in House of
Commons debates).
108. The lame-duck period used to be even longer. Until the ratification of the
Twentieth Amendment in 1933, which set the Presidential inauguration date on January
20, U.S. Const. amend. XX, § 1, presidential inaugurations were held on March 4,
approximately four months after the elections. See U.S. Const. amend. XII; John
Copeland Nagle, A Twentieth Amendment Parable,72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 470, 471 (1997)
[hereinafter Nagle, Twentieth Amendment].
109. Two weeks after President Carter lost the 1980 election he stated: "He [Presidentelect Reagan] and I understand very well that I will be the President in the fullest sense of
the word until Inauguration Day, and then instantly at the time he takes the oath of office,
he will have the full responsibilities." MOSHER ET AL., supra note 15, at 107. Outgoing
President Clinton also made clear that he would "remain a vigorous president" until the
day he left office. Tom Raum, Bush Team to Undo Late Changes (A.P. Jan. 5,2001). See
also GEORGE W. NORRIS, FIGHTING LIBERAL 334 (1945) ("Under our Constitution, a
member's right, if not his duty, to participate fully in all legislation up to the close of his
constitutional term, cannot be questioned or denied."). Other lame-duck presidents, such
as President Taft, attempt to leave consideration of all but the most urgent matters to their
successors. See HENRY, supra note 13, at 41-42. Similarly, President Wilson, expecting to
lose the 1916 election, commented on the role that he and his successor would play in
foreign affairs:
Four months would lapse before [the President-elect] could take charge of the
affairs of the government, and during those four months I would be without such
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voters and scholars nonetheless view the actions of a lame duck as
being not entirely legitimate democratically.
By electing his
opponent, the voters can be understood to have repudiated the
outgoing President and his agenda.110
Thus, the outgoing
administration can no longer be said to represent the will of the
people."u
For this reason, a democratic tension arises whenever a lameduck office-holder uses his remaining days in office to advance policy
objectives that he believes his successor does not support.

That

tension, however, is manageable when the lame-duck's actions
concern domestic affairs because the successor has a variety of means
at his disposal to limit or wholly eliminate the eleventh-hour domestic

deeds of his predecessor. Whether and how he uses those means will
depend on a number of factors. For instance, although President

Reagan reportedly opposed the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 12 the toxic
waste legislation that lame-duck President Carter rushed through a
lame-duck session of Congress,11 3 he did not seek its repeal
moral backing from the nation as would be necessary to steady and control our
relations with other governments. I would be known to be the rejected, not the
accredited, spokesman of the country; and yet the accredited spokesman would
be without legal authority to speak for the nation. The direction of the foreign
policy of the government would in effect have been taken out of my hands and
yet its new definition would be impossible until [the inauguration].
Id. at 136-37.
110. Sanford Levinson, PresidentialElections and ConstitutionalStupidities, 12 CONST.
COMMENT. 183, 183-85 (1995).
111. See id. at 184-85. See also the debate concerning the Twentieth Amendment,
which shortened the lame-duck period. 75 Cong. Rec. 3842 (1932) (statement of Rep.
Black) ("The very presence [of lame ducks], after repudiation, is a denial of
representation."); 74 Cong. Rec. 5886 (1931) (statement of Rep. Lozier) (contending that
"it is un-American, undemocratic, unrepublican to allow [a lame duck] to remain in office
two or three months following his defeat and after the repudiation of his policies by his
constituents"); id. at 5881 (statement of Rep. Celler) (opining that members "who have
been defeated at the polls are not really qualified to have a voice in our legislature after
that defeat"); 75 Cong. Rec. 3824 (1932) (statement of Rep. Greenwood) (criticizing lame
ducks as contrary to principles of representative government).
112. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
113. See Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
1, 1-2 (1982); John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA'S Mistakes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1405,
1405-08, 1412 (1997). The hurry with which CERCLA was passed is evident in the law's
many ambiguous provisions, see Nagle, supra at 1427-45, and drafting mistakes. Id.at
1412-26; 126 CONG. REC. 31,969 (1980) (statement of Rep. Broyhill) (asserting that
CERCLA "was hurriedly drafted without the use of legislative counsel and as the result
contains a large but unknown number of drafting errors. In just one night of review,
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presumably because the law had broad popular support.114 But he did
implement the law only in a rather lackadaisical fashion. 115 By
contrast, incoming governors George Voinovich and Lamar
Alexander, of Ohio and Tennessee, respectively, filed lawsuits to
invalidate their predecessors' lame-duck commutations of death
sentences, commutations that the states' voters vehemently
opposed."1 6 More extreme still was the hysteria that greeted lameduck President Grover Cleveland when he set aside twenty-one
million acres of timber land as forest reserves to preserve it from
Goaded by incensed constituents,1' 8 the House of
logging." 7
Representatives tried for two days to impeach Cleveland, and when
that effort failed, the Senate attached to the Sundry Civil Bill a rider
annulling Cleveland's reservations. 119 Cleveland issued a pocket veto
and left office. 20 Incoming President McKinley then convened a
legislative counsel has identified more than 45 technical errors alone."); see also United
States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D. N.H. 1985) ("CERCLA has acquired a welldeserved notoriety for vaguely-drafted provisions and an indefinite, if not contradictory,
legislative history.").
114. James R. Buckley, Note, The PoliticalEconomy of Superfund Implementation, 59
S. CAL. L. REV.875,880-81 (1986).
115. Id.at 878-84 (describing the Reagan Administration's tepid implementation of
CERCLA).
116. On Ohio, see Maurer v. Steward, 644 N.E.2d 369, 370-71 (Ohio 1994); Daniel T.
Kobil, Do the Paperworkor Die: Clemency, Ohio Style?, 52 OHIO ST. L.. 655 (1991). On
Tennessee, see Linda L. Ammons, DiscretionaryJustice:A Legal and Policy Analysis of a
Governor's Use of the Clemency Power in the Cases of IncarceratedBattered Women, 3 J.L.
& POL 1, 51 (1994) (citing Larry Sabato, GubernatorialClemency: A Time of Trial?, 53
STATE GOV'T 40,40-41 (1980)).
117. PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 569 (1968)
(citing 29 Stat., Proclamations 19-31); United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 706
(1978); J. William Futrell, The History of Environmental Law, in SUSTAINABLE
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 19 (Celia Campbell-Mohr et al. eds., 1993). President Cleveland
had made forest protection one of the key aims of his administration, Futrell, supra at 19;
GIFFORD PINCHOT, BREAKING NEW GROUND 93-94 (Island Press 1987) (1947)
(reporting that Cleveland advocated preservation in his first message to Congress);
however, the issue was sufficiently controversial that he waited until he was a lame duck in
February 1897 to set aside the reserves. See also PINCHOT, supra at 108 (commenting that
the reservations placed Cleveland in the midst of "the most remarkable storm in the whole
history of" the environmental movement).
118. GATES, supra note 117, at 569 ("A storm of protest arose in the West, expressed in
memorials..., by letters from western public officials, angry editorials and vituperative
denunciation of the President in both Houses of Congress that has rarely been equaled.");
see also United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 706 (1978); THURMAN WILKINS,
JOHN MUIR: APOSTLE OF NATURE 196-97 (1995) (describing the effect of Cleveland's act
on the public).
119. WILKINS, supra note 118, at 198.
120. Id.at 198; see STEWART L. UDALL, THE QUIET CRISIS 101 (1963).
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Special Session of Congress to address the reservations, 121 and it
enacted the Organic Administration Act of 1897,122 which suspended
the reservations and limited the purposes for which national forests
123
could be reserved.

Most extreme perhaps was the response to President Warren
Harding's support for ship subsidies in 1922, for it spawned a
constitutional amendment that shortened the lame-duck period. The
issue of ship subsidies had been central to the 1922 congressional
campaigns, and the voters had defeated most members of Congress
who supported the subsidy legislation. 124

President Harding, still

desirous of enacting the legislation, called a special lame-duck session
of the Congress to consider the matter.125 This action so inflamed
certain Senators that they drafted what later became the Twentieth
Amendment to the Constitution.

The Twentieth Amendment

shortened the presidential lame-duck period from approximately four
months to the current approximately two-and-a-half months, 126 and it
was intended to abolish lame-duck sessions of Congress, by
shortening the Congressional lame-duck period from approximately
128
thirteen months12 7 to approximately two months.

121. Futrell, supra note 117, at 19.
122. Organic Administration Act of 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 34 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 473-482, 551 (1994)).
123. See id.; United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 706-08 (1978); GATES, supra
note 117, at 569.
124. NORRIS, supra note 109, at 328.
125. Id. at 328-29. See also HENRY, supra note 13, at 261 (noting statements in
Congress and failure of session).
126. The Twentieth Amendment replaced the March 4th presidential inauguration
date, followed by long-standing practice and implicitly adopted by the Twelfth
Amendment, with a January 20th inauguration date. Nagle, Twentieth Amendment supra
note 108, at 471.
127. Id. at 484-85.
128.

BRUCE ACKERMAN,

THE CASE AGAINST LAMEDUCK IMPEACHMENT 3-4

(1999). Nagle, Twentieth Amendment, supra note 108, at 478-80. Before the Twentieth
Amendment, Congress convened for a long session, beginning in December and ending in
the following spring or summer, and a shorter lame-duck session, beginning in the
December after the election and continuing until March 4th. Nagle, supra note 108, at
484-85. The Twentieth Amendment instructs Congress to begin its term on January 3rd,
U.S. CONST. amend. XX, §§ 1-2, less than two months after the election, and it was
assumed that that change would effectively abolish lame-duck sessions because no lameduck Congress would meet during the period between the election and the beginning of
the new session. Id. at 485-86; ACKERMAN, supra at 17-33. In fact, lame-duck Congresses
have met quite frequently, and the most recent-the lame-duck 105th House-voted to
impeach President Bill Clinton. ACKERMAN, supra. Given the partisan nature of the
voting, it is likely that at least one if not both of the articles of impeachment would not
have gained majority support in the newly constituted 106th Congress. Id. at 7.
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President George W. Bush's responses to outgoing President

Clinton's "blizzard" of lame-duck lawmaking 2 9 will also be
influenced by a variety of political and legal factors. In his final
weeks in office, President Clinton, among other things, signed an
executive order protecting 58.5 million acres of timberland from road
building and logging 130 and issued regulations imposing new
131
workplace safety rules, actions denounced by many Republicans.
In deciding whether to challenge some or all of Clinton's actions,
Bush will have to consider not only the legal difficulties of doing so
so will "risk blotting his own 'compassionate
but also whether doing
' 32
conservative' label.'
While examples such as these abound in the domestic sphere,
they are far more difficult to come by in the realm of foreign affairs.
Indeed, as a theoretical matter, questions concerning the legitimacy
of lame-duck lawmaking become especially pressing when that
lawmaking occurs in the international realm because incoming
Presidents, at least in theory, do not have the range of responses
described above to limit or eliminate their predecessor's foreign

affairs' commitments. This is because a President who enters into an
international agreement obligates the United States to fulfill the
duties contained in the agreement, and these obligations remain in
A subsequent
effect throughout changes of administration. 133
129. Raum, supra note 109.
130. Eric Pianin, Clinton Set To Protect Vast Areas of Forest,WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2001,
at Al.
131. Raum, supra note 109 (noting Republican Representative Jim Henson's assertion
that the new restrictions are "among 'the most egregious abuses by the Clinton
administration."'); Douglas Jehl, Bush To Review Clinton's Environmental Blitz, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Jan. 8, 2001, at 3 (noting that Republicans and their allies "are drawing
battle plans in the hopes of blunting or reversing much of what President Clinton has
sought to accomplish in a blizzard of last-minute orders on environmental policy").
132. Raum, supra note 109.
133. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 38 (3d ed.
1979) (noting that "a change of government is not as such a ground for noncompliance
with obligations"); O-J. Lissitzyn, Editorial, Durationof Executive Agreements, 54 AM. J.
INT'L L. 869, 873 (1960); see also Discussion of the Bundy Paper by the Commission, in
PAPERS ON PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY, VOL. II: PROBLEMS
AND PROSPECTS 73, 79 (Kenneth W. Thompson ed., 1986) (discussing whether a President

legally binds his successor with "solely a private commitment"). By contrast, in the
fifteenth through seventeenth centuries, states were regarded as the personal possessions
of their rulers, so that treaties were considered private contracts, and no international
agreement signed by one prince was binding on his successor. MOSHER ET AL., supra note
15, at 10. Similarly today, very difficult questions arise when states dissolve and are
replaced by new states or secede from existing states. See MALCOLM N. SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 439-57 (2d ed. 1986).
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President may choose to ignore the obligations but doing so will
render the United States in breach of international law. Thus, a
certain tension exists between democracy and international law
regardless of whether the administration binding the state is a lame
duck. Democracy requires deference to the right of the majority to
change its mind, whereas international law, in its effort to attain the
stability necessary to ensure the peace and security of states, requires
states to honor their commitments until the other party or parties to
the agreement consents to a change. In other words, "democracies
institutionalize the principle that the people may change governments
and thereby government policy, but the basic principle of
international law is that commitments (including treaties, executive
agreements, and some other pledges) bind the state which is to say
1 34
that they do bind successor governments.
This tension between democracy and international law becomes
even more acute when the administration binding the state has been
voted out of office so that at the time that it binds the state, it no
longer represents the will of the people. Historically, the problem has
been more theoretical than real for several reasons. First, lame-duck
administrations have typically attempted to defer controversial
foreign affairs decisions until the new administration took power, or
at the least, have attempted to consult with the President-elect to
attain agreement as to the course to pursue. An example of the
former strategy occurred in February 1913, when a revolution erupted
in Mexico City and American business interests in Mexico looked to
the lame-duck Taft Administration for protection. President Taft
decided to "wait [the situation] out" as he was reportedly "'anxious to
avoid taking any steps that would embarrass his successor,' regarding
it 'unfair to commit the United States to a policy that President
Wilson would be obliged to carry out for the sake of National honor
or because he could not help himself."' 135 Similarly, in 1920, the
lame-duck Wilson Administration deliberately disengaged itself from
negotiations with Mexico regarding diplomatic recognition "on the
theory that such a controversial matter had best be left to the new
134. MOSHER ET AL., supra note 15, at 81. Indeed, it has traditionally been assumed
that democracies-which typically are characterized by frequent changes in leadership and
are "dependent on the vagaries and passions of public opinion"-are less capable of
making strong international commitments than are other forms of government. Kurt
Taylor Gaubatz, Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations, 50 INT'L
ORG. 109, 112-13 (1996).
135. HENRY, supra note 13, at 65.
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administration.' 1 36 By contrast, in 1932, lame-duck President Hoover
did not believe that questions concerning the repayment of European
war debts could be deferred until the inauguration, but he did seek

several consultations with President-elect Roosevelt, believing that he
should not proceed without Roosevelt's support. 137 Similarly, lameduck President Truman sought President-elect Eisenhower's
commitment to support Truman's position on the forced repatriation
of prisoners in the ongoing Korean War armistice negotiations.

38

Some of this apparent caution on the part of lame-duck
Presidents stems from the fact that lame ducks have typically
commanded little ability to conduct foreign affairs even if they
desired to. 139 That is, once an administration has lost an election,
foreign governments usually shift their focus to the incoming
administration. 140 Finally, up until the last few decades, politicians of
both parties adhered to the maxim "politics stops at the water's
edge.'

141

While vigorous partisan disagreement might characterize

public debate on domestic policy, questions of foreign affairs
commanded general agreement; party rancor challenging the
consensus was not only considered inappropriate but potentially

136. 1& at 178.
137. See id. at 284-310.
138. See id-at 480-86.

139. MOSHER ET AL., supra note 15, at 5.
140. Id.at 132. As Dean Acheson said, when he attended his last NATO Council
Meeting in December 1952 after Eisenhower had been elected: "Our [foreign] colleagues
treated us with the gentle and affectionate solicitude that one might show to the dying, but
asked neither help nor advice nor commitment for a future we would not share with them.
For this they were waiting for our successors." DEAN ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE
CREATION: MY YEARS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT 708 (1969). See also HENRY, supra
note 13, at 104 (noting that after the election of 1912, negotiations with Colombia over
long-standing grievances "broke down, as Colombia seemed to prefer to wait for the new
administration"); i& at 512 (During the final weeks of President Truman's term, "foreign
friends and enemies alike chose to await the installation of a new regime with the effective
power to negotiate and make commitments."); id. at 708 (even before the old
administration actually loses the election, "foreign nations may prefer to await the election
results rather than deal with" the sitting President).
141. MOSHER ET AL., supra note 15, at 17; see also HENRY, supra note 13, at 476
(quoting letter from President Truman to President-elect Eisenhower in which Truman
stated, "Partisan politics should stop at the boundaries of the United States"); id. at 473
(noting that even before the 1952 conventions, President Truman desired "'to keep
foreign policy out of partisan politics'); id. at 177 (noting that the Wilson
Administration's "conduct of foreign affairs in its final months was principally intended to
preserve the status quo and avoid new commitments").
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dangerous. 142 For instance, although candidate Woodrow Wilson
strongly opposed President Taft's conduct of foreign affairs, Wilson
virtually ignored such issues during the campaign and prior to his
143
inauguration.
By the 1980 Presidential election, however, these constraints no
longer constrained. For one thing, any foreign policy consensus that
might have existed in the decades following World War II had
144
evaporated, as had the consensus against debating such matters.
Rather, during the 1980 campaign, issues of foreign affairs provided
Ronald Reagan with a fertile field for partisan attack. 145 Reagan
criticized President Carter's entire approach to foreign policy,
maintaining, among other things, that Carter had no coherent
strategy for confronting Soviet advances, that he had no clear sense of
how his policies affected the American alliance system, and that he
had exhibited patent ineptitude in his responses to the Soviet invasion
146
of Afghanistan and in his attempted rescue of the hostages in Iran.

Reagan also criticized the Panama Canal Treaties, which had been
negotiated under both Republican and Democratic Presidents, 47 and
made

statements

suggesting

that

he

"might

repudiate

the

142. MOSHER ET AL., supra note 15, at 17-18. Foreign policy stability during past
changes of administration was also enhanced by a core of foreign affairs experts of both
parties who shared general views on American objectives and enjoyed mutual respect and
friendship. Id. at 67; Newsom, supra note 20, at 138.
143. See HENRY, supra note 13, at 89; see also Bundy, supra note 107, at 6, 9 (describing
general agreement on foreign affairs during the Truman-Eisenhower transition and the
Eisenhower-Kennedy transition).
144. Leslie Gelb, Reflections on the Carter Transition, in PAPERS ON PRESIDENTIAL
TRANSITIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY, VOL. I: HISTORY AND CURRENT ISSUES 69, 76
(Kenneth W. Thompson ed., 1986) (stating that "the way we make foreign policy is
different now than in the twenty years after World War II, that there is much less sense of
bipartisanship. People are much more ideological about it."); Bundy, supra note 107, at 19
("There are, in the country .. greater differences of view from one end of the foreign
policy spectrum to another than existed in the periods when transitions were capable of
being handled with relative ease by people who knew each other and respected each
other's views and felt a high degree of compatibility."); William P. Bundy, Presidential
Transition Problems, in PAPERS ON PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY,
VOL. II: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 21, 23 (Kenneth W. Thompson ed., 1986) (opining
that both the incoming Carter and Reagan Administrations had "been much more sharply
critical of their predecessors, in the area of foreign policy than was the case in earlier
transitions").
145. See KYVIG, supra note 68, at 5 ("Candidate Reagan was quite vocal about foreign
policy matters.").
146. MOSHER ET AL., supra note 15, at 224.
147. Id. at 224-25; KYVIG, supra note 68, at 5 ("The Panama Canal, Reagan concluded,
was a symbol of national power and prestige and, as such, ought to remain under U.S.
-ontrol.").
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normalization of relations with Communist China, first undertaken by
Nixon and continued by Carter."' 48 In this way, Reagan made clear
that his victory would result in a profound re-examination of basic
American foreign policy.149
It was this aggressive rhetoric, and in particular, Reagan's vocal
criticism of President Carter's handling of the hostage crisis, that had
the atypical effect of empowering, rather than enfeebling, the Carter

Administration once it became a lame duck.150 Reagan had
repeatedly and vehemently stated his ideological opposition to
negotiating with terrorists under any circumstances. 51' Moreover, he
148. MOSHER ET AL., supra note 15, at 224-25.
149. Id. at 224; The Clinton Administration, Congress and InternationalLaw: Remarks
by Stephen Rickard, 88 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 354, 368 (1994) ("The Carter
Administration was seen as having come to praise multilateralism-the Reagan
Administration, to bury it."). As for the present day, the presidential candidates in the
2000 election, like their 1980 counterparts, felt free to attack one another's views on
foreign affairs. For instance, Governor Bush contended that President Clinton and Vice
President Gore overextended United States military forces by intervening in places that
are not linked to United States' strategic interests. The Gore campaign, for its part,
sharply criticized Bush's plan for withdrawing from the Balkans. Steven Mufson & John
Lancaster, Vietnam Era Shaped Two Different World Views, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2000,

at A14. See also Ceci Connolly & Mike Allen, Crises Take Precedence with the
Candidates,WASH. POST., Oct. 13, 2000, at A30 (noting that vice-presidential candidate
Richard Cheney "used news about the terrorist attack" on the USS Cole "to criticize the
Clinton-Gore administration for failing to maintain a strong military and for its energy
policies"); John Lancaster, Foreign Policy Challenges To Command Bush's Attention,
WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2000, at A26 (stating that during the campaign Bush "accused the
Clinton Administration of neglecting key alliances with European allies and Japan);
Roberto Suro, 2005 Missile Defense Inception Is at Risk, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2000, at A4
(stating that Bush criticized the Clinton Administration "as weak on military matters").
150. See Gelb, supra note 144, at 79. Carter's empowerment extended only to the
hostage crisis, however. Soon after the election, Carter met with Israel's Prime Minister
Begin and learned first-hand that his "power as a defeated President was not equal to that
of one who is expected to remain in office." CARTER, supra note 41, at 576. As Carter
described the meeting:
In spite of my best efforts, there would be little substance to my discussions with
the Prime Minister. The Israelis preferred to await the new administration in
order to continue any top-level negotiations. Before the election, [Egyptian
President] Sadat had also expressed his preference to wait until the new year, and
so it now seemed best to encourage Reagan to assume this responsibility after his
inauguration.
Id. at 575-76.
151. See Smist & Meiers, supra note 19, at 302 (reporting on candidate Reagan's pledge
of a "get tough" policy concerning terrorists: "During the presidential debate between
Carter and Reagan on October 28, 1980, Reagan stated... 'There will be no negotiation
with terrorists of any kind."'); Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 182
(testimony of Walter Stoessel) (stating that not negotiating for the release of the hostages
"is a strongly held view of the President... that is, that it was a mistake to become
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appeared none-too-impressed with the content of those
negotiations. 152 So, far from encouraging Iran to wait for the new
Administration to continue its negotiations, as would have been
typical, Reagan's statements motivated Iran hurriedly to consummate
an agreement with the Carter Administration.
The Carter
Administration, for its part, wanted to forge ahead, for President
Carter was convinced that negotiations with Iran provided the most

likely means of securing the safe release of the hostages. 153 Further,
the hostages' release had become a matter of pride to the Carter
Administration. 54 Carter's inability to secure their release was
widely believed to have substantially contributed to his electoral
defeat; 155 bringing the hostages home would at least vindicate the
course Carter had so long pursued over so much criticism. 156 These

involved in such prolonged negotiations; we should insist, rather on the release of hostages
taken and should use the full range of instruments available to us to effect that result");
Negotiation of the Algiers Accords, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at 59
(comments of Roberts Owen) (describing Reagan's view that "just the act of talking, or
negotiating with a terrorist government was totally unacceptable").
152. See Weisman, supra note 20; Newsom, supra note 20, at 131 ("Many in the
transition team of the [Reagan] administration came to Washington largely convinced that
in Algeria we were negotiating ransom for the hostages. Because there were those in the
[Reagan] administration who felt that they had a very different view of the situation and
would not support the negotiations as they understood them, they refused to be briefed on
what was going on in Algiers."); see also Carswell & Davis, supra note 56, at 215.
When President Reagan later welcomed the hostages at the White House, he
contrasted himself with President Carter by announcing that in the future, he would deal
swiftly and strongly with any similar terrorist act. See Senate Banking Comm. Hearing,
supra note 62, at 59.
153. CARTER, supra note 41, at 594.
154. Id. ("The release of the American hostages had almost become an obsession with
me."); BRZEZINSKI, supra note 42, at 506 (resolving the hostage issue before leaving office
was a "matter of personal pride for Carter").
155. BRZEZINSKI, supra note 42, at 506 ("The Iranian debacle was clearly one of the
three major factors contributing to [Carter's] defeat ....); SMITH, supra note 42, at 11
("The fifty-two hostages held captive in Teheran seemed to symbolize the ineffectiveness
of the President and of the United States under his leadership."); BRAUER, supra note 16,
at 205 ("Carter met defeat in 1980 partly because of the reputation he acquired for
vacillation, weakness, and frustration abroad, all symbolized by the Iranian revolution and
the extended captivity of American diplomatic hostages in Teheran."); CARTER, supra
note 41, at 594 ("It was very likely that I had been defeated and would soon leave office as
President because I had kept these hostages and their fate at the forefront of the world's
attention, and had clung to a cautious and prudent policy in order to protect their lives
during the preceding fourteen months.").
156. CARTER, supra note 41, at 594 ("I wanted to have my decisions [regarding the
hostages] vindicated."); see also SMITH, supra note 42, at 207 ("Jimmy Carter stayed up all
of his final night in office, hoping to hear that the hostages had been released while he was
still President."). Cf. MOSHER ET AL., supra note 15, at 107 (The "glue" that binds
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factors converged to create strong incentives on both sides to
conclude

an

important

international

agreement

before

the

inauguration of a new United States President.
Indeed, the frantic rush to conclude the Algiers Declarations
before President Reagan's inauguration bears surface resemblance to
the eleventh-hour death penalty commutations described above or
the great hurry to enact CERCLA, but, in fact, the situation involving

the Algiers Declarations was far more complex. First, the primary
objective Carter sought-the safe release of the hostages-was one
that everyone shared. Indeed, President Reagan was among those
who would benefit most from Carter's success. During the campaign,
Reagan had feared Carter's efforts to secure the release of the

hostages because Carter's success might have gained for him the
election;157 once Reagan won the presidency, however, the release of

the hostages could only redound to Reagan's benefit. Because lameduck President Carter was able to execute an agreement with Iran,

incoming President Reagan was free to begin his term without a
devastating crisis sapping strength from his Administration and
diverting attention from the domestic economic and social reforms
that he had promised to carry out.

58

Further, although there is no

reason to question that Reagan was sincere in his criticism of the
Carter Administration for negotiating with Iran, at the same time,
that criticism also unquestionably helped the Carter Administration
to succeed in those very negotiations. 159
together members of the outgoing administration "is to defend and protect what they have
wrought and to push forward with the unfinished enterprises they have begun.").
157. See Sick, supra note 66, at 164; EDWIN MEESE III, WITH REAGAN: THE INSIDE
STORY 55 (1992).
158. See Cutler, supra note 106, at xviii-xix; BRAUER, supra note 16, at 237 ("It was in
Reagan's interest that [the hostage] negotiations be successfully concluded before he took

office.").
159. See Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 41 (Senator Percy
crediting President-elect Reagan's unequivocal, harsh, direct, and blunt statements as
helping to bring this crisis to a head and former Secretary of State Edmund Muskie
agreeing); see also Our People, Your Money, THE ECONOMIsT, Jan. 24, 1981, reprintedin
id. at 290 ("President Reagan, hinting punishment to come by scorning Iran's 'barbarians'
before his inauguration, helped by providing a deadline for agreement. In practice, he
might not have been able to take violent action without getting the hostages killed. But
Iran got the message: it could not expect better terms from Mr. Reagan... than Mr.
Carter was offering.").
Once he decided to implement the Agreements, President Reagan and members of
his Administration did not hesitate to take credit for Reagan's role in pressuring the
Iranians. See Implementation of Hostage Agreements the Settlement with Iran, 81 DEP'T
ST. BULL. No. 2048 at 17 (Iran "was ultimately forced to settle on terms that simply
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Finally, the most important complicating fact was that, regardless
of President Reagan's views as to the desirability of the Algiers
Declarations, they were and are a valid treaty legitimately entered
into by the United States. 160
For that reason, the Reagan
restored the status quo ante because the advent of the new Administration finally
confronted it with a serious deadline."); see also MEESE III, supra note 157, at 293
(maintaining that "[t]hroughout the campaign, Reagan assumed a posture that was
designed to accelerate [the hostages'] release" by, among other things, encouraging the
Iranians to believe that Reagan "would have been much tougher to deal with than was
Carter"); ALEXANDER M. HAIG, CAVEAT: REALISM, REAGAN, AND FOREIGN POLICY
69 (1984) ("The Iranians (and some others involved in the negotiations) feared that
Reagan might avail himself of options that the forbearing Carter had eschewed. We did
nothing to disabuse the parties of their anxiety; it could only speed the return of the
captive Americans.").
160. While clearly a valid treaty for purposes of international law, the Algiers
Declarations are, in domestic law usage, a "sole executive agreement," which some believe
to have questionable status under the United States Constitution. Article II, section 2 of
the Constitution authorizes the President to enter into treaties with the consent of twothirds of the Senate; however, from the very beginning of our nation, Presidents have
routinely bypassed the requirement of Senate consent by entering into international
agreements that they termed "executive agreements" rather than "treaties." Louis
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 215 (2d ed. 1996). Over the
past two centuries, presidents have made many thousands of executive agreements, far
surpassing the number of treaties they have entered into, and these executive agreements
have been held constitutional. Id. at 173-87; see Michael D. Ramsey, Executive
Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 133, 134-41(1998);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
303(4) (1986). See generally WALLACE MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENTS (1941) (arguing that through the widespread and continuous use of
executive agreements, they have become "constitutional usage"). Not all commentators
believe they should be held constitutional, however, see, e.g., RAOUL BERGER,
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 140-62 (1974); Raoul Berger, The
Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1972), and many
commentators have distinguished in particular between those executive agreements
termed "congressional-executive agreements," which have in some fashion been approved
by Congress and those termed "sole executive agreements" or "Presidential agreements,"
which are made by the President alone, without any referral or authorization by Congress.
See Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or
PresidentialAgreements: InterchangeableInstruments of National Policy: 1,54 YALE LJ.
181, 204-06, 307-08 (1945); Edwin Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the
Treaty?, 53 YALE L.J. 664, 671-75 (1944); RESTATEMENT, supra, § 302 & cmt. a. Because
they do not have the benefit of congressional authorization, sole executive agreements are
generally considered to be the least constitutionally justifiable executive agreements, and
some have claimed that they can only be made with respect to certain subjects,
RESTATEMENT, supra, § 302 & cmt. h; Ramsey, supra at 194-97; that they can never be
self-executing, Ramsey supra at 218-35; or, that unlike treaties and CongressionalExecutive agreements, they do not supersede earlier inconsistent Congressional
legislation, RESTATEMENT, supra, § 115, cmt. d & rpt. n.5.
The Office of Legal Counsel reviewed the Algiers Declarations pursuant to a request
by President Reagan and concluded that President Carter had had the authority to adhere
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Administration's implementation of the Algiers Declarations was, at
least in theory, constrained not solely by domestic political and legal
processes but by international law and the various interests that are
implicated in international affairs. That point is particularly relevant
with respect to the Algiers Declarations because the Declarations
created the Tribunal to decide, among other things, disputes "as to
the interpretation or performance of any provision" of the
Declarations themselves.' 61 So, the lame-duck treaty confronting
President Reagan would create the very institution that would
subsequently pass on his implementation of that treaty.
B. President Reagan's Response to the Algiers Declarations
For all of the above reasons, the Algiers Declarations presented

President Reagan with a knotty problem, and any qualms he might
have had before the election increased once he took office as a result
of the domestic political pressures that immediately confronted him.
American companies that had claims against Iran banded together to
form the United States Iranian Claimants Committee and petitioned

President Reagan immediately after his inauguration to issue "no
further orders or regulations" until the committee had had the
opportunity to meet with Reagan Administration officials to discuss
the committee's concerns. 162 So, faced with political pressure over an
agreement whose negotiation he had opposed all along, President
Reagan declined immediately to endorse it or the various executive
orders that President Carter had issued upon signing the Declarations
in order to implement them. 63 Instead, he commissioned the
to them. Review of Domestic and International Legal Implications of Implementing the
Agreement with Iran, 4A U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 314, 315-16 (1981). The Supreme
Court later confirmed this view in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981).
161. General Declaration, supra note 17, para. 17, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. at 8. See also Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 17, at art. VI, para. 4,
reprintedin 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 11 ("Any question concerning the interpretation
or application of this agreement shall be decided by the Tribunal upon the request of
either Iran or the United States."); id.art. II, para. 3.
162. Senate ForeignRelations Hearings,supra note 19, at 75. See also id.at 77-78 (letter
to President Reagan); Herman Nickel, The Iran Deal Doesn't Look Bad, FORTUNE, Feb.
23, 1981, reprinted in id.at 289 ("By January 22, a group of 100 companies, including
Xerox, Ingersoll-Rand, and Brown & Root, the huge construction contractor, were urging
President Reagan to hold up the release of Iranian assets, mainly Iranian deposits in
domestic branches of U.S. Banks, against which they have more than $1 billion in
claims.").
163. As Lawrence Newman, Chairman of United States Iranian Claimants Committee,
put it, "[T]he Reagan administration apparently followed our suggestion and withheld
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Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel to prepare a report

detailing the domestic and international legal issues involved in
implementing the Declarations. 164
The Office of Legal Counsel concluded that the presidential
actions necessary to implement the Declarations were "well within
the President's power under the Constitution and applicable statutes
and treaties"; 65 however, it also opined that the United States might
be considered entitled under international law to repudiate the
Declarations on the ground that they were procured by the threat or

use of force and thus were void ab initio under Article 52 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 16 6 The argument for
repudiation subsequently received some scholarly support, 167 but
more important at the time was the advice President Reagan received

from his advisers. The day after his inauguration, President Reagan
met with top aides and members of his Cabinet to discuss the Algiers
Declarations. 168 According to then-Secretary of State Alexander
Haig, everyone in the room was angry with the Iranian terrorists and
the Ayatollah's regime and "[w]ithout preamble, it was suggested that
the [Algiers Declarations] be abrogated.' ' 69 Consequently, in
addition to raising the Vienna Convention argument, certain advisers
also pointed out "that a gesture of this kind would have a huge

release of further regulations pending its review of the agreements." Senate Foreign
Relations Hearings,supra note 19, at 75.
164. Review of Domestic and International Legal Implications of Implementing the
Agreement with Iran, 4A U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 314 (1981).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 321-26. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art.
52, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 334 ("A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the
threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the
Charter of the United Nations.").
167. See Symposium, The Settlement with Iran, 13 U. MIAMI J. INT'L L. 1, 46-71 (1981);
FRANCIS ANTHONY

BOYLE, WORLD POLITICS AND

INTERNATIONAL LAW 221-22

(1985); see also Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 99 (prepared
statement of Thomas W. Luce III, counsel for Electronic Data Systems) ("When the
accords with Iran were first made public, many people-including the Chairman of the
Board of EDS, Ross Perot-publicly stated their view that the national interest of the
United States lay in a renunciation of those accords by President Reagan. Proponents of
this view maintain that the United States entered into those accords under duress, and,
consequently, is not legally bound by them. They also argue that the United States has a
unique opportunity by renouncing the accords to signal a new era of firmness in foreign
policy by means of a nonmilitary message."); George W. Ball, Hostage Deal: "Crime
Should Not Pay," WASH. POST., Jan. 26, 1981, reprintedin id. at 286.
168. HAIG,supra note 159, at 77-78.
169. Id. at 78.
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propaganda impact abroad and a salutary effect on public opinion at
home."170

In the end, though, President Reagan decided not to repudiate
the Algiers Declarations. No doubt a number of factors contributed
to this decision. Haig reports that he invoked the honor of the United
States, reminding President Reagan that the United States had

pledged its word, and "[n]o incoming Administration had the right to
renounce lightly a solemn international contract entered into by its
predecessor."' 171 Former Carter Administration officials expressed
similar sentiments and also emphasized that a refusal to implement
the Algiers Declarations "would have serious international
consequences."' 72 It would not only "cast doubt on the readiness of
the U.S. Government to honor its comMitments,"1 173 it would also
constitute an insult to the many governments-Algeria, in
particular-that "gave their assistance on the premise that the United
170. Id. See also Lawrence W. Newman, Litigation in the United States of Claims
Against Iran, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at 34, 43 (comments of Lloyd
Cutler, Counsel to President Carter) (describing the difficulty of "persuading the Reagan
Administration that it should support the accords" as a result of its concerns as to whether
"the Accords amounted to the payment of ransom or whether they had been imposed on
the United States, whether the United States had been coerced into them"); Newsom,
supra note 20, at 132 (describing Reagan Administration officials as initially "convinced
that the United States had paid substantial ransom for the release of the hostages. It was
only after considerable discussion that they were convinced otherwise."). But see
Negotiation of the Algiers Accords, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at 88-89
(comments of John M. Walker, Assistant Secretary of the Reagan Administration)
(stating that the Reagan Administration State Department working group recognized that
the Algiers Declarations were a great achievement).
171. HAIG, supra note 159, at 78.
172. See House Foreign Affairs Hearings,supra note 40, at 8 (statement of Harold H.
Saunders); Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra note 19, at 32 (testimony of Warren
Christopher) (stating that repudiation of the Algiers Declarations "would have, to
understate the matter, a damaging effect on our international reputation, which would
linger for long time and interfere with our capacity to carry out our foreign policy").
173. House Foreign Affairs Hearings, supra note 40, at 8 (statement of Harold H.
Saunders); see also id.at 138 (statement of Edmund S. Muskie) ("We should fulfill the
agreement because we are a great power with an interest in preserving our honor. We
should do so, quite simply, because the terms are fair-and our word is good."); see also
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, InternationalLaw and the Hostage Agreemen WALL ST. J., Jan.
27, 1981, reprintedin Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra note 19, at 292, (arguing
that the United States would "lose its credibility as a nation that bargains in good faith" if
it repudiated the Algiers Declarations); BOYLE, supra note 167, at 222-23 ("The foremost
consideration supporting adherence to the settlement was that the U.S. government had a
critical long-term interest in demonstrating to all states of the world, and especially those
of the Middle East and Southwest Asia, that it possessed a serious, sincere, and
meaningful commitment to the peaceful settlement of its disputes with other countries,
especially with minor powers, and even if its adversary was clearly in the wrong.").
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States was acting in good faith."'1 74 The Reagan Administration also

considered "selective implementation" - that is, implementing only
certain parts of the agreement-but the Office of Legal Counsel
opined that such a course would be inconsistent with international
law. 175
While those considerations no doubt carried some weight, what

likely clinched President Reagan's decision to implement the Algiers
Declarations was the fact that doing so was clearly in the best
financial interests of United States nationals. The United States had

already unfrozen and transferred the bulk of Iran's assets
immediately upon the hostages' release. 176 What remained for the
United States to do by the time President Reagan reviewed the

Declarations was (1) to transfer certain additional categories of
assets; (2) to take the limited steps set out in the Declarations to assist
Iran in its litigation in United States courts to obtain the return of the

assets of the former Shah and his family; and, most importantly, (3) to
terminate lawsuits against Iran in United States courts, nullify the
corresponding attachments, and create, along with Iran, the IranUnited States Claims Tribunal which would, among other things,
arbitrate the claims of United States nationals against Iran. And this
third obligation was less of an obligation than it was the reason to
fulfill the other obligations.

174. House Foreign Affairs Hearings,supra note 40, at 144 (statement of Warren M.
Christopher); see also Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra note 19, at 57 (testimony
of Edmund Muskie) (opining that repudiation would cause the Algerians to lose much of
their respect and goodwill for the United States and could well "undercut [Algeria's]
standing in the nonaligned world"); Symposium, The Settlement with Iran, 13 U. MIAMI J.
INT'L L. 1, 51 (1981) (Professor Covey Oliver arguing that "[t]he major political trouble
with anyone calling these Agreements void for duress or jus cogens is that these were not
Agreements between the United States and Iran, but with a willing, helpful third party,
Algeria. Thus, another key state in the Middle East was involved in the process"); Our
People, Your Money, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 24, 1981, reprinted in Senate Foreign
Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 290, ("But not to keep Mr. Carter's word to the
admirable Algerian mediators of the deal would make America's name mud in the third
world....").
175. See Whether the Agreement with Iran Can Be Treated as Void in Part, 4A U.S.
Op. Off. Legal Counsel 330, 330 (1981); see also Senate Banking Comm. Hearing, supra
note 62, at 10 (testimony of Harold H. Saunders) (criticizing selective implementation as
paving the way for Iran "to reject parts of the solution which serve Americans better than
Iranians"); Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra note 19, at 32 (testimony of Warren
Christopher) (admonishing against "repudiation of the Declarations of Algiers, in whole
or in part") (emphasis added).
176. See Senate Banking Comm. Hearing, supra note 62, at 12-13 (prepared statement
of Harold H. Saunders).
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As noted above, after President Carter froze Iran's assets in

November 1979, American nationals flocked to the courts to assert
claims against Iran.177 The regulations then in effect allowed the

preliminary phases of the lawsuits to proceed but prohibited final
judgments. 178 So, no suit filed after the hostage-taking had proceeded

to a final judgment against Iran,179 and it looked as though few suits
would because they would instead be barred by the doctrine of
sovereign immunityj.80 Further, many feared that even if some suits
did proceed to final judgment, Iran would have immunity from
177. See supra text accompanying footnote 61; see also Islamic Republic of Iran v.
United States, Case Nos. A15(IV) & A24, Award No. 590-A15(IV)/A24-FT, paras. 21-22,
1998 WL 930565 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. (Dec. 28,1998)).
178. 31 C.F.R. § 535.203(e); 31 C.F.R. § 535.504(a)-(b) (1980). See also Carswell &
Davis, supra note 56, at 185-86.
179. One Claimant, Electronic Data Services ("EDS"), however, had filed its claim
against Iran in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas in
February 1979 and had obtained a prejudgment attachment on Iranian assets by June 13,
1979. After a two-week trial in January 1980, the court entered a final judgment for EDS
for approximately $19 million in May 1980. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra note
19, at 100-01 (prepared statement of Thomas W. Luce, III, counsel for EDS). See also
Electronic Data Sys. Corp. Iran v. Soc. Sec. Org. of the Gov't of Iran, 508 F. Supp. 1350,
1351-52 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
180. Owen, supra note 47, at 303-04 ("The lawyers among us were very much aware
that in the pending federal suits Iran was going to claim sovereign immunity under our
Federal Sovereign Immunities Act, which meant that, even without any cancellation of
claims, our claimants were in a very vulnerable position."); Newman, supra note 61, at 637
(lawyer for claimants against Iran explaining that the claimants had obtained judicial
attachments on Iranian assets in Germany in 1980 "because we worried that U.S. courts
might determine that they did not have jurisdiction over the various Iranian government
entities under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act"); Senate ForeignRelations Hearings,
supra note 19, at 124 (prepared testimony of Lee R. Marks, lawyer for American claimants
against Iran) (describing various jurisdictional problems, including sovereign immunity,
that claimants faced); id at 3 (testimony of Edmund Muskie) (stating that in U.S. litigation
"many companies would face a serious obstacle because of Iran's sovereign immunity
[whereas] the defense of sovereign immunity will not be available to Iran in proceedings
before the International Tribunal"); House ForeignAffairs Hearings,supra note 40, at 143
(testimony of Warren M. Christopher) ("Prior to the crisis, most of the assets of Iran in
the United States were protected by the doctrine of sovereignty, and by the sovereign
immunity statute enacted by this Congress. For that reason, and other technical reasons,
U.S. claimants would have faced very great difficulty in collecting their claims against
Iran."); iL at 116 (testimony of Harold H. Saunders) ("Most of [the claimants'] cases
"); Cutler, supra note 106, at xix (describing
would not have succeeded in court ....
obstacles facing United States claimants in United States courts); Symposium, The
Settlement with Iran, 13 U. MIAMI J. INT'L L. 1, 97 (1981) (Mark Feldman, former
Department of State Deputy Legal Adviser, setting forth the reasons why "most of the
cases filed in the U.S. courts would not, in all events, succeed in coming to an execution of
judgment"); id at 67 (Lawrence Newman, lawyer for numerous U.S. claimants,
acknowledging that some claimants would be better off in the Tribunal than they would
have been in U.S. courts).
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execution of judgments. 181 Finally, even if these barriers could be

overcome, there was concern that the attached assets remaining in the
United States would be insufficient to provide the claimants full

recovery. 182 In comparison, the Tribunal looked good. The
Tribunal's jurisdiction over most of the claims was clear, 183 and its

181. See Symposium, The Settlement with Iran, 13 U. MIAMI J. INT'L L. 1, 97 (1981);
Senate Banking Comm. Hearing, supra note 62, at 42 (testimony of Roberts B. Owen)
("Iran's sovereign immunity would have made it difficult in many cases to enforce
judgments against [Iran's] assets."); House Foreign Affairs Hearings,supra note 40, at 116
(testimony of Harold H. Saunders) (The claimants "never would have collected claims had
they secured judgments in the courts").
182. See Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra note 19, at 124 (prepared testimony
of Lee R. Marks, lawyer for United States claimants) ("[H]owever adequate the billiondollar security account may or may not prove to be, it is one billion dollars more than is
available with certainty for litigants in the United States courts."); Senate Banking Comm.
Hearing, supra note 62, at 13 (prepared statement of Harold H. Saunders) ("[T]he
settlement substitutes for the uncertain attachments on Iranian assets in U.S. banks a
program of binding arbitration backed by a security account of $1 billion, not to fall below
$500 million."). See also Drafting the Claims Settlement Agreement, in REVOLUTIONARY
DAYS, supra note 19, at 91, 113-14 (comments of Robert Carswell) (U.S. could not have
given claimants 100 cents to the dollar, even if it had not returned any assets to Iran).
183. The primary uncertainty regarding the Tribunal's jurisdiction resulted from Article
II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration, see supra note 17, reprinted in 1
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 9. Toward the end of negotiations, Iran insisted upon a
jurisdictional exclusion for claims arising under contracts with Iranian choice-of-forum
clauses. The United States did not want simply to exclude the claims but rather wanted
the Tribunal to determine whether such forum-selection clauses should be enforced given
the massive changes that Iran had made in its judicial system. The United States thus
drafted Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration to exclude "claims
arising under a binding contract between the parties specifically providing that any
disputes thereunder shall be within the sole jurisdiction of the competent Iranian courts in
response to the Majlis position." Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 17, at art. II
para. 1, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 9 (emphasis added). The United States
specifically inserted the word "binding" to give the Tribunal the opportunity to decide that
the provisions were not in fact binding due to changed circumstances. Owen, supra note
47, at 319; Mark B. Feldman, Implementation of the Iranian Claims Settlement
Agreement-Status, Issues, and Lessons: View from Government's Perspective,in PRIVATE
INVESTORS ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INT'L BUSINESS IN 1981 75, 80-81

(Martha L. Landwehr ed., 1981). When presented with the question, however, the
Tribunal declined to decide it, holding that "[i]f the parties wished the Tribunal to
determine the enforceability of contract clauses specifically providing for the sole
jurisdiction of Iranian courts, it would be expected that they would be [sic] so clearly and
unambiguously." Halliburton Co. v. Doreen/IMCO (U.S. v. Iran), Case No. 51, Award
No. ITL-2-51-FT, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 242, 245 (Nov. 5, 1983). The Tribunal did,
however, interpret the forum-selection exclusion narrowly, holding that a contract clause
that fails unambiguously to require that any and all disputes that arise under the contract
be settled by Iranian courts, and only by Iranian courts, does not deprive the Tribunal of
jurisdiction over disputes arising from the contract. ALDRICH, supra note 33, at 103.
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Security Account-labeled a "bottomless pitcher" 84 because Iran was
required to replenish it whenever it dipped below $500,000,000185promised claimants full recovery on their claims. So, while there
were unquestionably significant risks associated with an untested
arbitral tribunal, one-third of whose members would be Iranian, 186 the
Tribunal nonetheless offered American claimants their best hope for
187
compensation on their claims.
This fact was not lost on the claimants. 188 As a consequence, they
commenced a substantial lobbying effort to encourage the Reagan
184. See Senate Banking Comm. Hearing,supra note 62, at 43 (testimony of Roberts B.
Owen); Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 31 (testimony of Warren

Christopher).
185. General Declaration, supra note 17, para. 7, reprintedin 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
at 2 ("Whenever the Central Bank shall thereafter notify Iran that the balance in the
Security Account has fallen below $500 million, Iran shall promptly make new deposits
sufficient to maintain a minimum balance of $500 million in the Account.").
186. Richard D. Harza, President of Harza Engineering Company, a claimant against
Iran, stated:
The new Iran-United States Claims Tribunal presents another set of
uncertainties. Will the Claims Tribunal actually be established as called for by
the agreements? Will it operate with reasonable speed-and, in particular, will
there be enough arbitrators to hear the many cases likely to be brought there?
We can't tell yet whether the Claims Tribunal will provide the fair hearing we are
seeking.
Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra note 19, at 88; see also Decisions of the IranUnited States Claims Tribunak Remarks by the Chairman,78 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC.

221, 221 (1984) (noting that lawyers representing claimants interests wondered at the
outset "[w]ould the Tribunal observe standards of due process and fairness comparable to
our own constitutionally based values? Would the Tribunal observe its mandate in article
V of the Claims Settlement Declaration to decide all cases 'on the basis of respect for law,'
or would its process rather given-support to the notion that 'arbitral' and 'arbitrary' mean
the same thing?").
187. See The U.Slranian Hostage Settlement, Remarks by Andreas F. Lowenfeld, 75

AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 236, 242 (1981) (opining that United States "claimants were
much better off under the arbitral procedure than they would have been if they had been
required to sue in American courts"); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE
AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., IRAN: THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE

HOSTAGE SETLEMENT AGREEMENT 38 (Comm. Print 1981) ("Strong arguments can be

made that, for all the potential pitfalls in the Claims Tribunal, non-bank claimants are
better off now than before the freeze."); BOYLE, supra note 167, at 223-24 (contrasting the
opportunity claimants against Iran had of obtaining "payment at full face value" for their
claims with claimants against the People's Republic of China, who, after the United States'
1979 settlement, received forty-two cents on the dollar, which, discounted for inflation and
unpaid interest, amounted in reality to only twelve cents on the dollar).
188. See Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra note 19, at 188 (testimony of Mark

Feldman, Deputy Legal Adviser for the Carter Administration and Acting Legal Adviser
for the Reagan Administration) ("[M]y impression from discussions with [the claimants] is
that there is a large majority that probably always knew and are finally beginning to be
ready to admit to us that the remedies they had in U.S. courts were of very great
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Administration to implement the Declarations, but to implement

them on terms favorable to the claimants189 - terms, so favorable in
certain cases, that they bore little resemblance to the text of the
Algiers Declarations. According to Lawrence Newman, Chairman of
United States Iranian Claimants Committee, the lawyers representing
American claimants were not "initially unhappy with" the Algiers
Declarations; however, because they feared that the Reagan
Administration "might rush uncritically into accepting the deal made
by the Carter Administration," Newman wrote to President Reagan

to express the concerns the claimants did have and to request a
meeting to discuss them. 190

Likewise, other lawyers for claimants

against Iran wrote to President Reagan to raise additional concerns
and to request meetings. 191 These meetings were held, 192 and they
provided the claimants the input they had sought. The Reagan
uncertainty."); id. at 189 (testimony of Walter Stoessel) (stating that claimants realize that
they have a better chance of recovery in the Tribunal than they would have without it); id.
at 31 (testimony of Warren Christopher) ("[I]n the opinion of most lawyers, the U.S.
claimants will be generally better off with the new program than they were before the
hostage crisis arose.").
189. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra note 19, at 133 (testimony of Brice M.
Claggett, lawyer for claimants) ("exhort[ing] the responsible branches of Government...
to see that the agreements are implemented in a way that serves American interests"); id.
at 225 (prepared statement of John F. Olson, lawyer for claimants) (recommending that
"the agreements with Iran [be] implemented with the overall objective of assuring the
fairest possible treatment for American claimants consistent with their rather ambiguous
terms"); see id. at 229 (same statement) (arguing that the Reagan Administration should
honor the Algiers Declarations but "only if they are implemented fairly, carefully, and in a
manner consistent with their language but sensitive to the valid and substantial concerns
of American claimants against Iran. Only if that is done will the United States be living up
to a promise we have made to our own citizens, a promise that is every bit as important as
the international obligations we undertake.").
190. Newman, supra note 61, at 635-36; see also Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,
supra note 19, at 77-78 (reprint of Newman's letter to President Reagan). Newman gave
the letter to the news media and also conducted radio and television interviews so as to
"draw the attention of the public and the government to [the claimants'] concerns."
Newman, supra note 61, at 636. See also Lawrence W. Newman, Litigation in the United
States of Claims Against Iran, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at 36-37.
191. See Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 220-24 (letter and
"presentation" sent to President Reagan from Burns, Jackson, Summit, Rovins & Spitzer,
attorneys for William Bikoff and George Eisenpresser); id. at 127 (letter from Lee R.
Marks, Chairman of American Bar Association's Committee on Foreign Claims Section of
International Law) (suggesting meeting with committee members who "include attorneys
representing U.S. claimants and Iranian interests").
192. Id. at 80 (Lawrence Newman's letter to several Reagan Administration officials)
("We, together with Washington counsel for various plaintiffs, have had several meetings
with you and other administration officials ... for the purpose of discussing the
interpretation and implementation of" the Algiers Declarations.).
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Administration later made clear that in preparing the regulations
which implemented the Algiers Declarations, the Administration had
"discussed [the regulations] in extensive detail with representatives of
a wide variety and large number of U.S. claimants" and had
considered their views "fully... in the drafting process."'

93

So, after approximately a month of consultation and review,
President Reagan ratified the executive orders signed by President
Carter, 194 and the State Department issued a statement regarding the

settlement with Iran.195 The tone of the latter document was
recriminatory. It announced that the "present Administration would
not have negotiated with Iran for the release of the hostages," and it
pointedly noted that it had not considered how the whole crisis
"could have been handled better [or whether] a better set of
agreements [could] have been negotiated.'

96

Nonetheless, stating

that "[w]e are confronted with an accomplished fact," the
Administration announced its decision to implement the Declarations
but only "in strict accordance with the[ir] terms."'197 The Statement in
addition showed the Reagan Administration's disdain for
international law by making clear that the Administration did not
consider whether the Declarations were legally binding under

international law but chose to implement them because it was "in the
overall interests of the United States" to do so.198 Mark Feldman,
who was Deputy Legal Adviser for the Carter Administration and
Acting Legal Adviser for the Reagan Administration in its earliest
days, explained:
at 158 (prepared testimony of R. Timothy McNamar, Deputy Secretary of the
193. Ild.
Treasury, Reagan Administration); see also id at 162 (testimony of Walter Stoessel,
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Reagan Administration) ("We have
discussed these regulations in detail with U.S. claimants. Their views have been
considered fully in the drafting process."); id. at 83 (letter to Reagan Administration
officials from Lawrence Newman) ("We hope that we will be afforded the opportunity to
review the text of drafted executive orders and regulations before they are issued in order
to ensure that they do not unintentionally adversely affect United States claimants.").
194. Message to Congress, Feb. 24, 1981, reprintedin LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS
FOR POLITICAL ENDS, supranote 31, at DS-874-75.
195. Implementation of Hostage Agreements the Settlement with Iran, 81 DEP'T ST.
BULL. No. 2048 at 17.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. IL; see also Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra note 19, at 161 (testimony of
Walter Stoessel, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Reagan Administration)
("We did not see it as necessary to reach a conclusion as to the agreements' legally binding
character under international law. We are proceeding with implementation because it
appears clearly to be in the overall interests of the United States to do so.").
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[T]he specific reason for the disclaimer of any determination
concerning the binding effect of the Agreements under
international law was a political concern. The Administration did
not want it thought that it was observing these Agreements because
it was bound by international law to do so.... The Agreements
were implemented because they served the national interest.1 99
As the Statement suggests, although the Reagan Administration
decided to implement the Algiers Declarations, it by no means
tempered its rhetoric or moderated any of the criticism it had leveled
at the Carter Administration's handling of the crisis. Indeed, during
subsequent hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Walter Stoessel, Deputy Secretary of State for the Reagan
Administration, reiterated that the Reagan Administration would not
have negotiated for the hostages' release and opined that the Reagan
Administration "would have taken a different attitude from the
outset, and that action immediately after the seizure of the hostages
would have been very quick and very effective, and that we would not
have been in a situation which would have required lengthy
negotiations. ' 200 Stoessel similarly maintained before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee that the Carter Administration's
handling of the crisis injured United States' prestige abroad because
the whole situation went on for such a long time, that there were so
many months of attempted negotiations, that there were setbacks
and failures, that there were efforts to effect a release by other
means which failed, and that the whole procedure and the
prolonged nature of the situation was something that did not
enhance the image of the United States as a country able to defend
its interests, to defend its citizens, and to take the necessary action
20 1
in time.
199. Symposium, The Settlement with Iran, 13 U. MIAMI J. INT'L L. 1, 55 (1981).
200. House Foreign Affairs Hearings, supra note 40, at 200. However, persistent
questioning by Representative Zablocki did force Stoessel to backtrack slightly. See id. at
201 (acknowledging that "we would not wish to be categorical on" the question of
negotiating and that the sentence appearing in his statement-"[w]e will not negotiate the
payment of ransom nor the release of prisoners"-was "not clearly enough phrased"); see
also id. at 205 (Rep. Fountain criticizing the Reagan Administration for "repeating the
political comments"). Stoessel also repeated the recriminatory remarks that had appeared
in Reagan Administration's statement during hearings before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations. See Senate ForeignRelations Hearings,supranote 19, at 161.
201. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra note 19, at 182. Representative Solarzcontrasting the Reagan Administration's statements with former Secretary of State
Muskie's belief that the hostage crisis "will be seen in time as a sound and successful
application of our preference for settling disputes by peaceful means"-commented that
"this represents two rather fundamentally conflicting views of how we deal with this kind
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These statements highlight a fundamental tension in the Reagan

Administration's approach to the Algiers Declarations. The Reagan
Administration wanted to have it both ways: it wanted to continue to

talk tough-to trivialize international law and criticize the Carter
Administration for bungling the hostage crisis by negotiating an
international agreement-while at the same time, it wanted to gain
the many benefits contained in the international agreement that the

Carter Administration had in fact negotiated.
And that is, in fact, just what the Reagan Administration did.
All the while criticizing the Carter Administration, the Reagan

Administration consulted with United States claimants, and in light of
their comments, crafted its implementation of the Declarations in
ways that would maximize their interests. 2°2 Indeed, although

promising to implement the Declarations "in strict accordance with
the[ir] terms, '203 the Reagan Administration's implementation
arguably diverged from those terms-in ways suggested by the
United States claimants-in particular from certain provisions
relating to the return of Iran's assets, to litigation against Iran in
United States courts, and to litigation concerning the assets of the

former Shah and his close relatives.
Dissatisfied with these and other aspects

of the Reagan

Administration's implementation, Iran filed lawsuits with the
Tribunal, claiming that the United States violated myriad and sundry
provisions of the Algiers Declarations.

The Tribunal has only

recently decided the bulk of these cases, and taken as a whole, they
show that the Reagan Administration tried to have it all: pressed by

of situation." House Foreign Affairs Hearings,supra note 40, at 168; see also Senate
Foreign Relations Hearings,supra note 19, at 176 (Senator Percy noting that "[t]here is a
sharp difference of opinion enunciated by the Reagan administration against the Carter
administration"). The Reagan Administration's statements also sharply contrast with the
views of Cyrus Vance, the Carter Administration's first Secretary of State, who stated:
I am still convinced that the basic strategy of restraint, escalating international
pressure, and diplomacy adopted in the first days of the crisis was right and
consistent with the honor and interests of the United States and the safety of the
hostages. In the end it proved successful, even though the president and the
administration were wounded by it.
VANCE, supra note 29, at 380.
202. See Senate ForeignRelations Hearings,supra note 19, at 153 (opening statement of
Senator Percy) ("Having decided to go forward, it also is my impression that you [the
Reagan Administration] have done so with the greatest consideration for the interests of
American citizens and the integrity of American institutions.").
203. Implementation of Hostage Agreements the Settlement with Iran, 81 DEP'T ST.
BULL. No. 2048 at 17.
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American companies with claims against Iran, constrained by certain
inflexible domestic laws, ideologically opposed to an agreement
negotiated with terrorists, and tempted by the vague, undefined terms
in the Declarations themselves, the Reagan Administration tried to
secure for United States citizens the benefits provided by the Algiers
Declarations while interpreting its own obligations in a narrow,
sometimes highly implausible, way. The following section describes
Iran's claims and the Tribunal's resolution of them.

III. Cases Before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
As noted above, President Reagan inherited an international
agreement that had already been partially fulfilled. Iran had released
the hostages, and the United States had already transferred a
substantial portion of Iran's assets. But other obligations remained.
The Algiers Declarations contain provisions concerning the United
States' return of Iran's remaining assets, its termination of litigation
against Iran in United States courts, and its assistance in Iran's
litigation seeking the return of the Pahlavi assets. The Reagan
Administration implemented these and other provisions, but not to
Iran's satisfaction. Indeed, Iran complained about virtually every
aspect of the Reagan Administration's implementation of the
Declarations, and it consequently filed numerous suits with the
Tribunal alleging myriad treaty violations.
A. Standby Letters of Credit
(1) Background
Questions regarding standby letters of credit had plagued the
Carter Administration throughout the hostage crisis,2°4 and these
difficulties only increased with the signing of the Algiers
Declarations. Some background is necessary to understand the
issues.
As noted above, prior to the Islamic Revolution, hundreds of
American businesses had obtained lucrative contracts to supply goods
and services in Iran. When a United States contractor contracted
with an agency or instrumentality of Iran's pre-Revolutionary
government, the contract typically required the United States
contractor to secure its performance by means of a standby letter of

204. See Carswell & Davis, supra note 56, at 184.
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credit. The United States contractor did this by obtaining a bank
guarantee from an Iranian bank ("Iranian guarantor bank") in favor
of the Iranian government agency that was party to the contract
("beneficiary"). Normally, these guarantees were either advance
payment guarantees that secured an accounting to the Iranian
beneficiary for any advance payments for goods it made under the
contract, or performance guarantees that secured payment to the
Iranian beneficiary for damages if the United States contractor
defaulted on the contract. 2 5 The Iranian beneficiary would receive
up to the amount guaranteed by making a demand upon the
guarantee. 20 6 Some guarantees would be paid upon a simple demand,
while other guarantees required the Iranian beneficiary to certify that
the United States contractor had breached its contractual
obligations, 207 but even the latter kind of guarantee did not require
the Iranian beneficiary to provide any particulars, let alone any
208
evidence, of the alleged breach.
205. Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No. A15(I:C), Award No. ITL 78A15(I:C)-Fr, 25 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 247,248 para. 2 (Nov. 12, 1992) thereinafter Case
No. A15(I:C)].
206. I& at 248-49 para. 3.
207. Id
208. See Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra note 19, at 159 (prepared testimony
of R. Timothy McNamar) ("Under their terms, the standby letters of credit may be called
by the Iranian beneficiary at any time, with or without cause, and the issuing bank is
automatically obligated to pay the beneficiary, without regard to the merits of the
underlying transactions."); Wyle v. Bank Melli Of Tehran, 577 F. Supp. 1148, 1151 (N.D.
Cal. 1983) (noting that a U.S. shipping company obtained a letter of credit requiring the
Iranian beneficiary to document claims for missing or damaged cargo caused by the
shipping company but the Iranian beneficiary rejected that letter of credit and insisted that
the shipping company obtain one that was payable "against a 'simple demand"'); John A.
Barrett, The Iranian Cases,56 PLIICoMM 139, 143 (1985) (stating that payment letters of
credit generally "required no other documentation than a simple written declaration by
the Iranian bank beneficiary that it had paid out the funds under the Guarantee to the
Iranian agency equal to the amount of the particular payment request on the Letter of
Credit"). Such unconditional guarantees have been called "suicide" letters of credit or
"suicide bonds." Newman, supra note 61, at 631; Herbert A. Getz, Enjoining the
InternationalStandby Letter of Credit: The IranianLetter of Credit Cases, 21 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 189, 196 (1980); H.J. van der Vaart, Standby Letters of Creditand the Problem of Bad
Faith Calls, 8 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 36, 43-44 (1981) (noting that "'suicide' calling
provisions" facilitate bad faith calls); George Kimball & Barry A. Sanders, Preventing
Wrongful Payment of Guaranty Letters of Credit-Lessonsfrom Iran, 39 Bus. LAW. 417,
418 (1984). See also Getz, supra, at 195 (describing typical standby letters of credit as
requiring only a pro forma declaration by the beneficiary that the customer has failed to
perform); Harris Corp. v. Nat'l Iranian Radio and Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1356 (11th
Cir. 1982) ("In order to collect upon the guarantee letter of credit [National Iranian Radio
and Television] was required to declare that Harris had failed to comply with the terms
and conditions of the contract."); Senate Banking Comm. Hearing,supra note 62, at 23-24
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To secure the Iranian bank's guarantee, the United States
contractor would next have a United States bank open a standby

letter of credit in favor of the Iranian guarantor bank. The United
States bank ordinarily would pay the Iranian guarantor bank upon a
certification by the Iranian bank that it had been required to pay
under its guarantee. 2 9 Once the United States bank made its
United States contractor (or "account
payment, it would look to the
210
party") for reimbursement.
In sum, if an Iranian agency believed that the United States
contractor defaulted on the contract, the Iranian agency would certify
that the default had occurred and would receive payment from the
Iranian guarantor bank under its guarantee. After making such
payment, the Iranian guarantor bank would obtain reimbursement by
drawing on the United States bank under the standby letter of credit,
and the United States bank would then obtain reimbursement from
the United States contractor. 211 Standby letters of credit thus can be
understood to provide their beneficiaries with irrevocable payment
commitments that are independent of any dispute over the

performance of the underlying contract

12

In essence, they provide

(statement of Robert Carswell) (describing standby letters of credit as "written totally in
Iran's favor, and on their face, arguably could be called on demand by the relevant Iranian
entity").
209. Case No. A15(I:C), supranote 205,25 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 249 para. 4.
210. See id.; United States v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. A-16, Award No. 108A-16/582/591-FT, 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 57, 59-60 (Dec. 27, 1985) [hereinafter Case
No. A16]. For a more detailed description of standby letter of credit relationships, see
Getz, supra note 208, at 190-96; van der Vaart, supra note 208, at 38-43. See also Harris
Corp. v. Nat'l Iranian Radio and Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1346-47 (11th Cir. 1982): Itek
Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 511 F. Supp. 1341, 1342-43 (D. Mass. 1981); Am. Bell
Int'l v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420, 421-22 (S.D. N.Y. 1979); Mark P.
Zimmett, Standby Letters of Credit in the Iran Litigation: Two Hundred Problems in
Search of a Solution, 16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 927, 932-33 (1984).
211. Thus, the standby letters of credit were part of a complex four-party transaction
involving three contractual relationships: the bank guarantee between the Iranian agency
and the Iranian guarantor bank; the standby letter of credit itself between the issuing
United States bank and the Iranian guarantor bank; and the reimbursement agreement
between the United States contractor and the United States bank.
212. See Zimmett, supra note 210, at 928; Getz, supra note 208, at 203; Rockwell Int'l
Sys., Inc. v. Citibank, 719 F.2d 583, 587 (2d Cir. 1983) ("The letters of credit represent
separate contractual undertakings that are, in legal contemplation, wholly distinct from
whatever performance they ultimately secure."); United Techs. Corp. v. Citibank, N.A.,
469 F. Supp. 473, 477 (S.D. N.Y. 1979) ("It is axiomatic that the issuing bank's obligations
under its letter of credit is independent of its customer's obligations under the contract of
sale."); Guy W. Lewin Smith, Irrevocable Letters of Credit and Third Party Fraud: The
American Accord, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 55, 56 (1983).
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the beneficiary (here the Iranian agency) rather than the account

party (the United States contractor) the right to hold disputed funds
until the underlying contractual dispute is settled, arbitrated, or
213
litigated.
In November 1979, several hundred of these standby letters of
credit worth more than $1 billion were outstanding. 214 The day after
President Carter froze Iran's assets, the Treasury Department
implemented the freeze by promulgating the Iranian Assets Control
Regulations. 215 Initially, these regulations permitted United States
banks to honor Iranian calls on standby letters of credit but required
the funds to be paid into the frozen bank accounts of the Iranian
beneficiaries. 216 The United States contractors, however, found
themselves in a worrisome position. Although they had been
217
perfectly happy to secure these so-called "suicide" letters of credit
when they were contracting with one of the United States' most

reliable allies, once the Islamic Revolution succeeded and the
American Embassy was seized, the United States contractors became
concerned that Iran would make bad-faith calls on the letters of
credit. So, beginning in November 1979, scores of United States
contractors visited, phoned, and wrote the Treasury Department
beseeching it to do something to protect them.218 Although these

213. See Kimball & Sanders, supra note 208, at 419; Itek Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of
Boston, 730 F.2d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 1984) ("Parties to a contract may use a letter of credit in
order to make certain that contractual disputes wend their way towards resolution with
money in the beneficiary's pocket rather than in the pocket of the contracting party.").
214. Carswell & Davis, supra note 56, at 184; see also Case No. A15(I:C), supra note
205, 25 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 249 para. 5; Case No. A16, supra note 210, 5 Iran-U.S.
Cl. Trib. Rep. at 60.
215. 31 C.F.R. §§ 535.101-535.901 (1979).
216. 31 C.F.R. §§ 535.416, 535.508 (1979). See also Senate ForeignRelations Hearings,
supra note 19, at 159 (prepared testimony of R. Timothy McNamar) ("[T]he initial
regulations issued on November 14, 1979, authorized payment of any funds owed to Iran
to blocked accounts in domestic banks in the name of Iran. Thus, when calls were made
on the standby letters of credit, the banks would have paid the funds into blocked accounts
and then demanded reimbursement from the U.S. contractors.").
217. Getz, supra note 208, at 196; Kimball & Sanders, supra note 208, at 418.
218. See Carswell & Davis, supra note 56, at 184; Senate Banking Comm. Hearing,
supra note 62, at 82 (statement of Joseph R. Creighton, Vice President-General Counsel
of Harris Corp.) (describing "extensive negotiations with the government before the
freeze regulations actually provided any protection whatsoever to the American
contractors"); Lawrence W. Newman, Litigation in the United States of Claims Against
Iran, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at 34 (describing "importunings and
recitations to the Treasury Department"); see also Newman, supra note 61, at 638
(describing the similar concerns that American companies would later bring to the Reagan
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contractors by and large were sophisticated business people who had
knowingly bargained away their rights in order to secure the lucrative
underlying contracts, 219 they nonetheless argued that the risk of
politically motivated calls by Iran justified protection by the United
States government.220 By contrast, the United States banks that had
issued the letters of credit opposed governmental intervention
because they feared that anything that prevented them from honoring
calls pursuant to the literal terms of their contracts would harm their
221
reputation for reliability in the international financial community.
The contractors proposed restrictions of varying severity, with
some arguing for a wholesale nullification of the obligations.2 22 The
Treasury Department eventually settled on a less severe measure; on

Administration in anticipation of its promulgation of Treasury Regulations regarding
standby letters of credit).
Some United States companies did not wait for the hostage crisis to take action but
immediately upon the success of the Islamic Revolution in February 1979 filed suits to
enjoin the banks from honoring letters of credit in favor of Iranian beneficiaries. See, e.g.,
KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1979); Am. Bell Int'l v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. N.Y. 1979); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.
v. Bank Melli Iran, No. 79 Civ. 1190, (S.D. N.Y. Apr. 3, 1979). The suits were only
marginally successful. See Zimmett, supra note 210, at 929-30; van der Vaart, supra note
208, at 45-46; Gillespie, supranote 47, at 19-20.
219. See Barrett, supra note 208, at 142 (noting that "the lucrative market for both
commercial and consumer goods and services that existed in Iran under Shah Reza
Pahlavi's government" was so attractive that "most U.S. companies agreed without
hesitation to a demand by the contracting Iranian agencies for a 'performance guarantee'
on behalf of each U.S. company contracting to supply goods or services to Iran"); Am. Bell
Int'l Inc., 474 F. Supp. at 426 (denying Bell's motion for a preliminary injunction, stating
that "Bell, a sophisticated multi-national enterprise well advised by competent counsel,
entered into these arrangements with its corporate eyes open.... [Tihese arrangements
redounded tangibly to the benefit of Bell. The Contract with Iran, with its prospect of
designing and installing from scratch a nationwide and international communications
system, was certain to bring to Bell both monetary profit and prestige and good will in the
global communications industry. The agreement to indemnify Manufacturers on its Letter
of Credit provided the means by which these benefits could be achieved.").
220. Carswell & Davis, supra note 56, at 184; Richard J. Davis, The Decision to Freeze
IranianAssets, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at 18-19.
221. Carswell & Davis, supra note 56, at 185; Richard J. Davis, The Decision to Freeze
Iranian Assets, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at 19; see also Am. Bell Int'l,
474 F. Supp. at 426 (case decided prior to asset freeze which noted that if Manufacturers'
Bank were enjoined from paying a called standby letter of credit, bank could be subject to
suit elsewhere for failing to pay its obligations; bank's assets could be attached; and bank
would "face a loss of credibility in the international banking community"). Cf Senate
Banking Comm. Hearing, supra note 62, at 84 (written answers of Joseph R. Creighton)
(responding to banks' claim that "they are required to pay on a draw by the Iranian banks
in order to preserve the sanctity of international banking transactions").
222. Carswell & Davis, supra note 56, at 184.
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November 28, 1979, it amended the Iranian Assets Control
Regulations by adding Section 535.568, which required an issuing
bank to notify the account party-the United States contractorwhen it received a call on a letter of credit. The account party was
then allowed to apply for a license to establish a blocked account on
its own books;223 if a license was issued, then the United States bank
was prohibited from paying any proceeds into the blocked bank
account of the Iranian guarantor bank.2 4
Between November 1979 and January 1981, Iranian banks called
scores of standby letters of credit.2 5 Pursuant to Section 535.568, the
United States banks notified their account parties of the calls. In
many cases, the account party availed itself of the procedure
described in Section 535.568 and established a blocked account on its
own books, thereby preventing the bank from paying funds into a
blocked bank account.226 In addition, or as an alternative, some
account parties obtained preliminary injunctions from United States

courts enjoining the banks from honoring the letters of credit.227 In
other cases, the account parties took no action at all, and the United
States banks paid the amounts demanded into the blocked bank
accounts of the Iranian guarantor banks.2z This is how matters stood
223. 31 C.F.R. § 535.568(b). That subsection provided:
Whenever an issuing or confirming bank shall receive such demand for payment
under a standby letter of credit, it shall promptly notify the person for whose
account the credit was opened. Such person may then apply within five business
days for a specific license authorizing the account party to establish a blocked
account on its books in the name of the Iranian entity in the amount payable
under the credit, in lieu of payment by the issuing or confirming bank into a
blocked account and reimbursement therefor by the account party.
See also Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra note 19, at 159 (prepared testimony of
R. Timothy McNamar, Deputy Treasury Secretary, Reagan Administration).
224. 31 C.F.R. § 535.568(a).
225. Case No. A15(I:C), supra note 205,25 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 250 para. 7.
226. lIL; Case No. A16, supra note 210,5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 60.
227. Case No. A15(I:C), supra note 205,25 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 250 para. 7; Case
No. A16, supra note 210, 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 60-61. For examples of this
litigation, see Rockwell Int'l Sys. v. Citibank, N.A., 719 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1983); Harris
Corp. v. Nat'l Iranian Radio and Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1346-47 (11th Cir. 1982); Itek
Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 511 F. Supp. 1341,1342-43 (D. Mass. 1981).
228. Case No. A15(I:C), supra note 205,25 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 250 para. 7; Case
No. A16, supra note 210, 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 61. In many cases, the Treasury
regulations were not called into play at all because the Iranian call did not on its face
conform to the letter of credit, so the issuing bank accordingly refused to honor the call.
Case No. A15(I:C), supra note 205, 25 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 250 para. 7; Case No.
A16, supra note 210, 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 60. See, e.g., Rockwell Int'l Sys., 719
F.2d at 585, n.3.
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on January 19, 1981, when Iran and the United States entered into the

Algiers Declarations.
(2) Treatment under the Algiers Declarations

The Algiers Declarations do not specifically address the return of
standby-letters-of-credit proceeds, but several provisions could be
read to bear on the issue. Most broadly, General Principle A of the
General Declaration requires the United States, "[w]ithin the
framework of and pursuant to the provisions of the" Algiers

Declarations, to "restore the financial position of Iran, in so far as
possible, to that which existed prior to November 14, 1979" and to
"ensure the mobility and free transfer of all Iranian assets within its
jurisdiction, as set forth in Paragraphs 4-9."229

As to the specifics of the United States' obligation to transfer
Iranian funds, paragraphs 6, 8, and 9 of the General Declaration
appear most relevant to the question of whether the United States
was obligated to bring about the transfer of the standby-letters-ofcredit proceeds. 230 Paragraph 6 obligates the United States to bring

about the transfer "of all Iranian deposits and securities in U.S.
banking institutions in the United States .... ,,231 Paragraph 8
obligates the United States to bring about the transfer "of all Iranian

financial assets (meaning funds or securities) which are located in the
United States and abroad, apart from those assets referred to in

Paragraph 5 and 6 above .... ,,232 Finally, Paragraph 9 obligates the
United States to "arrange, subject to the provisions of U.S. law
applicable prior to November 14, 1979, for the transfer to Iran of all
Iranian properties which are located in the United States and abroad
and which are not within the scope of preceding paragraphs. '233 At
229. General Declaration, supra note 17, General Principal A, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S.
Cl. Trib. Rep. at 3.
230. The General Declaration contains several paragraphs addressing different parties
in possession of different categories of Iranian assets. For instance, as to different parties,
paragraph 4 addresses assets held by the Federal Reserve Bank, while paragraph 5
addresses assets held by foreign branches of United States banks, and paragraph 6
addresses assets held by United States branches of United States banks. General
Declaration, supra note 17, paras. 4-6, reprintedin 1 Iran-U.S. C1. Trib. Rep. at 4-5. As to
the different categories of assets, paragraphs 5 and 6 direct the transfer of "all Iranian
deposits and securities" while paragraph 9 directs the transfer of "all Iranian properties
which are located in the United States and abroad and which are not within the scope of
the preceding paragraphs." Id. paras. 5-6, 9, reprintedin 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 5-6.
231. Id. para. 6, reprintedin 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 5.
232. Id. para. 8, reprintedin 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 6.
233. Id. para. 9, reprintedin 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 6.
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the time he signed the Algiers Declarations, President Carter issued
Executive Orders 12279, 12280, and 12281, which implemented, and

34
largely mirrored, Paragraphs 6, 8, and 9 of the General Declaration.2

President Reagan ratified these and President Carter's other
executive orders when he announced that he would implement the

Algiers DeclarationsP35

Although neither the Algiers Declarations nor President Carter's

executive orders specifically addresses the transfer of letter-of-credit
proceeds, those proceeds that the banks had been able to place in
blocked Iranian bank accounts were understood to fall within the
Declarations' directives and were therefore transferred to Iran along
with the other funds in those accountsP 6 But what about the letterof-credit proceeds that the banks had not been able to pay either

because the account parties had obtained injunctions enjoining the
banks' payment or had created substituted blocked accounts on their
own books pursuant to 31 C.F.R. § 535.568? Although by no means
perfectly clear, the provisions of the Algiers Declarations described
above could easily be read to require the United States to transfer
234. Executive Order 12279 directed "[a]ny branch or office of a banking institution
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" to transfer all "funds or securities legally
or beneficially owned" by Iran and all "deposits standing to the credit of or beneficially
owned" by Iran. Exec. Order No. 12,279 § 1-101, 46 Fed. Reg. 7919 (1981). It also
revoked "[a]ll licenses and authorizations for acquiring or exercising any right, power, or
privilege, by court order, attachment or, otherwise," pertaining to the properties described
in the executive order, id § 1-102(a), and it nullified "all rights, powers, and privileges
relating [to the above-mentioned property] which derive from any attachment,
injunction,... or other action in any litigation" after November 14, 1979, except those of
the Government of Iran and its agencies, id. § 1-102(b).
Executive Order 12280, implementing paragraph 8 of the General Declaration,
directed "any person" ... which is not a banking institution and is ...in possession or
control of funds or securities of Iran ...to transfer [the] funds ... to the Federal Reserve

Bank." Exec. Order No. 12,280 § 1-101, 46 Fed. Reg. 7921 (1981). Like Executive Order
12279, it also revoked all licenses relating to the properties it described, id.
§ 1-102(a), and
it nullified all rights deriving from any attachment, injunction or like proceedings in
litigation after November 14, 1979, except those of the Government of Iran and its
agencies, id. § 1-102(b). Finally, Executive Order 12281, like its progenitor Paragraph 9 of
the General Declaration, directs "all persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States in possession or control of properties, not including funds and securities, owned by
Iran" to transfer such properties to Iran. Exec. Order No. 12,281 § 1-101, 46 Fed. Reg.
7923 (1981). Like the other two executive orders, Executive Order 12281 also revoked all
licenses relating to the properties it described, id. § 1-102(a), and it nullified all rights
deriving from any attachment, injunction, or like proceedings in litigation after November
14,1979, except those of the Government of Iran and its agencies, id. § 1-102(b).
235. Message from the President of the United States, Feb. 24,1981, reprintedin Senate
ForeignRelations Hearings,supra note 19, at 282.

236. Case No. A15(I:C), supra note 205,25 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 257 para. 24.
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those funds. Further, President Carter's Executive Orders, mirroring

the terms of the Declarations, give no support for a contrary
conclusion.
(3) The Reagan Administration'sResponse
However one might read the Algiers Declarations or President

Carter's Executive Orders, in February 1981 it was the Reagan
Administration that was implementing the Algiers Declarations, and
that Administration was confronted with vocal American account
parties who were utterly aghast at the thought that the hundreds of
millions of dollars that they had-at least nominally- placed in
substituted blocked accounts on their own books would be
transferred to Iran. Most of the contractors were convinced that
Iran's letter-of-credit calls were fraudulent, 237 and this conviction was
by no means without support. Iran had made a large number of its
calls virtually simultaneously in March 1980 and for the full face
amounts of the letters of credit, thus suggesting that the calls were not
238
based on actual defaults but rather were politically motivated.
Although the Tribunal's ability to rectify any improper payments to
Iran might in theory have mitigated the claimants' fears, some

237. See Senate Banking Comm. Hearing,supra note 62, at 81 (testimony of Joseph R.
Creighton, Vice President-General Counsel, Harris Corp., claimant against Iran) ("After
the revolution several Iranian banks attempted to collect on such standby letters of credit,
even though there was no default claimed by the Iranian contracting party."); Rockwell
Int'l Sys. v. Citibank, 719 F.2d 583, 584 (2d Cir. 1983) ("The gist of Rockwell's case is that,
as a result of the revolution in Iran and its aftermath, it was prevented by the new
government in Iran from completing performance of the contract and that the subsequent
calls by Iranian officials ...on the letters of credit were fraudulent.").
238. See Rockwell Int'l Sys., 719 F.2d at 588, 589 (noting that letter-of-credit calls which
had occurred on March 31, 1980 and April 22, 1980 arose "in the context of a wholesale
series of calls on similar letters in other Iranian transactions" and supported "Rockwell's
contention that these letters ... were therefore fraudulent"); Newman, supra note 61, at
638-39 (contending that claimants seeking to enjoin payment of standby letters of credit
"were aided ... by statements contained in an order, a copy of which we managed to
obtain, issued by the Central Bank of Iran, Bank Markazi. That document called for all
Iranian banks that were beneficiaries under standby letters of credit issued at the request
of American companies to demand payment under them, regardless of the underlying
circumstances."); Wyle v. Bank Melli Of Tehran, 577 F. Supp. 1148, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
(noting that there "is some evidence of a substantial nature to support plaintiff's claims
concerning an Iranian policy of demanding payment on letters of credit without regard to
whether payment is justified" and pointing in particular to the "remarkable" document
that Bank Melli transmitted to Bank of California to call the letter of credit which is "a
form, fill-in-the-blanks, in which the operative language concerning failure to pay on
demand on a letter of credit has clearly been typed by a different typewriter than the
language which identifies the particular respondent bank and letter of credit").

January 2001]

CARTER, REAGAN, AND KH-OMVEINI

claimants were not certain that their claims against Iran would fall
within the Tribunal's jurisdiction,239 and even those claimants who
were relatively certain of their ability to bring a claim before the

Tribunal were not inclined to pay first and wait for the Tribunal to
issue them a refund later. As a consequence, they lobbied the
Reagan Administration to allow them, at the very least, to retain the
letter-of-credit proceeds that they had already placed in substituted
blocked accounts and to retain the regulations permitting substituted

blocked accounts so as to prohibit banks from paying subsequentlycalled standby letters of credit.2 40
And that is just what the Reagan Administration did. To
implement the Algiers Declarations, the Treasury Department
amended the Iranian Assets Control Regulations to provide for the
But, the Treasury
transfer of the remaining Iranian assets.
allowed United
which
535.568,
§
C.F.R.
31
retained
Department
from honoring
banks
issuing
States account parties to preclude
standby-letter-of-credit calls by establishing substituted blocked
accounts on their own books. Moreover, the Treasury Department
promulgated 31 C.F.R. § 535.438 which provided that the transfer
239. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra note 19, at 228 (prepared testimony of
John F. Olson, lawyer for claimants) (delineating Tribunal's jurisdictional exclusions and
noting that "[t]here will thus be many cases where there will be doubt about the tribunal's
eventual ability to make a decision and an award"); Feldman, supra note 183, at 79-80;
Rockwell Int'l Sys., 719 F.2d at 586-87 (noting that district court's grant of preliminary
injunction on the payment of standby letter of credit was "based largely on [its] finding
that it was 'highly probable that the Hague Tribunal will refuse to accept jurisdiction over
plaintiff's claims"').
240. See Senate ForeignRelations Hearings,supra note 19, at 87 (prepared statement of
Richard D. Harza) (stating that Harza Engineering Co. advised the State and Treasury
Departments, among other things, that "(flunds subject to the letters [of credit] should be
kept frozen until the underlying disputes between U.S. companies and Iranian agencies
are decided on the merits"); id. at 227 (prepared statement of John F. Olson, lawyer for
claimants) ("The protection against unwarranted calls on standby letters of credit and
bank guarantees.., which presently appears in Section 535.568 of the freeze regulations
must be maintained firmly in place until the underlying claims are determined before the
new tribunal or in the courts."); Newman, supra note 61, at 636-37 (One of the concerns
that the claimants brought to the Reagan Administration was "that the standby letters of
credit might somehow be permitted to be called for payment before the Tribunal had a
chance to deal with the claims arising out of the contracts under which those credits had
been issued."); Senate Banking Comm. Hearing,supra note 62, at 84 (prepared statement
of Joseph R. Creighton) (noting that Harris Corp. and other similarly situated companies
are satisfied with the Reagan Administration's regulations that would retain the freeze).
However, Mr. Creighton of the Harris Corporation had gone so far as to suggest that
Congress enact legislation permanently terminating the letters of credit. See id.; see also
Trooboff, supra note 49, at 148 ("Many contractors believe that [standby letters of credit]
should be cancelled by congressional action.").
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directives contained in the amended regulations did not apply to
standby letters of credit to which a blocked account had been
established on the books of a United States account party, or to which
payment was prohibited under a court injunction. 241 So, United
States account parties were not required to transfer to Iran the funds
they had placed in substituted blocked accounts; moreover, when
Iranian beneficiaries called letters of credit after the Algiers
Declarations were signed, United States contractors were able to
continue to prevent the issuing banks from honoring the calls by
establishing blocked accounts on their own books. Finally, President
Reagan also issued Executive Order 12294 which suspended all legal
proceedings against Iran before United States courts with the
exception of a few categories, one of which was claims concerning the
validity or payment of standby letters of credit. 242 Thus, in addition to
providing the protection of the substituted blocked accounts, the
Reagan Administration also authorized United States account parties
to institute or continue litigation to enjoin United States banks from
honoring Iranian calls on letters of credit.
(4) Iran's Case Before the Tribunal
Iran filed suit in the Tribunal, claiming that the United States
had breached the Algiers Declarations by failing to bring about the
transfer of the funds in the substituted blocked accounts; by
authorizing further substituted accounts to be established; and by
243
failing to terminate litigation pertaining to standby letters of credit.
As for its first two claims, Iran contended that by failing to revoke the

241. 31 C.F.R. § 535.438(a) reads in full:
Nothing contained in §§ 535.212, 535.213, and 535.214 [directing the transfer of
Iranian funds] or in any other provision or revocation or amendment of any
provision in this part affects the prohibition in § 535.201 and the licensing
procedure in § 535.568 relating to certain standby letters of credit, performance
bonds and similar obligations. The term "funds and securities" as used in this
part does not include substitute blocked accounts established under section
535.568 relating to standby letters of credit, performance or payment bonds and
similar obligations.
Likewise, Section 535.337 of the amended regulations provides that "[f]or purposes of
this part, the term 'funds' shall mean monies in trust, escrow and similar special funds held
by non-banking institutions, currency and coins. It does not include accounts created
under § 535.568." And Section 535.333(a) provides that "[t]he term 'properties' as used in
§ 535.215 ...does not include obligations under standby letters of credit ...."
242. Exec. Order No. 12,294 § 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 14111 (1981); see also 31 C.F.R. §
535.222(g) (1981).
243. Case No. A15(I:C), supra note 205,25 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 248 para. 1.
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licensing procedure established by Section 535.568 and by failing to
transfer the letter-of-credit proceeds that had previously been placed
in substituted blocked accounts, the United States had breached its
General Principle A obligation to "restore the financial position of
Iran, in so far as possible, to that which existed prior to November 14,
1979.,"2u
In a previous case involving General Principle A, the United
States had argued that the General Principles aid in interpreting the
relevant Declarations' provisions but impose no independent
obligations on Iran or the United States.2 45 This argument was
consistent with the understanding of the Carter Administration
officials who had negotiated the Declarations and who had added the
General Principles with the belief that they would provide the Iranian
negotiators with political cover while not altering the obligations
contained in the Declarations in any substantive way. 246 The Tribunal
rejected the argument, however, holding that the "General Principles
are not simply statements of purpose," but rather, embody "broad
legal commitments, with the ways of their implementation being
detailed in the following parts of the General Declaration." 247
In the letters-of-credit case, the United States acknowledged that
it was required to transfer Iranian "assets" but argued that the letters
of credit that had been subject to an injunction or whose proceeds
had been placed in substituted blocked accounts were not assets but
merely "contingent rights."2m According to the United States, the
letters-of-credit proceeds became assets only when the letters of
credit had been honored by American banks between November 14,
1979 and January 19, 1981 and the proceeds deposited in the blocked
bank accounts of the Iranian beneficiaries. 249 In so arguing, however,
the United States ignored the fact that it was the United States' own
regulations that prevented the banks from honoring the letters of
credit and placing the funds into the blocked bank accounts of Iranian
beneficiaries. That is, if the funds were not "assets" under the United

244. Id at 256 para. 22.
245. Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. A15(I:G), Award No. ITL 63-A15(I:G)-F-, 12
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 40,45 para. 11 (Aug. 20,1986) [hereinafter Case No. A15(I:G)].
246. Owen, supra note 47, at 318-19.
247. Case No. A15(I:G), supra note 245,12 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 46-47 para. 17.
248. Case No. A15(I:C), supra note 205,25 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 257-58 paras. 2425.
249. 1 at 257 para. 24.
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States' definition of the term, it was because United States
regulations prevented them from so becoming.
The United States next pointed out that Iranian banks had made
"'wholesale claims' on large numbers of standby letters of credit
without regard for their terms or for the status of the performance on
the underlying contracts. '250 According to the United States, if it had
permitted the banks to honor the letters of credit under those
circumstances, "the United States account parties involved would
have initiated legal actions in the United States courts to block
payment on what they regarded as fraudulent calls on these letters of
credit. '251 The United States thus argued that retaining the
regulations preserved the status quo until the underlying contractual
disputes could be decided by the Tribunal. This argument ignores the
fact that the whole purpose of a standby letter of credit is to provide
the beneficiary with the right to hold disputed funds until the dispute
is settled. 252 If the beneficiary must wait until the underlying
contractual disputes are settled, then its standby letter of credit is
valueless. More notably, the United States' argument begs the
question of its General Principle B obligation-at issue in this very
case-to terminate and prohibit further litigation against Iran in
United States courts. The United States can hardly fulfill its General
Principle A obligations by violating General Principle B. Indeed, the
United States' remarkably weak legal arguments go a long way
toward confirming that its preservation of the letter-of-credit
regulations had very little to do with the terms of the Algiers
Declarations and a lot to do with the political uproar that would have
greeted the Reagan Administration had it adopted a different course.
However, it is the Tribunal, and not the Reagan Administration,
that definitively interprets the Algiers Declarations. In Award No.
A15(I:C), the Tribunal-with all three American arbitrators in
agreement-held that the United States, by continuing to permit
substituted blocked accounts, had failed to fulfill its General Principle
A obligation to restore the financial position of Iran, insofar as
250. Id. at 252 para. 11.
251. Id.
252. See Kimball & Sanders, supra note 208, at 419; Itek Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of
Boston, 730 F.2d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 1984) ("Parties to a contract may use a letter of credit in
order to make certain that contractual disputes wend their way towards resolution with
money in the beneficiary's pocket rather than in the pocket of the contracting party."); see
also Zimmett, supra note 210, at 929 ("The issuing bank's independent, irrevocable
commitment to honor th[e beneficiary's] demand is what gives the standby letter of credit
its value and is why it is so widely accepted in international trade.").
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The
possible, to that which existed before November 14, 1979.2
Tribunal held that before November 14, 1979,
[i]f an Iranian guarantor bank called such a letter of credit, the
United States bank would pay the amount called if it found the call
to be timely and conforming. If the United States bank refused
payment because of alleged untimeliness or nonconformity, the
Iranian guarantor bank could attempt to remedy this deficiency. In
addition, a United States account party that contended that a call
was clearly legally unjustified could seek a court injunction to
prevent payment of such a standby letter of credit. There existed
to establish
no provision for United States account parties
4
substitute blocked accounts on their own books.25
Fortunately for the United States, the Tribunal's holding covered
few letters of credit. The Tribunal noted that Iran no longer pursued
claims with respect to letters of credit (1) that the parties had settled;
(2) that are or were at issue in a claim brought before the Tribunal for
so long as the claim is or was pending before the Tribunal; or (3) that
are or were at issue in a claim that the Tribunal will resolve or has
resolved on the merits. Thus, the Tribunal held these claims to be
5
moot.2
The Tribunal did not find it feasible to determine the precise
amount of damages at that stage of the proceedings, so it asked the
parties to negotiate as to the identity of the letters of credit falling
within the Tribunal's holding and "the consequences" of that
holding Z 6 As noted above, Iran had also claimed that the United
States had violated General Principle B by failing to vacate the
preliminary injunctions that enjoined the payment of letters of credit
and by failing to prohibit further litigation thereon. The Tribunal
declined to address that claim because it and numerous, similar claims
regarding continuing litigation in United States courts were at issue in
another case Iran brought against the United States-Case No.
A15(IV)-but it did encourage the parties to include the claim in

253. Case No. A15(I:C), supra note 205,25 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 261 para. 35.
254. Id at 258 para. 27. The Tribunal acknowledged, however, that "for a certain
period after 19 January 1981, the United States' retention of the [licensing regulations]
might well have been consistent with... General Principle A," inter alia, because "'the
restoration of the financial position of Iran is a complex process' that 'compris[es] several
successive steps' so that "'General Principle A does not imply that all Iranian funds
within the United States ... were to be returned to Iran immediately' after the Algiers
Accords were concluded." Id. at 260 para. 31 (quoting Case No. A15(I:G), supra note 245,
12 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 48 paras 21-22).
255. Id at 260 para. 32.
256. I at 261-62 para. 36.
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States,

apparently

recognizing that its chances of prevailing on the litigation claim were
slim, did just that and settled both Case No. A15(I:C) and Case No.
A15(IV:C) -involving letter-of-credit litigation-in February 1996 as
258
part of an even larger settlement.
(5) PreliminaryConclusions

Faced with great potential harm to United States account
parties259 and a not-entirely-clear text, the Reagan Administration
called the doubt in favor of the United States account parties. And it
lost; that is, it was held to have breached the Algiers Declarations,
and, as a result, it paid Iran damages. Those consequences are

obviously undesirable, and they can be said to stem in some part from
the Reagan Administration's long-standing predisposition to take a
hardline against Iran. However, a closer, more textured view suggests
that on the issue of standby letters of credit, the Reagan
Administration had no real choice but to interpret the Declarations as
257. Id. at 262 para. 38.
258. Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No. A13, A15(I and IV:C), and
A26(I, II, and III), Award No. 568-A13/A15(I and IV:C)/A26(I, II, and III)-FF, 1996 WL
1171803 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Feb. 22, 1996). As part of the settlement, the Parties disposed
of a case pending before the International Court of Justice as well as several cases pending
before the Tribunal, including Cases No. A15(I:C) and A15(IV:C). See id. The parties
named 37 letters of credit as falling within the Tribunal's Interlocutory Award, although
they acknowledged that there could be others. See id.
In summary, the United States agreed to pay Iran $131.8 million, $61.8 million of
which was in settlement of the Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of July 3, 1988
pending before the International Court of Justice. The United States paid the remaining
$70 million in settlement of (a) four cases pending before the Tribunal-(1) Case No.
A15(I), excluding A15(I:F), except for accounts 78915710 and 01297539 formerly held at
Philadelphia National Bank; (2) Case A15(IV:C); (3) Case A13; and (4) those parts of
Case A26 that had been consolidated with Case A15(I) pursuant to the Tribunal's Order
of June 2, 1993 in that case-and (b) Dollar Account No. 2. Of the $70 million paid in
settlement of Tribunal cases, $15 million was deposited into the Tribunal's Security
Account. See 11 No. 2 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 3 (1996) (describing settlement);
Marian Nash (Leich), Contemporary Practiceof the United States Relating to International
Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 263, 278-79 (1996) (describing settlement); Conrad K. Harper,
FriedmannAward Address, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 265, 267-68 (1997) (describing
negotiations leading to settlement). The United States also amended 31 C.F.R. §535.568.
As amended, it revoked authorization for blocked accounts unless the account party could
provide documentation that the license pertained to a standby letter of credit that fell
within one of the categories that the Tribunal had found to be moot. 56 Fed. Reg. 6546-47
(1991).
259. See van der Vaart, supra note 208, at 44 (noting that when a beneficiary "exercises
its 'unconditional' right to call for payment of the standby letter," it may cause the
bankruptcy of the account party and solvency problems for the bank).
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it did. Given the substantial evidence that Iran's calls were
fraudulent, given the uncertain nature of the Tribunal's jurisdiction to
rectify improper payments along with doubts as to how equitable and
efficacious the Tribunal would be even when it had jurisdiction, and

given the background of pervasive hostility amongst United States
voters toward anything that could be deemed pro-Iranian,260 there
was no politically viable way for the Reagan Administration to order
the transfer of hundreds of millions of dollars in standby-letter-ofcredit funds absent a clear directive in the Algiers Declarations.
Indeed, even though neither the Declarations nor President
Carter's Executive Orders provides any specific protection to United
States account parties, and there is nothing in the negotiating history
of the Declarations suggesting that such protection was contemplated,
the political pressures which would support such protection were

sufficiently clear at the time the Declarations were being
implemented. Thus, in prepared testimony before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Robert
Carswell, who had been Deputy Treasury Secretary for the Carter
Administration, opined-notably without referring to any provision
of the Declarations-that "under the [Declarations] the U.S. can

continue to prevent payments under" standby letters of credit.261 The
Reagan Administration had issued a "clarifying announcement" on
January 26, 1981-about three weeks before Carswell's testimonyindicating that letter-of-credit payments (and substituted blocked
accounts created as a result of past letter-of-credit calls) would
260. Indeed, even some U.S. public officials had difficulty concealing their animosity
towards Iran. See Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra note 19, at 50 (comments of
Senator Hayakawa) (asking whether the United States had agreed to do "police work for
this nasty nation of Iran"); Transcript of Prehearing Conference at 5, Nov. 27, 1991,
Islamic Republic of Iran v. Shams Pahlavi, Case No. WEC69489 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Apr.
26, 1993) (Doc. 105, Ex. 10) (Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Irving Shimer stating,
among other things, that he was "biting [his] tongue" because the things he thought about
the Ayatollah Khomeini were "not printable") (on file with author).
261. Senate Banking Comm. Hearing,supra note 62, at 24. Carswell went on to state in
live testimony:
I think it is clear that before the freeze, firms that had entered into these
irrevocable letters of credit were dangerously exposed. Indeed, a number of
them were in court, trying to prevent the banks from paying over on the
irrevocable letters of credit. And there were no very good defenses. They had
lost lawsuits they brought. The banks were either paying, or preparing to pay.
When the freeze came along we, in effect, gave them relief. And that relief is still
in effect. The way the agreements were negotiated, the new administration is in
a position to keep that relief indefinitely in effect.
I at 56.
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remain frozen. 262 So, when testifying before a Senate committee that
263
was concerned about the concessions the United States had made,
Carswell was no doubt reluctant to criticize the Reagan
Administration's proposed implementation of the Declarations on
the ground that the Reagan Administration had wrongfully provided
United States nationals with the much-needed protection that the
Carter Administration had failed to secure. Interestingly, however,
Carswell's broad, unsupported statement contrasts with the
comments of Mark Feldman, who drafted portions of the Algiers
Declarations as Deputy Legal Adviser for the Carter Administration
and who coordinated the Reagan Administration's implementation of
the Declarations for its first four months. Feldman was careful not to
of
speak of what the Declarations provide with respect to letters
' 264
taken.
has
States
"United
the
"position"
credit but only of the
Events occurring after the Reagan Administration made its
decision to retain the blocking regulations confirmed the need for
those regulations. 265 In November 1981, Iran instituted another wave
of calls on standby letters of credit, this one prompted by a directive
from Iran's Bureau for the Coordination and Implementation of the
Algerian Declarations, which stated:
As regards overdue guarantees [standby letters of credit], where a
bank issuing the guarantee has not been asked to pay the sum of
the guarantee prior to maturity, the Iranian bank should request
the issuing bank by telex to pay the sum of the guarantee.
Where the guarantees [standby letters of credit] issued by
American banks have not yet matured, the Iranian bank should

262. See Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra note 19, at 227.
263. See, e.g., Senate Banking Comm. Hearing, supra note 62, at 3 (Senator Heinz
asking whether "[b]y moving previously frozen and attached assets out of the country, is
the President doing by indirection what he most certainly could not do directly, namely
using the assets of private citizens to pay ransom to a foreign government, thereby
depriving those citizens of their property without due process as guaranteed by the fifth
amendment"); id. at 49-51 (Senator Heinz subjecting Carter Administration officials to
pointed questioning about the United States' obligations to assist in Iran's litigation
against the former Shah and his close relatives); id. at 53-54 (Senator Garn questioning
Carter Administration officials on same); id. at 57 (Senator Heinz questioning as to
whether Iran will renege on its obligation to replenish the Tribunal's Security Account);
id. at 61-63 (Roberts B. Owen's responses to Senator Proxmire's questions).
264. Feldman, supra note 183, at 82.
265. The Iranian standby-letter-of-credit cases motivated many companies to reexamine the terms of the performance guarantees they had given to other countries and to
propose provisions that would prevent the beneficiaries from making the kind of unilateral
calls that Iran had been able to make. Trooboff, supra note 49, at 148.
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contact the relevant beneficiary and take appropriate action for the
266
collection of the sum of the guarantee.

This directive, along with other circumstances, resulted in United
States courts as well as courts around the world enjoining payment on
the letters of credit because of the substantial likelihood that the calls
were fraudulent. 267 Typical of the foreign cases is Alfa-Laval AB, in
which the Tribunal de Commerce de Bruxelles found Bank Meli's
draw on a Bank of America standby letter of credit "obviously

abusive," "obviously in bad faith," "abusive and fraudulent," and "of
a purely political nature... in the context of the conflict between the

United States and Iran. '268 Further, the Tribunal, in one of its earliest
cases involving a contract secured by a standby letter of credit, found
'269
Iran's call on the letter to be "improper.
It goes without saying, of course, that the desirability of the
protection the United States provided its nationals-however
obvious-is irrelevant if the treaty text prohibits such protection.
However, an ironic feature of Case No. A15(I:C) is that the United
States was not found to have breached any of the detailed provisions
of the Algiers Declarations that specified the United States'

obligations to return Iran's assets. Rather, the Tribunal held that the
United States violated General Principle A, one of the two additions
that Iran had insisted upon including at the eleventh hour and that
the Carter Administration had agreed to, believing that it-the Carter

266. 1982 Iranian Assets Lit. Rep. 4409,4416-17; Barrett, supranote 208, at 151.
267. See, e.g., Itek Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 730 F.2d 19, 24-25 (1st Cir. 1984)
(holding that account party had shown that Iranian beneficiary's call had "no plausible or

colorable basis under the contract [so that] its effort to obtain the money is fraudulent");
Rockwell Int'l Sys., Inc. v. Citibank, 719 F.2d 583, 589 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that account
party will probably be able to demonstrate that the letter of credit call was fraudulent);
Harris Corp. v. Nat'l Iranian Radio and Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1356 (11th Cir. 1982)
(issuing preliminary injunction because account party showed substantial likelihood that it
would prevail on the ground of fraud); Wyle v. Bank Melli Of Tehran, 577 F. Supp. 1148,

1163 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (finding that facts show Iranian beneficiary's "active, intentional
fraud"); Collins Sys. Int'l, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, Trib. com. Paris (ord. r6f.), Feb.

12, 1982, D. 1982, 507, note Vasseur; Fortres-Icas Continental Assoc./Algemene Bank
Nederland, N.V., President of the District Court, 18 Dec. 1980, Kort Geding, 1980, No.
1065, affid Ct. App. Amsterdam, 4th Chamber, 13 Jan. 1983 (unpublished). See also
Barrett, supra note 208, at 156 (noting that Iranian cases resulted in a sharp shift in the

jurisprudence concerning fraud as a basis for enjoining payment on standby letters of
credit).
268. Alfa-Laval AB v. Bank of America v. Bank Melli and Iranian Dairy Industries,

Case No. 2920, Commercial Court of Brussels (Apr. 6,1982), 1982 D.S. Jur. 504.
269. Ultrasystems Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. 84, Partial Award No. 2784-3,4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 100 (Dec. 19,1983).
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Administration -had drafted the Principles in such a way that they
would have no substantive content independent of the Declarations'
specific provisions. Thus, although it was the Reagan Administration
that breached the Algiers Declarations by retaining the blocking
regulations, it breached a provision that the Carter Administration
believed to impose no obligations.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the consequences of the Tribunal's
holding were relatively slight, particularly when contrasted with the
political costs that the Reagan Administration would have incurred
had it rescinded the protective regulations. Because the Tribunal did
not make its decision until nine years after the Declarations were
signed, and because it held moot all the letters of credit relating to
claims pending before the Tribunal, claims resolved by the Tribunal,
and claims settled by the parties, 270 the Tribunal ended up issuing a
very narrow award, one that should not have cost the United States
too much to settle.271
B. Iran's Interests in Tangible Assets
(1) Background
In 1992, the Tribunal addressed another aspect of the Reagan
Administration's implementation of the Algiers Declarations, this
time involving Iran's tangible assets. When President Carter froze
Iran's assets on November 14, 1979, he blocked the transfer of, among
other things, numerous tangible properties.
These properties
included military equipment that Iran had purchased from the United
States Government but that, for one reason or another, remained in
the hands of the United States, as well as both military and nonmilitary properties that Iran had sent to American private parties for
repairs or improvements and that were held by those parties at the
time of the asset freeze. Paragraph 9 of the General Declaration
addresses the United States' obligation to return Iran's tangible
properties, and in particular, requires the United States to "arrange,
subject to the provisions of United States law applicable prior to
November 14, 1979, for the transfer to Iran of all Iranian properties

270. Case No. A15(I:C), supra note 205,25 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 260 para. 32.
271. See 5 No. 20 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 3 (1990) ("Iran's victory on the letter of
credit issue was somewhat hollow" as a result of the Tribunal's conclusion that most of the
letter-of-credit claims were moot).
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which are located in the United States and abroad and which are not
within the scope of the preceding paragraphs."2 72
At the same time that President Carter signed the Algiers
Declarations, he issued several executive orders, one of whichExecutive Order 12281-implemented paragraph 9's directives. The
Executive Order addressed "properties, not including funds and
securities, owned by Iran," and it directed "[a]ll persons subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States... to transfer such properties, as
directed.., by the Government of Iran," subject to the caveat that
the directive "does not relieve persons subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States from existing legal requirements other than those
based upon the International Emergency Economic Powers Act." 273
The Executive Order also revoked all licenses for acquiring any right,
power, or privilege in Iranian properties,274 and it nullified all rights,
powers, and privileges relating to Iranian property which derive from
any attachment, injunction, or like process in any litigation after
November 14, 1979, except those of the Government of Iran. 75
Finally, and most relevant to the Reagan Administration's
subsequent implementation of paragraph 9, section 1-102(c) of the
Executive Order provides that "[a]ll persons subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States are prohibited from acquiring or
exercising any right, power, or privilege, whether by court order or
otherwise, with respect to the properties" described in the Executive
Order.276
Neither paragraph 9 nor Executive Order 12281 defines the term
"properties," nor does either one of them make clear the role that
"the provisions of U.S. law applicable prior to November 14, 1979"
might play in the definition of that term, if any.2 77 What was clear to
the Reagan Administration at the time that it was called upon to
implement the Algiers Declarations, however, was that the American
companies who were holding arguable "properties" of Iran did not
want to return them. Specifically, companies that held Iranian
272. General Declaration, supra note 17, para. 9, reprintedin 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
at 6. Since the preceding paragraphs covered bank deposits and funds and securities, the
properties which form the subject of paragraph 9 were understood to be Iran's tangible
assets.

273. Exec. Order No. 12,281 § 1-101, 46 Fed. Reg. 7923 (1981).
274. Idl § 1-102(a).
275. Id § 1-102(b).
276. Id § 1-102(c).
277. See Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 124-25 (prepared
statement of Lee R. Marks).
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property but that also had claims against Iran lobbied the Reagan
Administration to be permitted to retain the property until their

claims had been adjudicated; this way, if the companies prevailed on
their claims, they could use the Iranian property to satisfy the claims

27 8
by way of set-off or counterclaim.
However, lawyers for these claimants recognized that however
much their clients might desire the right to retain Iranian property
until their claims against Iran had been resolved, it was not a right
which the Carter Administration had provided them. In hearings
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, one lawyer stated
that President Carter's executive orders required all of Iran's assets to
be returned. 279 Similarly, another lawyer criticized President Carter's
"last minute executive orders," maintaining that, while they
"purported to implement" the Declarations, they "did so without
careful consideration of the immensely complex status of Iranian
assets frozen in the United States" so that if they had been executed
immediately, they would have severely prejudiced the interests of
American claimants.28 0 He went on to praise by contrast the Reagan
Administration for "slow[ing] the express train down" and in
particular, for its "clarifying announcement" that signalled its initial

281
plans for the return of Iran's tangible assets.

278. Id. at 95 (prepared statement of Brice M. Claggett, lawyer for claimants) ("The
forthcoming Treasury regulations should make it clear that, in any situation where under
our law Iran's claim might fail because of the successful assertion of the U.S. company's
claim in the form of a counterclaim, the U.S. company is under no obligation under the
agreement to send any so-called 'property' to Iran until the claims on both sides have been
resolved."); id. at 227 (prepared testimony of John F. Olson, lawyer for claimants) (stating
that regulations must "make it crystal clear that American claimants who can assert a lien,
counter-claim or right of set-off against Iranian property they hold, or which is held by a
third party, have the right to have their rights determined before the property is returned
to Iran"); id. at 124-25 (prepared statement of Lee R. Marks, lawyer for claimants). See
also id. at 89 (prepared statement of Richard D. Harza, President of Harza Engineering
Co.) ("Recent statements by State and Treasury Department officials also lead us to hope
that the Executive's regulations implementing the agreements will enable companies that
now hold Iranian property in this country, and that seek to satisfy their claims against Iran
by set-offs or counter-claims against this property, to retain this property rather than
transfer it at once to Iran, and to satisfy their claims against Iran out of this property.").
279. Id. at 139 (testimony of Lee R. Marks).
280. Id. at 227 (prepared testimony of John F. Olson, lawyer for United States
claimants).
281. Id. The lawyer, John F. Olson, also proved himself well-versed in the anti-Iranian
rhetoric prevailing at that time when he stated:
Quite apart from the language of the agreements, nothing could be more
inappropriate, or more damaging to the image of the United States in the world,
than the spectacle of our Government racing about the countryside vacuuming
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The Reagan Administration ultimately promulgated regulations
that obliged the United States claimants entirely. Although 35 C.F.R.
§535.215 repeated almost verbatim Executive Order 12281's transfer
directive, it made that directive applicable only to "properties" as
defined in Section 535.333. 282 Section 535.333(a) defines "properties"
as including "all uncontested and non-contingent liabilities and
property interests of the Government of Iran." 3 Section 535.333(c)
provides that "[liabilities and property interests may be considered
contested if the holder thereof reasonably believes that a court would
not require the holder, under applicable law to transfer the asset by
virtue of the existence of a defense, counterclaim, set-off or similar
reason."2 4 Finally, Section 535.333(b) provides that "[p]roperties are
not Iranian properties or owned by Iran unless all necessary
obligations, charges and fees relating to such properties are paid and
liens against such properties (not including attachments, injunctions
and similar orders) are discharged." 285
So, the Reagan
Administration's regulations appear to allow a holder of Iranian
property to retain that property if the holder reasonably believed that
Iran owed him money for storage of the property, for repair, for
breach of an unrelated contract, for expropriation, or for any other
reason.286 The Reagan Administration's regulations also made clear
that the transfer of properties remained subject to any restrictions
that might be imposed by United States export control laws, including
the requirement that licenses be obtained for the transfer of military
equipment. 287

up all assets to which Iran has any claim, however tenuous, and then delivering
those assets post haste to the same Iranian Government that has illegally
detained our diplomatic personnel in open defiance of international law for more
than fourteen months.
Id.
282. 35 C.F.R. § 535.215 (1981).
283. 35 C.F.R. § 535.333(a) (1981) (emphasis added).
284. 35 C.F.R. § 535.333(c) (1981).
285. 35 C.F.R. § 535.333(b) (1981).
286. See Islamic Republic of Iran v.United States, Case No. A15 II:A & II:B, Award
No. 529-A15-FT, 28 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 112, 127-28 para. 44 (1992) [hereinafter Case
No. A15(II:A & lI:B)]; Trooboff, supra note 49, at 117.
287. 35 C.F.R. § 535.437 provides:
Nothing in this part in any way relieves any persons subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States from securing licenses or other authorizations as required from
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce or other relevant agency prior
to executing the transactions authorized or directed by this part. This includes
licenses for transactions involving military equipment.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52

(2) Iran's Case Before the Tribunal

Iran brought Cases No. A15(II:A and II:B) to the Tribunal in
October 1982. In Case No. A15(II:B) Iran sought compensation for
the damages that it suffered as a result of the United States' freezing
of its assets during the period in which hostages were held.28 That
claim found no basis in the Algiers Declarations, and the Tribunal
appeared to have no difficulty in deciding to dismiss it.289 Iran's Case
No. A15(II:A), however, proved more troublesome. There, Iran
claimed that the United States had violated the Algiers Declarations
by failing to require the transfer of "all Iranian tangible properties" as

Iran believed paragraph 9 and General Principle A required.2 9° The
United States responded by arguing that paragraph 9 did not create

an unconditional duty to transfer all Iranian properties within its
jurisdiction; rather, the United States maintained that the phrase
"subject to the provisions of United States law applicable prior to
November 14, 1979" in paragraph 9 preserved the rights of individual

property holders under United States property laws and permitted
the application of the United States export control laws in effect prior

to November 14,

1979.291

The Tribunal held that the United States violated the Algiers
Declarations by exempting from its transfer directive Iranian
properties held by persons who possessed liens or by persons who
contested Iran's right to the property by virtue of a defense,
counterclaim, or set-off.292 As for liens, the Tribunal held that
paragraph 9 required the United States to transfer to Iran "all Iranian
See also Case No. A15(II:A & II:B), supra note 286, 28 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 118
para. 14.
Finally, in July 1982, the Reagan Administration amended its regulations to grant the
Treasury Department the discretion to issue licenses permitting the public sale of Iranian
tangible properties that were subject to outstanding charges, liens, or claims, but only after
certain conditions had been met, and in particular, after the holder of the property agreed
to indemnify the United States "for any monetary loss which may accrue to the United
States from a decision by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal that the United States is liable to
Iran for damages that are in any way attributable to the issuance of such license." 35
C.F.R. § 535.540 (1982).
288. Case No. A15(II:A & II:B), supra note 286,28 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 114 para.
1. Specifically, Iran sought compensation for "excessive and unnecessary storage charges"
and for the damage, deterioration, and the decline in value that its property suffered
during the freeze as well as for Iran's inability to use the property. Id. at 120 para. 19.
289. Id. at 138-39 paras. 68-70. Predictably, however, the Iranian arbitrators dissented
to the Tribunal's dismissal.
290. Id. at 119 para. 16.
291. Id. at 120 para. 18.
292. Id. at 130-32 paras. 50-54.

January 2001]

CARTER, REAGAN, AND KHOMEINI

properties," including those subject to liens, no matter when those
liens arose.293 In reaching that conclusion, the Tribunal relied
primarily on President Carter's Executive Order 12281. The United
States had made available to Iran the text of this and other executive
orders during the negotiations of the Declarations, 294 and the
Tribunal found them to form part of the "practice" of the
Declarations for purposes of their interpretation. 295 The Tribunal
read Executive Order 12281 as "clearly prohibit[ing] the exercise of
all liens, no matter when they arose"; 296 in light of this Executive
Order, the Tribunal concluded that the Reagan Administration's
regulations had unilaterally redefined "Iranian properties" as "nonIranian properties." 297
In so holding, the Tribunal rejected the United States' argument
that the so-called U.S. law clause of paragraph 929 -the phrase
"subject to the provisions of United States law applicable prior to
November 14, 1979"-allowed the holders of Iranian properties to
contest Iran's possession of the properties pursuant to United States
lien laws.299 First, the Tribunal noted that even if the United States'
argument were accepted in principle, its regulations were too broad in
that they also protected holders of properties outside of the United
States who claimed rights under "applicable law."
More
fundamentally, the Tribunal determined the United States law clause
not to refer to "rights and privileges accorded by that law to the
holders of Iranian properties," but to the "restrictions and
requirements imposed by that law on the movement of those
properties. '' 30° In support, the Tribunal relied again, inter alia, on
President Carter's Executive Order 12281, which the Tribunal
interpreted as forbidding the exercise of liens or similar claims and as
implementing the U.S. law clause by providing that "persons subject
293. Id at 129 para. 48.
294. Id. at 143-44 (Holtzmann, Aldrich & Allison, JJ., dissenting in part, concurring in
part).
295. Id at 129 para. 48.
296. Id
297. Id. at 130 para. 50. The Tribunal also found support for its conclusion in General
Principle B, the main purpose of which, the Tribunal held, was to remove claims against
Iran from United States courts so that they could be brought to the Tribunal. I& at 129
para. 49. The Tribunal believed that the purpose of General Principle B would best be
effected by prohibiting the exercise of liens since the only way that Iran could contest a
lien was through litigation in United States courts. Id.
298. Id at 130 para. 51.
299. Id
300. Id
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to United States jurisdiction are not relieved 'from existing legal
requirements other than those based upon the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act."' 3 1 Finally, although it did not
decide the question, the Tribunal held that its conclusions were
supported by the argument that the United States state laws on which
the liens were based "violate the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
are unconstitutional under the United States Constitution, and are
''3°2
not in conformity with general international law.
Given its analysis with respect to liens, the Tribunal, not
surprisingly, reached the same conclusions about properties held by
persons who asserted a defense, counterclaim, or set off. According
to the Tribunal, if the United States had wanted to protect such
possessory interests it should have done so explicitly in the Algiers
Declarations. It did not and thus could not consistently with the
Algiers Declarations unilaterally provide such protection through its
303
regulations.

Finally, the Tribunal addressed the properties that were subject
to United States export control laws.

As noted above, Iran had

purchased numerous military items from the United States and from
private parties, and at the time President Carter froze Iran's assets,
many of these properties remained in the United States, some in the
possession of the United States Government, others in the possession
of private parties. In a prior case-Case No. B1 (Claim 4)30n-the
Tribunal had considered the United States' obligation to transfer the
military properties in its possession. The United States had refused to
license the transfer of such items pursuant to its export laws, and
relying on both the text and the negotiating history of the U.S. law
clause in paragraph 9, the Tribunal held that the United States'

refusal did not violate the Algiers Declarations because the U.S. law
301. Id.
302. Id. at 131 para. 52.
303. Id. at 131 para. 54. As to 35 C.F.R. § 535.540, which permitted holders of Iranian
properties to sell them under certain conditions and after obtaining a license from the
Treasury Department, the Tribunal held the regulation not to be per se inconsistent with
the Algiers Declarations. The Tribunal held that if a person who received a license to sell
Iranian property was in possession of that property by virtue of one of the exemptions
from the transfer obligation that the Tribunal had already held to be violative of the
Algiers Declarations, then liability already existed, and the licensing of the sale of the
property could not affect that liability. By contrast, if the exemption was consistent with
the Algiers Declarations, then the Tribunal found it "difficult to see how the licensing
would ...give rise to any United States liability." Id. at 133 para. 57-58.
304. Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No. B1, Award No. 382-B1-FT, 19
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 273 (Aug. 31, 1988).
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clause preserved the United States President's discretion to deny
export permission provided in the security export laws that were in
The United States
effect prior to November 14, 1979.305
Iran for the
compensate
should
it
that
however,
acknowledged,
otherwise it
that
conceding
properties it had refused to transfer,
would be unjustly enriched by their retention. Consequently, the
Tribunal ordered the United States to compensate Iran, relying both
on the United States' acceptance of its obligation to do so,306 as well
as on the Tribunal's conclusion that paragraph 9 in conjunction with
3 7
General Principle A, implicitly obligates the United States to do so. 0
In Case No. A15(II:A), however, the United States did not
believe that it owed Iran compensation because the properties at
issue in that case were held by private persons, including Iran's freight
forwarders, which meant that Iran could at any time order the
properties sold and receive compensation 08 Despite that obvious
and substantial distinction, the Tribunal applied its holding from Case
No. B1 (Claim 4) to conclude that paragraph 9, read in conjunction
with General Principle A, impliedly obligates the United States to
compensate Iran for losses incurred as a result of the United States'
refusal to license exports of Iranian properties, regardless of whether
those properties were military or non-military or whether they were
held by the United States or by private parties.309 According to the
Tribunal, "[t]he United States' implied obligation.., derives from the
[General Principle A] obligation to restore Iran's financial position to
that which existed prior to 14 November 1979."310

The Tribunal

appeared to recognize that the United States had no obligation to
grant the necessary export licenses prior to November 14, 1979 and
that the risk that the United States would not grant the licenses was
higher in 1979, particularly just before November 14, 1979, than it had
been at the time the relevant contracts were entered into. The
305. IL at 287 para. 45-46.
306. Il at 294-95 para. 68.
307. I& at 294 para. 66-67. One of the American arbitrators, Judge Holtzmann,
dissented on a number of grounds including the Tribunal's "needless stretching and
twisting of the terms of the General Declaration in an effort to find an implied treaty
obligation that requires the United States to do what it has always been prepared to do
without any such compulsion." Id. at 298-99 para. 3 (Holtzmann, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
308. Case No. A15(II:A & II:B), supra note 286, 28 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 135-36
para. 64.
309. Id.at 136 para. 65.
310. Id.
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Tribunal, nonetheless, concluded that "the reason why Iran's
properties were not returned was due to decisions that the United
States Government took as a result of the change in its relations with
Iran after the Islamic Revolution and the seizure of the American
Embassy in 1979."311 According to the Tribunal, if the United States
thereby caused losses to Iran, the Algiers Declarations implicitly
required the United States "to compensate Iran... since Iran's
'312
financial position would otherwise not be restored fully.
Finally, the Tribunal concluded that the parties' pleadings were
not sufficient for it to determine Iran's damages. 313 Consequently, the
Tribunal ruled that a hearing on damages would follow and ordered
the parties to submit pleadings thereon. 314 The parties have not yet
completed their pleadings, so the amount of damages the United
States must pay is as yet undetermined.
The Tribunal's American arbitrators-Judges Holtzmann,
Aldrich, and Allison-were unanimous in their vehement dissent
from the Tribunal's conclusion that the Algiers Declarations
impliedly obligate the United States to compensate Iran for property
in the hands of private parties that the United States refuses, pursuant
to its export control laws, to license for transfer.3 1 5 The American
arbitrators sharply criticized the majority's "blind" application of its
holding in Case No. B1 (Claim 4) when all of the relevant elements of
that case were missing in Case No. A15(II:A). 316 Further, with
respect to the United States' General Principle A obligation to
restore Iran's financial position insofar as possible to that which
existed prior to November 14, 1979, the American Arbitrators
pointed out that
1) prior to 14 November 1979, the United States bore no risk of
liability to Iran or to anyone else for refusal of export licenses for
Iranian properties in the custody of private American companies;
and 2) Iran or its contractors assumed all the risks involving export
317
licensing decisions by the United States.
311. Id. at 137.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 124 para. 31, 137 para. 67.
314. Id. at 139 para. 71.
315. See id. at 144-49 (Holtzmann, Aldrich & Allison, JJ., dissenting in part and
concurring in part).
316. Id. at 145 (Holtzmann, Aldrich & Allison, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in
part).
317. Id. at 146 (Holtzmann, Aldrich & Allison, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in
part).
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According to the American arbitrators, the Tribunal relieved
Iran of the risks that it had assumed, and it did so by erroneously
assuming that Iran routinely received export licenses prior to
November 14, 1979. The American arbitrators pointed out that
United States export licensing policy changed drastically once the
Islamic Revolution, with its virulent anti-American overtones,
succeeded in February 1979. Although the United States continued
to grant some licenses during the following months, it rejected others,
so that Iran could not assume that all such licenses would be
granted.318 More importantly, the American arbitrators contended,
no one would have expected any licenses to be granted after the
seizure of the American Embassy on November 4, 1979; thus, by
November 14, 1979-the date as of which General Principle A
required the United States to restore Iran's financial position-Iran
had "no prospect whatsoever of receiving U.S. export licenses.

'319

The American arbitrators disagreed among themselves as to the
Tribunal's holding that the United States breached the Algiers
Declarations by failing to direct the transfer of property encumbered
by liens. All three American arbitrators dissented from the
Tribunal's statements regarding the relationship between liens and
sovereign immunity. 320 Judge Aldrich, however, concurred with the
majority's finding of a United States breach because, in his view,
Executive Order 12281 appeared to prohibit the exercise of liens
against Iranian properties, so that Iran could have reasonably
believed that they were prohibited. 321 Judges Holtzmann and Allison
disagreed that Executive Order 12281 either implicitly or explicitly
prohibited the exercise of liens. 322 They pointed out that the word
"lien" does not appear anywhere in the Executive Order; 323 further,
"[s]ection 102(b) of the Order nullifies only rights deriving from
318. Id. at 147 (Holtzmann, Aldrich & Allison, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in

part).
319. Id.
320. Id. at 154-58 (Holtzmann, Aldrich & Allison, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring
in part).
321. Id. at 143-44 (Holtzmann, Aldrich & Allison, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring
in part). As noted above, see supra text accompanying note 234, Executive Order 12281
prohibited all persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States from "exercising any
right, power, or privilege, whether by court order or otherwise, with respect to the
properties."
322. Case No. A15(II:A & II:B), supra note 286, 28 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 144
(Holtzmann, Aldrich & Allison, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
323. Id. at 151 (Holtzmann, Aldrich & Allison, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in
part).
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attachments obtained after November 14, 1979," thus, implying that
attachments obtained before November 14, 1979 were left
324
undisturbed.
(3) Preliminary Conclusions
The lessons one might draw from Case No. A15(II:A) point in
different directions. First, it is clear that the same concerns that
motivated the Reagan Administration in its treatment of standby
letters of credit were also at work in its interpretation of its obligation
to transfer Iran's tangible properties.
Again, the Reagan
Administration was subject to substantial political pressure, this time
from American companies who did not want to lose the only security
they had for their claims, particularly since the Tribunal's jurisdiction
and its substantive decisions, presuming jurisdiction existed, were
uncertain.
That pressure, in conjunction with the Reagan
Administration's own ideological inclination to interpret the Algiers
Declarations "in strict accordance with the[ir] terms" no doubt
contributed to the Administration's decision to exempt from its
transfer directive both properties subject to liens and properties held
by persons who could maintain a defense, counterclaim, or set-off
against Iran.
Be that as it may, it is likewise true that, with respect to
properties subject to liens, the Administration's interpretation was
also well-grounded in the text of paragraph 9. Although paragraph 9
requires the United States to transfer "all Iranian properties," that
requirement is "subject to the provisions of U.S. law applicable prior
to November 14, 1979," and the lien laws on which the United States
relied were certainly United States laws applicable prior to November
14, 1979. However, the Administration's decision also to exempt
from the transfer directive properties held by persons who reasonably
believed that "under applicable law" a court would not require them
to transfer the property by virtue of "a defense, counterclaim, set-off
324. Id. Judges Holtzmann and Allison also criticized the majority's reliance on
General Principle B, noting that although the majority defined the purpose of General
Principle B to be the "removal of disputes against Iran from United States courts," the
invalidation of liens does not serve that purpose; rather it eliminates Iran's need to bring
suits "against United States nationals in United States courts." Id. at 152 (Holtzmann &
Allison, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part). They further pointed out that Iran
would have had no other forum in which "to contest the validity of liens in situations in
which the lienholders are United States nationals" because the "Tribunal has no
jurisdiction over the claims by Iran against United States nationals." Id. at 153
(Holtzmann & Allison, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
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or similar reason" 3 5 strongly suggests that the text of paragraph 9 was
not the sole or even a primary factor guiding the Reagan
Administration's interpretation, but rather a convenient post hoc
defense.3 26 There is no credible argument that there exists any
provision of United States law that permits a holder of another's
property to retain the property without a lien merely if the holder
believes that some court under some "applicable law" would not
require the transfer. Such an exemption has no basis in the text of the
Algiers Declarations and was designed simply to satisfy the desire of
United States claimants to keep Iran's property until the claimants'
claims had been resolved. Thus, it is not surprising that Judges
Holtzmann and Allison in dissent made no attempt to justify the
United States regulations insofar as they relate to this category of
property.
Of course, the clearest evidence that President Reagan's gaze
was focused not on the terms of the Algiers Declarations but on
providing United States claimants with rights that the Carter
Administration had failed to secure is found in the comparison
between President Carter's contemporaneous Executive Order 12281
and President Reagan's subsequent regulations. It is true, as Judges
Holtzmann and Allison pointed out, that the word "lien" does not
appear in the Executive Order. Moreover, it must also be noted that
after the Reagan Administration issued its "clarifying
announcement" indicating that the United States would not require
327
transfer of Iranian properties that were contested or contingent,
Robert Carswell, Deputy Treasury Secretary for the Carter
Administration, presented testimony before the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, which was somewhat
ambiguous but which could be read to support the Reagan
Administration's interpretation of paragraph 9. 328 Nonetheless, by
325. 31 C.F.R. § 535.333(c) (1981).
326. In addition, as the Tribunal found, "there is a complete absence... of any
evidence that the United States suggested during the negotiation of the Algiers
Declarations that the U.S. law clause had any purpose other than the preservation of
strategic export controls on military items," Case No. A15(II:A & II:B), supra note 286,28
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 130 para. 51, which also suggests that the clause was not
understood by either party as justifying the actions the Reagan Administration later took.
327. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra note 19, at 227 (prepared testimony of
John F. Olson).
328. Senate Banking Comm. Hearing, supra note 62, at 25. In his testimony, Mr.
Carswell described various categories of Iranian assets, and when he addressed the catchall category of "[o]ther assets in the U.S. and [a]broad," he stated:

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52

providing that "[a]ll persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States are prohibited from acquiring or exercising any right, power, or
privilege, whether by court order or otherwise, with respect to the
properties" described in the Executive Order,329 the Executive Order
appears, as the Tribunal held, clearly to prohibit the exercise of liens.
The Reagan Administration, by permitting the exercise of liens,
showed itself willing to re-write the bargain that the Carter
Administration had agreed to on the more politically palatable terms
that the Reagan Administration desired.
Indeed, it was the
obviousness of the "re-write" that appeared to be the primary source
of the United States' liability; that is, in finding that the United States
violated the Algiers Declarations by failing to transfer properties
subject to liens, the Tribunal relied heavily on the fact that President
Carter's Executive Order had directed the transfer of those
properties. President Carter's Executive Order thus provided a basis
for liability where the text of the Declarations alone might not have.
These facts notwithstanding, some points can be made in defense
of the Reagan Administration's interpretation of paragraph 9. First,
there is at least an argument that the Reagan Administration might
have encountered constitutional difficulties had it prohibited the
exercise of state-law liens. The United States Supreme Court upheld
the United States' nullification of attachments, but it may be

a
Id.

Some of these assets are subject to various types of liens or are contested by
U.S. parties holding them. Many have also been attached. Under
Declarations of Algiers, these assets will be returned to Iran, subject
settlement of contests by the holders of these properties as to Iran's rights to
property.

the
the
to
the

Although Mr. Carswell's statement could be read to mean that the Algiers
Declarations did not require the transfer of Iranian property until any contests by United
States holders were satisfied, the phrasing is rather ambiguous. More important than any
textual ambiguity, however, is the fact that Carswell's statement refers both to properties
subject to lien as well as properties subject to attachment. It is highly unlikely that
Carswell would suggest that the Algiers Declarations permit the retention of Iranian
properties subject to attachment given that General Principle B clearly obliges the United
States "to nullify all attachments," an obligation that even the Reagan Administration
appeared to recognize. See 31 C.F.R. § 535.218(b) (1981); see also Islamic Republic of
Iran v. United States, Case Nos. A15(IV) & A24, Award No. 590-A15(IV)/A24-Fr, paras.
173-77, 1998 WL 930565 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Dec. 28, 1998) [hereinafter Case No.
A15(IV)/A24]. Carswell's rather unclear statement, then, like his statement pertaining to
standby letters of credit, seems to reflect a desire to de-emphasize divergences between
the Reagan Administration's and the Carter Administration's interpretations of the
Algiers Declarations, particularly those divergences that highlight the concessions that
Carswell and his co-negotiators made.
329. Exec. Order No. 12,281 § 1-102(c), 46 Fed. Reg. 7923 (Jan. 19, 1981).
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interpreted as having done so at least partly because the attachments
were obtained under revocable Treasury Department licenses. 330 The

liens at issue in Case No. A15(II:A), by contrast, were based on state
laws that the United States federal government had less power to
modify.331 Of course, even if ordering the transfer of property subject
to liens would have run afoul of the United States Constitution, that

would not have excused the United States from the obligation that it
assumed under international law to transfer the property,332 but it

would provide a somewhat more principled justification for the treaty
violation.
Second, the portion of Case No. A15(II:A) involving properties
subject to export laws lends support to the fears that United States
claimants and the Reagan Administration must have harbored about
the Tribunal's ability to issue principled decisions. The Tribunal's
conclusion that paragraph 9 obliged the United States to compensate
Iran for properties held by private parties that the United States
refused to license for export was clearly unjustifiable for the reasons
given by the American arbitrators in dissent. The American
arbitrators concluded that the majority seemed mesmerized by the
words it used in Case No. BI (Claim 4) and that its decision on this
issue "can be explained only by... a misguided view of the
equities. ' '333 Although in 1981 the United States was probably more

concerned that the Tribunal would never get started, or that if it did

330. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 673-74 (1981). In Dames & Moore, the
Court noted that
Petitioner proceeded against the blocked assets only after the Treasury
Department had issued revocable licenses authorizing such proceedings and
attachments. The Treasury Regulations provided that 'unless licensed' any
attachment is null and void, and all licenses 'may be amended, modified, or
revoked at any time.' As such,... petitioner was on notice of the contingent
nature of its interest in the frozen assets.
lIL at 673 (citation omitted). However, the above rationale only supplemented the court's
primary basis for upholding the nullification of attachments: The International Emergency
Economic Powers Act authorized the President's actions. Ilaat 672-73.
331. The holders of Iranian properties relied, inter alia, on TEX. R. Civ. P. ANN. Art.
5503 (West 1989) and CAL. CIV. CODE § 3051 (West 1993). Statement of Defense of the
United States, Doc. 25, at 22-23, Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No.
A15(II-A and II-B), 1992 WL 928957 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. May 6, 1992) (on file with

author).
332. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 27, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331,339.
333. 28 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 147 (Holtzmann, Aldrich & Allison, JJ., dissenting in
part and concurring in part).
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commence, Iran would soon cease participating, 334 the United States
must also have feared that the Tribunal would interpret the Algiers
Declarations less by reference to their specific terms than to
amorphous equitable and political considerations. The portion of
Case No. A15(II:A) relating to properties subject to export controls
proves that such fears were not baseless.
C.

Litigation Against Iran in United States Courts

(1) Background
By the time the Algiers Declarations were signed, United States
nationals had filed approximately 400 lawsuits against Iran in United
States courts, 335 and had attached some billions of dollars in Iranian
assets. 336 As discussed above, Iran had made the cancellation of these
suits one of its four conditions for releasing the hostages. The United
States made clear during the negotiations, however, that claims could
be removed from United States courts only if Iran and the United
States agreed to an alternative claims settlement procedure. 337 As a
result, the countries agreed in the Claims Settlement Declaration to
promote the settlement of a specified group of claims, and if such
claims were not settled, to submit them to binding third-party
arbitration in the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. 338 The Claims
Settlement Declaration went on to provide that "[c]laims referred to
the... Tribunal shall, as of the date of filing such claims with the

334. Mark B. Feldman, Book Review, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 451, 454

(1992) (reviewing

JOHN A. WESTBERG, INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS AND CLAIMS
INVOLVING GOVERNMENT PARTIES: CASE LAW OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS

TRIBUNAL (1991)).

335. Introduction and Summary to Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel Relating to
the Iranian Hostage Crisis, 4A U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 71, 92 (1984); Statement of
Interest of the United States, reprintedin Symposium, Settlement with Iran, 13 U. MIAMI J.
INT'L L. A109, All n.3 (1981); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND
URBAN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., IRAN: THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE

(Comm. Print 1981).
336. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 88 (prepared testimony of
Richard D. Harza); see also IranianAsset Controls: Hearing Before the House SubComms.
on Europe and the Middle East and on International Economic Policy and Trade, 96th
Cong. 23 (1980) (reporting that by May 30, 1980 attachments totalled approximately $2.6
billion).
337. Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 328, para. 24.
338. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 17, at art. I, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. at 9.
HOSTAGE SETrLEMENT AGREEMENT 57
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Tribunal, be considered excluded from the jurisdiction of the courts
'339
of Iran, or of the United States, or of any other court.
As also noted above, in the very last stages of the negotiations,
Iran had insisted upon including certain General Principles, one of
which addressed the termination of claims against Iran in United
States courts. In response to Iran's demand, the United States
negotiators, inter alia, drafted General Principle B, which states:
It is the purpose of both parties, within the framework of and
pursuant to the provisions of the two Declarations of the
Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria,
to terminate all litigation as between the government of each party
and the nationals of the other, and to bring about the settlement
and termination of all such claims through binding arbitration.
Through the procedures provided in the Declaration relating to the
Claims Settlement Agreement, the United States agrees to
terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts involving
claims of United States persons and institutions against Iran and its
state enterprises, to nullify all attachments and judgments obtained
therein, to prohibit all further litigation based on such claims, and
to bring about the termination of such claims through binding
340
arbitration.
Immediately upon signing the Algiers Declarations, the Carter
Administration issued executive orders that implemented various of
the Declarations' provisions, and several of those executive orders
contained provisions nullifying the attachments that United States
litigants had obtained from United States courts; 341 however, the
Carter Administration issued no executive order pertaining to the
general termination of litigation against Iran in United States courts.
This omission may seem surprising because Paragraph 11 of the
General Declaration obligated the United States to "bar and
preclude" any United States national from prosecuting any claim
against Iran relating to Iran's hostage-taking or to the hostages'
subsequent detention3 42 and the Carter Administration did issue an

339. Id. at art. VII, para. 2, reprintedin 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 11.
340. General Declaration, supra note 17, at General Principle B, reprintedin 1 Iran-

U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 3.
341. E.g., Exec. Order No. 12,277 § 1-102(a), 46 Fed. Reg. 7915 (Jan. 19, 1981); Exec.
Order No. 12,279 § 1-102(a), 46 Fed. Reg. 7919 (Jan. 19, 1981); Exec. Order No. 12,280
§ 1-102(a), 46 Fed. Reg. 7921 (Jan. 19, 1981); Exec. Order No. 12,281 § 1-102(a), 46 Fed.
Reg. 7923 (Jan. 19,1981).
342. General Declaration, supra note 17, para. 11, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. at 6-7.
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executive order implementing that provision. 343 Whatever its reasons,
the Carter Administration provided the Reagan Administration no

guidance in its implementation of General Principle B, but, as a
consequence, also imposed on it no potential constraints.
Implementation of General Principle B proved not to be a simple
matter and, in particular, was complicated by the fact that Iran and
the United States did not agree to submit all the claims that United

States nationals could bring against Iran to the Tribunal. The
excluded claims relating to the hostage-taking, referred to above,
posed no problem because the United States had agreed to extinguish

those claims entirely. By contrast, other categories of claims were not
explicitly required to be extinguished but at the same time did not fall
within the jurisdiction that the countries had bestowed on the

Tribunal. For instance, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over
claims arising out of tort;344 likewise, it has no jurisdiction over
"claims arising under a binding contract between the parties
specifically providing that any disputes thereunder shall be within the
sole jurisdiction of the competent Iranian courts ....345

Both the Carter and Reagan Administrations believed that
General Principle B did not require the United States to terminate
these and other categories of claims that fell outside the Tribunal's

jurisdiction. Rather, they believed that General Principle B required
the United States to terminate only those claims that the two
countries had agreed to submit to the Tribunal-claims that the

343. Exec. Order No. 12,283, 46 Fed. Reg. 7927 (Jan. 19, 1981).
344. International Sys. and Controls Corp. v. Indus. Dev. and Renovation Org. of Iran,
Case No. 439, Award No. 256-439-2, 12 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 239, 262-263 paras. 94-95
(Sept. 26, 1986) (dismissing claim of intentional tort for lack of jurisdiction); see also
Senate Banking Comm. Hearing, supra note 62, at 29 (prepared testimony of Robert
Carswell) ("The claims settlement agreement does not provide a mechanism for
individuals to be compensated for tort claims."); Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra
note 19, at 58 (testimony of Warren Christopher) (advising that "[tihere may be some tort
claims that are not covered" by the Algiers Declarations); id. at 187 (testimony of Larry
Simms, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Reagan Administration) (same). Rather, the
Tribunal has jurisdiction, inter alia, over claims of United States nationals against Iran
which are "outstanding on the date of [the Algiers Declarations], whether or not filed with
any court, and arise out of debts, contracts (including transactions which are the subject of
letters of credit or bank guarantees), expropriations or other measures affecting property
" Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 17, at art. II, para. 1, reprinted in 1
rights ....
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 9.
345. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 17, at art. II, para. 1, reprintedin 1 IranU.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 9.
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Tribunal could arbitrate on the merits. 346 The difficulty, however, was
that it was not clear at the outset which claims the Tribunal would
eventually determine to fall within its jurisdiction and which it would

deem outside thereof, so the United States had no way of knowing
which claims to terminate and which to allow to proceed.

It was not long before the United States claimants brought this
and other problems to the Reagan Administration's attention 34 7 and
asked the Administration not to nullify attachments or terminate
litigation if there existed a possibility that the underlying claims were
not cognizable by the Tribunal. 4 Indeed, some claimants requested
that the United States take no action with respect to any claim unless
and until Iran stipulated that that particular claim fell within the
Tribunal's jurisdiction.349 The Reagan Administration tried to "flush

Iran out" by asking it to identify those claims which it considered to

346. Senate Banking Comm. Hearing, supra note 62, at 63 (prepared testimony of
Roberts Owen) ("If a particular claim asserted by a U.S. national does not fall within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the claimant should be entitled (if he is otherwise entitled) to
proceed in the U.S. courts, and I believe that the new Administration's regulations reflect
that principle.").
347. Indeed, United States claimants somewhat pointedly asked the Reagan
Administration not to "take further prejudicial action [regarding their litigation] in the
guise of implementing" the Algiers Declarations. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,
supra note 19, at 228 (prepared testimony of John F. Olson, attorney for United States
claimants).
348. Id. at 120 (testimony of Lee R. Marks, attorney for United States claimants)
(recommending that "[c]laimants who are or may be excluded from the tribunal should be
entitled to continue their litigation in U.S. courts and to maintain their existing
attachments"); see also id. at 123 (prepared statement of Lee R. Marks) (emphasizing that
it is not enough to allow litigation to proceed; attachments must also be preserved); id. at
88 (prepared testimony of Richard D. Harza, President of Harza Engineering Co.)
(expressing hope that claims that the Tribunal finds to be outside its jurisdiction can
proceed in United States courts); Senate Banking Comm. Hearing,supra note 62, at 91"
(prepared statement of Arthur Albertson, vice president of CBI Industries) ("As a first
step, the Administration should be urged to avoid taking any affirmative steps designed to
nullify or terminate pending lawsuits in the United States courts. Otherwise claimants
who find they have been excluded from the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal may be
barred everywhere.").
349. See Senate ForeignRelations Hearings,supra note 19, at 228-29 (testimony of John
F. Olson, attorney for United States claimants); id. at 124 (prepared statement of Lee R.
Marks, attorney for United States claimants) ("In those cases ... in which a U.S. claimant
is not sure that a claim is cognizable by the Tribunal and prefers to be in court, the United
States Government should do nothing unless and until Iran comes into court and agrees
that the claim is cognizable by the Tribunal.").
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fall within one of the Tribunal's jurisdictional exclusions, 350 but that
351
endeavor met with only limited success.
President Reagan issued Executive Order 12294 on February 24,
1981 to implement General Principle B, and in doing so, appeared to
steer something of a middle course between the requests of the
United States claimants and the text of the Algiers Declarations.
Although General Principle B speaks of the United States' obligation
to "terminate" claims, Executive Order 12294 instead "suspended"
That
them while they were pending before the Tribunal. 352
suspension ceased "upon a determination by the Tribunal that it [did]
not have jurisdiction" over the claim in question. 353 In this way, the
Reagan Administration, consistent with its interpretation of General
350. See id. at 187 (testimony of Larry Simms, the Reagan Administration's Acting
Attorney General).
351. Larry Simms, the Reagan Administration's Acting Attorney General stated that
Iran's attorneys "seem to be disposed also to take a narrow view of the construction of
[the jurisdictional exclusion] clauses for the purpose of insuring that as little litigation in
the U.S. courts as possible take[s] place," but he acknowledged that the Reagan
Administration was not sure of the extent to which Iran's attorneys represent Iran's views.
Id. See also Feldman, supra note 183, at 81 ("The [Reagan] administration had hoped that
Iran would help resolve the issues by taking a position in the U.S. litigation as to whether a
particular claim was excluded from the Tribunal. Iran has refused to do this.").
Whatever Iran's views were at the outset, by the time the United States nullified
the attachments and returned the remainder of Iran's assets, Iran had no further interest
in having claims against it brought before the Tribunal; consequently, it argued
vehemently for a broad construction of any and all of the Tribunal's jurisdictional
exclusions. See, e.g., Halliburton Co. v. Doreen/IMCO, Case No. 51, Award No. ITL-2-51FT, 1 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. 242 (Nov. 5, 1982) (addressing the forum-selection clause
exclusion); Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No. A18, 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 251, 265 (Apr. 6, 1984) (arguing that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction over dual
Iranian-United States nationals).
352. Exec. Order No. 12,294 § 1, 46 Fed. Reg. 14111 (Feb. 24, 1981). The relevant
portion of the section reads in full:
All claims which may be presented to the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
under the terms of Article II of the Declaration of the Government of the
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of
Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and all claims for equitable or other judicial relief
in connection with such claims, are hereby suspended, except as they may be
presented to the Tribunal. During the period of this suspension, all such claims
shall have no legal effect in any action now pending in any court of the United
States, including the courts of any state or any locality thereof, the District of
Columbia and Puerto Rico, or in any action commenced in any such court after
the effective date of this Order.
Id. See also 31 C.F.R. § 535.222(a) (1981) (implementing this portion of the executive
order).
353. Exec. Order No. 12,294 § 3, 46 Fed. Reg. 14111; see also 31 C.F.R. § 535.222(e)
(implementing this portion of the Executive Order).
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Principle B, preserved for future United States litigation the claims
that the Tribunal would later hold to fall outside of its jurisdiction.
However, the Reagan Administration did not similarly protect the
corresponding attachments, as some claimants had requested. As
noted above, President Carter's executive orders had nullified those
attachments, and on February 24, 1981, President Reagan ratified and
354
implemented Carter's executive orders.
Next, in order to protect claimants who had not yet filed in
United States courts from being precluded from subsequently filing
by United States statutes of limitation, Executive Order 12294
authorized the filing of lawsuits in United States courts for the
purpose of tolling the relevant statutes of limitations. 355 These suits
were then immediately suspended. 356 In this way, claimants who had
not yet filed suits in United States courts could preserve their ability
to litigate their claims there if the Tribunal later dismissed those
claims for lack of jurisdiction.
The Reagan Administration's interpretation of General Principle
B, as applying only to claims falling within the Tribunal's jurisdiction,
has a strong basis in the text of General Principle B, which requires
the United States to terminate all legal proceedings against Iran in
United States courts, but "[t]hrough the procedures provided" in the
Claims Settlement Declaration;357 that is, arguably, through
arbitration in the Tribunal.
Consequently, the provisions of
Executive Order 12294, which suspended rather than terminated

litigation and which permitted tolling suits, while not expressly
354. Exec. Order No. 12,94 § 8,46 Fed. Reg. 14111; see also Message to Congress, Feb.
24,1981, reprintedin LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS, supra note
31, at DS-874.
355. Exec. Order No. 12,294 § 1, 46 Fed. Reg. 14111. The relevant portion reads:
"Nothing in this action precludes the commencement of an action after the effective date
of this Order for the purpose of tolling the period of limitations for commencement of
such action." 1d. See also 31 C.F.R. § 535.222(c) (implementing this portion of the
Executive Order); Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 228 (prepared
testimony of John F. Olson) ("It will undoubtedly be a period of years before these
[jurisdictional] questions can be decided as to individual cases. Yet statutes of limitations
may be running against claimants who are not permitted access to United States courts but
may also be rejected from the reach of the tribunal.").
356. See Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 328, para. 127; Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438,441 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (pursuant to Executive Order
12,294,46 Fed. Reg. 14111, after claimant filed the tolling suit, "the District Court took no
action" while the plaintiffs "presented their claims against Iran to the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal").
357. General Declaration, supra note 17, at General Principle B, reprinted in 1 IranU.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 3.
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authorized by General Principle B, nonetheless seemed a reasonable
method of implementing that Principle while at the same time
preserving those claims that would later be held to fall outside the
Tribunal's jurisdiction.
Executive Order 12294 went further,
however, and authorized two additional classes of litigation: litigation
involving counterclaims 358 and litigation involving standby letters of
credit. 359 These authorizations, by contrast, had little or no basis in
the Algiers Declarations.
(2) Iran's Cases Before the Tribunal
Iran did not concern itself merely with these matters but claimed
to be dissatisfied with virtually every aspect of the United States'
interpretation of General Principle B, both those featured in
President Carter's contemporaneous executive orders as well as those
featured in President Reagan's subsequent Executive Order 12294.
Consequently, Iran brought Case No. A15(IV) to the Tribunal,
charging the United States with a multitude of Algiers Declarations'
violations. Some years later, Iran also brought to the Tribunal Case
No. A24, which addressed the United States' treatment of a particular
claim that had been brought to the Tribunal, subsequently dismissed
by the Tribunal, and finally amended and brought to a United States
court. The Tribunal consolidated Case No. A24 with Case No.
A15(IV) 360 and then bifurcated the consolidated cases into two
phases, the first addressing United States' liability, and the second
addressing any damages that might follow from the Tribunal's
361
holdings in the first phase.
Iran argued that General Principle B required the United States
to terminate all claims against Iran regardless of whether or not they
fell within the Tribunal's jurisdiction; consequently, Iran claimed,

358. Exec. Order No. 12,294 § 6, 46 Fed. Reg. 14111. It reads:
Nothing in this Order shall prohibit the assertion of a counterclaim or set-off by a
United States national in any judicial proceeding pending or hereafter
commenced by the Government of Iran, any political subdivision of Iran, or any
agency, instrumentality, or entity controlled by the Government of Iran or any
political subdivision thereof.
Id. See also 31 C.F.R. § 535.222(b) (implementing this portion of the Executive Order).
359. Exec. Order No. 12,294 § 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 14111. It reads: "Nothing in this Order
shall apply to any claim concerning the validity or payment of a standby letter of credit,
performance or payment bond or other similar instrument." Idt See also 31 C.F.R. §
535.222(g) (implementing this portion of the Executive Order).
360. Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 328, para. 5.
361. Id. para. 6.
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among other things, that the United States had violated General
Principle B by allowing litigation involving claims that the Tribunal
had determined to fall outside of its jurisdiction to resume in United
States courts.3 62 The Tribunal rejected this claim. It held that
General Principle B expressly ties the United States' obligation to
terminate litigation to "the procedures provided" in the Claims
Settlement Declaration, 363 in particular to the "arbitration mechanism
before the Tribunal.' '364 Thus, the Tribunal concluded that any claims
which "cannot be resolved on the merits by the Tribunal are not
'365
within the scope of the [United States] termination obligation.
The Tribunal likewise rejected several of Iran's other claims. For
instance, Iran argued that the United States violated General
Principle B by allowing United States nationals to bring suits against
Iran in foreign courts.3 66 The Tribunal disagreed, holding that the
plain language of General Principle B confines the United States'
3 67
termination obligation to litigation pending in United States courts.
Iran also claimed a General Principle B violation in the United
States' failure to nullify the attachments that had been obtained
before President Carter froze Iran's assets on November 14, 1979.368
The Tribunal held that the language in General Principle B that
requires the United States to "nullify all attachments" obtained in
legal proceedings involving claims of United States nationals against
Iran in United States courts "must be interpreted in light of General
Principle A," which obligates the United States to "restore the
financial position of Iran, insofar as possible, to that which existed
priorto November 14, 1979.1"369 The Tribunal reasoned that if Iranian
362. Id para. 32 (Claim A). Iran also claimed more specifically that the United States
violated General Principle B by allowing claims to proceed in United States courts that the
Tribunal had determined fell outside its jurisdiction by reason of the forum-selection
exclusion of Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration. Id para. 33

(Claim B).
363. Id para. 79.
364. Id para. 81.
365. Id; see also id paras. 119-125 (rejecting Iran's claim that the United States violated
General Principle B by allowing claims to proceed in United States courts that the
Tribunal had determined fell outside its jurisdiction by reason of the forum-selection
exclusion of Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration).
366. Id para. 35 (Claim E).
367. Id paras. 142-43; see also id para. 141 (dismissing Iran's claim based on espousal
of claims); id para. 144 (dismissing Iran's claim based on Article VII, para. 2, of the
Claims Settlement Declaration).
368. Id para. 36 (Claim F).
369. Id paras. 158-161 (emphasis added).
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assets were restrained by attachments on November 14, 1979, then
those attachments were a component of Iran's financial position at
that date, and to lift those attachments would improve Iran's financial
position, rather than merely restore it. Thus, the Tribunal concluded
that General Principle B required "the United States to nullify only
attachments of Iranian property that were obtained by United States
nationals in United States courts on or after 14 November 1979."370
Finally, the Tribunal rejected Iran's claim that the United States
violated General Principle B by failing to take a sufficiently active
role in nullifying attachments obtained after November 14, 1979,
holding that "[n]othing in the evidence suggests that the United
States stopped short of doing everything that it could pursuant to the
procedures of its legal system to have all post-[November 14, 1979]
attachments lifted. 37 '
By contrast, the United States did not fare so well with respect to
other aspects of the Reagan Administration's implementation of
General Principle B, which will be discussed in the following sections.
(a) Suspension vs. Termination
Pointing to General Principle B's reference to the "termination"
of litigation, Iran argued that the United States violated that Principle
by suspending litigation in United States courts pending a decision by
the Tribunal, rather than immediately terminating it. The Tribunal
acknowledged that there existed a "conceptual difference" between
the terms "suspension" and "termination," noting that "'termination'
implies that the activity being terminated is brought to an end
[whereas] '[s]uspension,' on the other hand implies a temporary
cessation of activity. '372 Nonetheless, the Tribunal took a pragmatic
view, concluding that suspension satisfied the Algiers Declarations if,
in effect, it resulted in a termination of litigation.373 The Tribunal was
concerned in this initial phase of the proceedings only with questions
of liability, but its holding as to suspension in fact tied the finding of
United States' liability to a determination of damages that would not
be made until the following phase. The Tribunal held that the United
States violated General Principle B if

370.
371.
372.
373.

Id. para.
Id. para.
Id. para.
Id. para.

161.
175 (rejecting Iran's Claim G).
94 (emphasis omitted).
99.
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Iran was reasonably compelled in the prudent defense of its
interests to make appearances or file documents inUnited States
courts subsequent to 19 July 1981 in any litigation in respect of
claims [within the Tribunal's jurisdiction] or in respect of claims
fied with the Tribunal until such time as those claims are dismissed
374
by the Tribunal for lack of jurisdiction ....
In setting forth this standard, the Tribunal showed itself disinclined to
find formalistic violations of the Algiers Declarations; whatever
words the United States may have used to fulfill its obligation, the
Tribunal found it to violate the Algiers Declarations only if its
implementation imposed actual damages on Iran.
Unfortunately for the United States, however, the Tribunal
seemed to abandon this pragmatic approach when it was called upon
to apply the standard that it had just articulated in the consolidated
Case No. A24. That case involved several affiliated American
corporations that had filed suit with the Tribunal, claiming that Iran
had expropriated their interests in an Iranian dairy.3 75 The Tribunal
has jurisdiction only over claims that were outstanding on January 19,
1981, the date of the Algiers Declarations, 376 so when the American
corporations-collectively known as Foremost-brought their suit to
the Tribunal, they claimed that Iran's expropriation of their interests
had culminated prior to January 19, 1981. 377 A few months after filing
suit with the Tribunal, Foremost "filed a complaint against Iran in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia for the
That
purpose of tolling the relevant statute of limitation. 3 78
complaint, while otherwise identical to the Statement of Claim that
Foremost had filed in the Tribunal, did not specify an expropriation
379
date.
In April 1986, the Tribunal issued its Award in Foremost-Tehran
and Islamic Republic of Iran,380 dismissing Foremost's expropriation
claim on the ground that Iran's interference with Foremost's rights in
374. Id-para. 101. The Tribunal also invited Iran to produce "evidence of the losses it
suffered as a result of the monitoring of the suspended claims" and invited both parties to
para. 102.
address whether Iran should be compensated for such losses. Id.
para. 39.
375. Id.
376. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 17, at art. H, para. 1, reprintedin 1 IranU.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 9.
377. Case No. A15("V)/A24, supranote 328, para. 199.
para. 41. See Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Civ. No. 82378. Id.
0220-TAF (D. D.C. 1981).
379. Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supranote 328, para. 199.
380. Foremost Tehran, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Case Nos. 37 & 231, Award No.
220-37/231-1,10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 228 (Apr. 11, 1986).
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the dairy "did not, by 19 January 1981,... amount to an
expropriation. '381 The case that had been filed in the United States
District Court had been dormant on that court's docket since it was
filed, and it remained that way until two years after the Tribunal
issued its Award. Then, on April 1, 1988, Foremost revived the
District Court suit by filing a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
In that motion and in a subsequent motion for leave to amend its
1982 complaint, Foremost made clear that it accepted the Tribunal's
determination that no expropriation occurred by January 19, 1981 but
asked the District Court to determine whether a post-January 19,
1981 expropriation had taken place.382 On June 23, 1997, the District
Court issued a decision holding that Iran's interference with
Foremost's rights "had ripened into an expropriation by April
1982."383
In Case No. A24, Iran alleged that the claim pursued by
Foremost before the District Court was the same claim that the
Tribunal had decided in 1986. Thus, Iran argued that by allowing the
Foremost lawsuit to proceed in the District Court, the United States
"breached its obligation.., to prohibit all further litigation of claims
' '384
resolved by the Tribunal.
Over the forceful dissent of the American arbitrators, the
Tribunal agreed with Iran that the two claims were identical at the
time they were filed,385 but it went on to conclude that the claim that
Foremost pursued in the District Court after April 1, 1988-that of a
post-January 19, 1981 expropriation- [was] materially different from

that considered by the Tribunal

.... "386

The United States thus

381. Id. at 250.
382. Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 328, paras. 43-44.
383. Id. para. 45.
384. Id. para. 189.
385. Id. para. 198. According to the American arbitrators:
The Tribunal's initial conclusion-that Foremost's Statement of Claim and its
District Court complaint were identical-is patently wrong.... [Tihe fact that
the Statement of Claim alleged an expropriation which culminated by 19 January
1981 while the complaint contained no such date restriction is a real and
important textual difference which reflects the real and decisive difference
between the two claims.
Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No. A15(IV) and A24, Award No. 590A15(IV)/A24-Fr, at 9, 1998 WL 930569 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Dec. 28, 1998) (Separate
Opinion of George H. Aldrich, Richard C. Allison, and Charles T. Duncan, Concurring in
Part and Dissenting in Part) [hereinafter American Arbitrators' Separate Opinion, Case
No. A15(IV)/A24].
386. Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 328, para. 209.
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incurred no liability for the litigation that proceeded in District Court
after April 1, 1988. But the Tribunal still had to address the nearly
two-year period between the Tribunal's dismissal of Foremost's
expropriation claim on April 11, 1986 and Foremost's revival of the
"materially different" claim in United States District Court on April
1, 1988. Had the Tribunal applied the standards it set forth in Claim
A of Case No. A15(IV), it would have held that the United States
violated the Algiers Declarations by failing to remove Foremost's
case from the District Court's docket only if that failure reasonably
compelled Iran "in the prudent defense of its interests to make
appearances or file documents" in the case.8 Instead, the Tribunal
ignored the standards it had previously set forth and simply held the
United States to have violated the Algiers Declarations by leaving the
case on the United States court's docket.388 The Tribunal did,
however, remain consistent with its holding in Claim A in its
determination that Iran is entitled to damages only to the extent it
"was... compelled in the prudent defense of its interests to make
appearances or file documents with respect to" the lawsuit during the
two-year period in which it inappropriately remained on the United
389
States court's docket.
(b) Statute of Limitations Tolling Suits
The formalistic bent that the Tribunal exhibited in Case No. A24
extended to its decision, in Claim D of Case No. A15(IV), regarding
the Reagan Administration's authorization of tolling suits. As noted
above, the Algiers Declarations require United States nationals to
bring their claims to the Tribunal; however, it was not always clear in
advance whether the Tribunal would have jurisdiction over a
particular claim. The Reagan Administration believed, and the
Tribunal later confirmed, that the Algiers Declarations permit a
387. Id. para. 101.
388. Id. para. 203. The American arbitrators stated in dissent:
The Tribunal states in Claim A that the United States can be considered to have
breached General Principle B only if Iran was reasonably compelled in the
prudent defense of its interests to make appearances or file documents in the
cases [described above]. Thus, a dead case which remains in name only on the
docket of a United States court after the Tribunal has issued an award on the
merits of the case is not a violation of General Principle B. Only if Iran was
required to file documents or make appearances in such a case would the United
States violate General Principle B.
American Arbitrators' Separate Opinion, Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 385, at 11.
389. Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 328, para. 205.
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United States claimant to return to United States courts if the
Tribunal declined jurisdiction over his claim, but by that time, the
applicable United States statute of limitations might bar the suit. So,
by allowing litigants to file tolling suits, the United States allowed
them to preserve their claims pending the Tribunal's jurisdictional
390
decision.
Although the Tribunal acknowledged that General Principle B
does not forbid the United States from preserving claims that the
Tribunal would ultimately find to be outside of its jurisdiction, the
Tribunal held that the particular means the United States chose39
authorizing tolling suits- does violate the Algiers Declarations. '
According to the Tribunal, the authorization of tolling suits conflicts
both with General Principle B's first sentence, which states that it is
the purpose of both parties to "terminate all litigation as between the
government of each party and the nationals of the other" and with its
second sentence, which obliges the United States "'to prohibit all
further litigation' based on claims by United States nationals against
Iran.'"392
This holding is extremely formalistic: a tolling suit that is
immediately suspended can be "litigation" only in the most formal
sense of the term. Further, the holding, like the Tribunal's holding in
Case No. A24, is unnecessary and in tension with the pragmatic
standards the Tribunal set forth in Claim A, as the American
arbitrators pointed out in dissent.393 In Claim D, the Tribunal
concluded that Iran was entitled to damages only to the extent that it
suffered losses as a result of making appearances or filing documents
in United States courts with respect to tolling suits filed after the
signing of the Algiers Declarations. 394 This is precisely the same
conclusion that the Tribunal reached in Claim A with respect to

390. Id. para. 127. See also Senate Foreign Relations Hearings,supra note 19, at 228-29
(prepared testimony of John F. Olson, lawyer for United States claimants) (noting that
because some time will pass before the Tribunal can determine whether it has jurisdiction
over a particular case, "new actions should be permitted to be filed, to prevent the running
of statutes of limitations").
391. Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 328, para. 131.
392. Id.
393. American Arbitrators' Separate Opinion, Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 385,
at 4.
394. See Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 328, para. 133. The Tribunal also invited
Iran to produce evidence "of the losses it suffered as a result of monitoring the tolling
suits" and invited both parties to address whether Iran should be compensated for those
losses. Id.
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damages for suspended claims filed before the Algiers Declarations.
Thus, the Tribunal's finding of a United States' treaty violation had
virtually no practical effect: whether a suit had been filed in a United
States court before the Algiers Declarations or only after by means of
a tolling suit, the United States was, in either event, liable for
was compelled to file documents or
damages only to the extent Iran
395
make appearances in the case.
(c) Litigation Involving Counterclaims
General Principle B states that the United States must terminate
"all legal proceedings in United States courts involving claims of
United States persons and institutions against Iran" and that the
United States must "prohibit all further litigation based on such
claims." President Reagan apparently interpreted the word "claim,"
as used in General Principle B, not to include counterclaims, for his
Executive Order 12294 specifically authorizes United States nationals
to bring counterclaims in suits that Iran brought to United States
courts.

3 96

There is little obvious evidence that the United States claimants
lobbied the Reagan Administration for the right to bring
counterclaims, but it is nonetheless easy to understand why they
would want such a right: Many United States nationals who had
claims against Iran would, for one reason or another, choose not to
bring those claims to the Tribunal. Some claimants' litigation costs
would exceed the value of their claims, while other claimants would
be disinclined to travel to The Hague to arbitrate a claim before an
untested arbitral body. But the claimants who were least likely to
bring their claims to the Tribunal were those who knew that if they
did, they would be subject to meritorious Iranian counterclaimsclaims that the Tribunal could not otherwise hear because it does not
have jurisdiction over the claims of Iran or the United States against

395. See American Arbitrators' Separate Opinion, Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note
385. The scope of United States' liability is not precisely identical for the two sets of
claims because the Tribunal interpreted the Algiers Declarations as providing a six-month
grace period for the United States to carry out its obligation to terminate claims filed
before the signing of the Algiers Declarations, but it held the United States liable for
losses that Iran incurred immediately after the signing of the Algiers Declarations for suits
filed after that date. Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supranote 328, paras. 110,133.
396. Exec. Order No: 12,294 § 6, 46 Fed. Reg. 14111; see also 31 C.F.R. § 535.222(b)
(implementing this portion of the Executive Order).
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nationals of the other government. 397 Whatever their reasons for not

bringing their claims before the Tribunal in the first instance, if these
litigants were to be sued by Iran in United States courts, perhaps

years after the deadline for filing in the Tribunal had passed, they
would want the opportunity to assert their original claim as a
counterclaim against Iran. So, the Reagan Administration provided
398
them that opportunity.
Unfortunately, however desirable the counterclaims exception
might have appeared from the United States' point of view, 399 there is
nothing in the Algiers Declarations suggesting that litigation

involving counterclaims against Iran may be treated differently from
all the other litigation against Iran that the United States was
obligated to terminate. Indeed, the Tribunal held that General

Principle B and Articles I and II of the Claims Settlement
Declaration make clear
that claims that would have been within the Tribunal's jurisdiction
and were not settled by negotiation were to be presented to the
Tribunal, and that if a claimant chose not to present such a claim to
the Tribunal, he was4°°not to be permitted thereafter to raise it in
United States courts.
Consequently, the Tribunal unanimously found the United States to

have violated the Algiers Declarations by authorizing counterclaims
in United States courts. 4°1

397. See Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Decision No. DEC-1-A2-FT, 1 IranU.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 101 (Jan. 13, 1982). However, the Tribunal does have jurisdiction over
"any counterclaim which arises out of the same contract, transaction or occurrence that
constitutes the subject matter of th[e] national's claim .... "
Claims Settlement
Declaration, supra note 17, at art. II, para. 1, reprintedin 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 9.
398. In Case No. A15(IV)/A24, the United States argued in defense that
the Algiers Declarations relieve Iran of the obligation to defend itself against
involuntary litigation in United States courts which falls within the Tribunal's
jurisdiction; nothing in the Declarations, however, requires the United States to
grant Iran a favored position by precluding the assertion of counterclaims in
litigation that Iran itself voluntarily chose to commence in United States courts.
Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 328, para. 113.
399. And, it certainly appeared acceptable to at least one United States federal court.
In Islamic Republic of Iran v. Boeing, 771 F.2d 1279, 1285 (9th Cir. 1985), the Ninth Circuit
held that Section 6 of Executive Order 12,294 permitting counterclaims did not violate the
Algiers Declarations.
400. Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 328, para. 114.
401. See id.
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(d) Litigation Involving Standby Letters of Credit

Quite likely, the Tribunal also would have held the United States
to have violated the Algiers Declarations by its authorizing continued
litigation in United States courts for claims involving standby letters
of credit 4° had the United States and Iran not settled that claim
before the Tribunal could render a decision.4 3 Again, the Reagan
Administration had perfectly good reasons for excepting those claims
from suspension. Although a large number of standby letters of
credit had been called in March 1980, a substantial number remained
uncalled at the time the Algiers Declarations were concluded. 4°4 The
United States believed that the earlier calls had been made in bad
faith, 4°5 and it no doubt expected Iran to make subsequent bad faith
calls on the outstanding letters of credit. So, in addition to retaining
the regulations prohibiting United States banks from honoring called
letters of credit if the United States account parties set up substituted
blocked accounts on their own books-the provisions the Tribunal
found to violate General Principle A in Case No. A15(I:C)-the
Reagan Administration also allowed United States account parties to
continue to file new lawsuits in United States courts to enjoin United
4°6
States banks from honoring Iranian calls.
402. Section 5 of Executive Order 12,294, authorizing the continued litigation, was
implemented by 31 C.F.R. § 535.222(g). Further, at the outset of its implementation, the
Reagan Administration amended 31 C.F.R. § 535.504, which, during the hostage crisis, had
barred the entry of any final judgment in relation to blocked Iranian assets to permit final
judgments in standby-letter-of-credit proceedings authorized by § 535.222. More than a
year later, on July 2, 1982, the Treasury Department again amended § 535.504(3)(i), see 47
Fed. Reg. 29,529 (July 7, 1982), presumably in order to appease Iran, to prohibit "[a]ny
final judicial judgment or order (A) permanently enjoining, (B) terminating or nullifying,
or (C) otherwise permanently disposing of any interest of Iran in any standby letter of
credit, performance bond or similar obligation." 31 C.F.R. § 535.504(b)(3)(i) (1982). See
also Itek Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 704 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1983). And the
Treasury Department again amended § 535.504 on December 7, 1982 to include within the
prohibition on final judgments cases in which judgment in a lower court was entered
before the July 2, 1982 amendment but which were still pending on appeal. 31 C.F.R. §
535.504(b)(3)(i) (1982).
403. See supra text accompanying notes 243-258.
404. See Statement of Defense of the United States, Doc. 65, June 1, 1983, at 13-14,
Case No. A15(I:C), supra note 205, (on file with author); see also supra text accompanying
notes 265 through 269 (discussing the wave of Iranian calls occurring in November 1981).
405. See Case No. A15(I:C), supra note 205, 25 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 252 para. 11.
406. The United States made two arguments to the Tribunal in its defense. First, as
noted supra note 402, the Treasury Department amended its regulations in July 1982 to
prohibit final judgments "permanently disposing of any interest of Iran in any standby
letter of credit." 31 C.F.R. § 535.504(b)(3)(i) (1982) (codifying 47 Fed. Reg. 29,529 (July 7,
1982)). Thus, United States litigants were permitted to obtain only preliminary

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52

The Tribunal, however, had not found these same concerns to
justify the United States regulations permitting substituted blocked

accounts. Further, other factors, some known at the time and others
learned only later, indicate that the Tribunal would not have looked
any more kindly upon the regulations authorizing continued
litigation. For one thing, even if the Tribunal had been sympathetic
to the United States' concerns about fraudulent calls on letters of
credit, the regulations authorizing litigation would likely have

appeared to be overkill since any such concerns should have been
eliminated by the United States' authorizing account parties to
establish substituted blocked accounts on their own books. Further,

the Tribunal's formalistic conclusion in Claim D of Case No. A15(IV)
that the United States breached General Principle B merely by
authorizing tolling suits (even though the suits were immediately

suspended) suggests a similar conclusion for the United States'
authorization of letter-of-credit suits that it did not immediately, or at
any time thereafter, suspend. Thus, the United States' decision to

settle the claim appeared at the time, and even more so in retrospect,
to be the correct one.
(3) PreliminaryConclusions
By authorizing counterclaims and continued litigation involving
standby letters of credit in United States courts, the Reagan
Administration continued its pattern of interpreting the Algiers
Declarations not by reference to their text but by the needs and

desires of American claimants. These authorizations had no basis in
injunctions or other temporary relief. Consequently, the United States argued that this
relief was necessary to prevent the claims presented to the Tribunal involving standby
letters of credit from being rendered moot by payment of the letter of credit. The relief
was also appropriate, the United States maintained, in light of Article 26(3) of the
Tribunal's Rules, which provides that "[a] request for interim measures addressed by any
party to a judicial authority shall not be deemed incompatible with the agreement to
arbitrate." Statement of Defense of the United States, Doc. 87, at 52-55, Case No.
A15(I:C), supranote 205, (Nov. 12, 1990) (on file with author). Second, the United States
pointed out that most of the lawsuits in United States courts were brought by United
States contractors who sought to prevent United States banks from paying the standby
letters of credit; that is, the lawsuits pitted the account party against the issuing bank, both
of whom were United States nationals. While the Algiers Declarations obligate the
United States to terminate legal proceedings in United States courts brought by United
States nationals against Iran, they do not obligate the United States to terminate legal
proceedings between United States nationals. Id- at 55-58. The United States
acknowledged, however, that while some courts enjoined only the issuing bank from
paying the standby letter of credit, others also enjoined collection by Iran under the letter
of credit and under the related Iranian bank guarantee. Id. at 57.
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the Declarations; thus, the United States was rightfully held to have
breached the Declarations for authorizing counterclaims and was
prudent to have settled Iran's claim as to standby-letter-of-credit
litigation.
That said, it must be remembered that the Reagan
Administration's treatment of counterclaims and standby-letter-ofcredit litigation constituted only a small part of its overall
implementation of General Principle B, and that implementation,
4W
examined in total, appears to have been conducted in good faith.
Although the United States claimants had asked the Reagan
Administration not to nullify attachments until the Tribunal
determined that the underlying claims fell within its jurisdiction, 408 the
Reagan Administration rejected their requests, nullified all the
attachments, and transferred the formerly attached funds back to
Iran. Doing so left United States claimants whose claims had been
dismissed by the Tribunal for lack of jurisdiction little incentive to
return to United States courts since Iran no longer held money in the
United States and was not likely to pay a judgment issued against it
voluntarily.
The unjustifiable features of the Reagan Administration's
implementation of General Principle B seem even further minimized
when viewed retrospectively in light of the Tribunal's somewhat
confused conclusions as to that implementation. The Tribunal held
the United States to have breached the Algiers Declarations by
authorizing tolling suits that were immediately suspended and by
failing to remove the Foremost case from a United States court's
docket between April 1986 and April 1988, a time during which the
suit was completely dormant. Both decisions were arguably wrong on
the merits, but more troublingly, they manifest an inability or
unwillingness to apply the general principles that the Tribunal itself
set forth to specific situations. The Tribunal's failure to apply to Case
No. A24 the standards it set forth in Claim A of Case No. A15(IV)
was unjustifiable, and its formalistic holding as to tolling suits shows
that it employed a rigid, non-contextual analysis that, in particular,
took no account of the domestic law constraints under which the
Reagan Administration operated. The Tribunal held that the Algiers

407. See Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note 328, para. 98 ("There is no reason to doubt
that the United States acted in good faith when it suspended, rather than terminated, the
litigation.").
408. See supratext accompanying note 348.
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Declarations permit the United States to use other means to toll the
relevant statutes of limitation; the Declarations simply forbid the use
of tolling suits to do so. The Tribunal, however, seemingly took no
account of the fact that the United States federal government was
probably unable to take other action to toll state-law statutes of
limitation without running afoul of constitutional principles of
federalism. Of course, as noted above, a state cannot invoke its
domestic law provisions as justification for its failure to perform the
treaty, 40 9 but it is appropriate to consider that law in assessing the
particular means a state chose in performing its obligations,
particularly when that means produced precisely the result the state
was obligated to produce-in this case, a cessation of litigation
410
against Iran in United States courts.
Finally, the Reagan Administration's actual treaty violations
seem trivial in light of Iran's allegations of United States' treaty
violations. Iran contended that everything the United States did or
did not do with respect to implementing General Principle B violated
Most of those allegations were too
the Algiers Declarations.
meritless to warrant much discussion here or even by the Tribunal in
its Award. But Iran's proclivity to litigate each and every aspect of
the United States' implementation, if known or suspected in advance,
provided the Reagan Administration further incentive to call all
doubts in the United States' favor since a more balanced approach
would hardly have gained it anything.
D. Return of the Assets of the Shah and his Close Relatives
(1) Background to Point IV of the Algiers Declarations
the Reagan
In its most recent Award addressing
the
Declarations,
Algiers
Administration's implementation of the
Tribunal again found the United States in breach of the Algiers
Declarations, this time as a result of the Reagan Administration's
implementation of Point IV of the General Declaration, which
addresses Iran's efforts to recoup the vast assets of the former Shah of

409. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 27, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 339; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 36 (3d ed. 1979).
410. Cf American Arbitrators' Separate Opinion, Case No. A15(IV)/A24, supra note
385, at 5 (noting that a state party is bound to implement treaty terms "in good faith";
however, "the specific manner of compliance is-unless it is stipulated in the agreement
itself-left up to the complying state").
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Iran and his family, assets that Iran claimed were "stolen by the Shah
and his family.
The fate of the Shah and of his assets took on great importance
both to the United States and to the new Iranian government
virtually from the moment the new government seized power. On
January 16, 1979, the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and his
wife, Farah Diba Pahlavi, left Iran for the last time.41' The new
Revolutionary Government took control of the country in February
1979412 and immediately announced that it would demand the
extradition of the Shah from Morocco, where he and Farah Diba
were staying, along with the confiscation and return to Iran of the
Pahlavi assets. 413 Toward that end, on February 28th, Ayatollah
Khomeini issued a "Decree of Imam Concerning Confiscation of the
Pahiavi Properties," which charged the Islamic Revolutionary
Council with confiscating, "in favor of the needy... all movable and
immovable properties of the Pahlavi Dynasty, its branches, agents
and affiliates who during their illegal rule embezzled [them] from the
'414
Treasury.
The Shah's departure from Iran raised troubling policy questions
for the Carter Administration. The Shah had been an important ally
of the United States while he was in power, so President Carter
wanted to show support for him in his time of need. 4 5 Consequently,
when the Shah left Iran, President Carter invited him to come to the

United States.4 16 Instead, desiring to remain nearer to Iran,41 7 he
went first to Egypt, then to Morocco, 41 8 but a few months later, he
411. Nicholas Gage, Ruler Goes to Egypt, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1979, at Al. After a
brief stay in Egypt, the couple took up temporary residence in Morocco on January 22,
1979. Marvine Howe, Moroccan Security Tight as Shah Arrives for 'Strictly Private Visit',
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,1979, at A3.
412. Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No. All, Award No. 597-All-Fr,
para. 7 2000 WL 394260 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Apr. 7,2000) [hereinafter Case No. All].
413. See Iran Likely to Demand Extradition of the Shah, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1979, at
A4; Iran Urges that Swiss Freeze Assets of Shah, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1979, at A3; Swiss
Refuse a Request to Block Shah'sAssets, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1979, at A3; Shah to be Tried
in Absentia, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7,1979, at A8.
414. I A DIGEST OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS APPROVED BY THE ISLAMIC
REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT 1 (Masouduzzafar trans., 1979).
415. See CARTER, supra note 41, at 448.

416. I. at 448, 452. Soon after his departure from Iran, the Shah appeared to be
making plans to move to the United States. A.O. Sulzberger, Jr., Iran's Ambassador
Preparesfor Shah's Trip to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1979, at A14.
417. CARTER, supra note 41, at 448.
418. Marvine Howe, Moroccan Security Tight as Shah Arrivesfor 'Strictly Private Visit,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1979, at A3. The Shah soon decided that "coming to the United
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was asked to leave Morocco. 419 By that time, however, President
Carter, concerned about the intense anti-American hostility in Iran
and the vulnerability of Americans remaining there, determined that
allowing the Shah to enter the United States would be too
dangerous. 420 This decision was not without controversy: Carter's
National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, advised him to invite
the Shah, as did former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, and
Chief Executive Officer of Chase Manhattan Bank, David
Rockefeller. 421 President Carter remained steadfast in his refusal,
however, until the Shah became ill while living in Mexico and needed
essential diagnostic tests that were not available in that country. 422
permitted the
President Carter then relented and, in October 1979, he
423
treatment.
medical
for
States
United
Shah to enter the
The Shah's arrival in New York has been widely blamed as
precipitating the hostage-taking. 424 Whether or not that assessment is
accurate, it is certainly true that immediately after taking the
hostages, the students responsible demanded that the Shah be
returned to Iran. 425 Twelve days later, Acting Foreign Minister Bani-

States would signal a political abdication; to return to Iran would then be impossible
because he would appear to have been sent by the Central Intelligence Agency." Bernard
Gwertzman, Shah Delays Arrival in U.S. as Envoy Opposes Visit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
1979, at A3.
419. CARTER, supra note 41, at 452.
420. Id.; MACKEY, supra note 27, at 293 ("When the shah expressed his wish to enter
the United States ... the nervous Carter Administration found him refuge in a villa in
Cuernavaca, Mexico.").
421. CARTER, supra note 41, at 452. See also STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING,
FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., REPORT ON IRAN: THE FINANCIAL
ASPECTS OF THE HOSTAGE SETrLEMENT AGREEMENT 55 (Comm. Print 1981) ("It is no

secret that David Rockefeller and persons associated with him played an important role in
the Shah's admission to the United States.").
422. CARTER, supra note 41, at 455.
423. Id. at 456.
424. See Saunders, The Crisis Begins, supra note 27, at 58-60. See also House Foreign
Affairs Hearings, supra note 40, at 230 (statement of Bruce Laingen, former Charg6
D'Affaires, U.S. Embassy in Tehran) ("We did counsel in messages, both in July and in
the latter days of September, against admission of the Shah at that time .... [I]t was my
view, that until we had a regular government in place, a constitution adopted, the
provisional government no longer provisional.., that it would be unwise to admit the
Shah.").
425. Teheran Students Seize U.S. Embassy and Hold Hostages, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5,
1979, at Al; ROCKY SICKMANN, IRANIAN HOSTAGE: A PERSONAL DIARY 7 (1982).
Iran's Prime Minister, Mehdi Bazargan, queried Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Carter
Administration's National Security Adviser, about the return of the Pahlavi assets a few
days before the American Embassy takeover. BRZEZINSKI, supra note 42, at 476 ("When
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Sadr repeated the students' demand that the Shah himself be
returned for trial, but later that day, he stated that Iran sought instead
the return of the Shah's assets. 426 To this latter demand, the United

States repeatedly advised Iran that it must pursue its claims against
the Shah in United States courts, 427 and at about this time, Iran

attempted to do just that. On November 27, 1979, Iran filed suit
against the Shah and Farah Diba Pahlavi in New York State court,
claiming that the couple had misappropriated, embezzled, and

otherwise diverted to their own use assets belonging to Iran.42 The
Shah and Farah Diba left the United States on December 15, 1979 for
Panama,429 but a month later they, through their lawyers, moved to
dismiss Iran's lawsuit on several grounds including invalid service and
forum non conveniens.430 A few months later, on February 25, 1980,
Iran filed a similar suit against the Shah's twin sister Ashraf Pahlavi
also in New York State court, claiming that she had conspired with
the Shah to divert money and property belonging to Iran to her
personal use.431 Several months later, the United States requested
that both lawsuits be stayed to avoid prejudicing the Administration's
efforts to resolve the hostage crisis.

The courts granted these

requests.432 The Shah died on July 27, 1980 in Cairo. 433
Throughout the negotiations over the release of the hostages,

Iran continued to insist that the United States return the Pahlavi
assets. 434 As noted above, on September 12, 1980, the Ayatollah
the question of the Shah's assets was raised, I told my Iranian interlocutors that the doors
to our courts were open and that they could sue for them anytime they wished.").
426. See Saunders, Diplomacy and Pressure, supra note 53, at 81, 87; Senate Foreign
Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 10 (prepared testimony of Edmund Muskie). On
November 17, 1979, the Ayatollah Khomeini declared that the hostages would not be
released "until the United States had handed over the former Shah for trial and returned
his property to Iran." Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.CJ. 3,34, reprintedin 19 I.L.M. 553,569 (1980).
427. Saunders, Diplomacy and Pressure, supra note 53, at 80; House Foreign Affairs
Hearings,supra note 40, at 42, 49 (prepared statement of Harold H. Saunders); Senate
Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 11, 13 (prepared testimony of Edmund
Muskie).
428. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 28.
429. Bernard Gwertzman, New Phase in Crisis,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,1979, at Al.
430. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 31.
431. Id.para. 44.
432. ld.paras. 33,46.
433. Deposed Shah Dies in Egypt at 60; Iran Says Death Will Not Affect Fate of the 52
American Hostages,N.Y. TIMES, July 28,1980, at Al.
434. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 30 (testimony of Warren
Christopher).
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Khomeini announced four conditions for the release of the hostages,
and these conditions were confirmed in a resolution by the Iranian
Parliament (or "Majlis"). 435 As the fourth condition, the Majlis
demanded
[t]he return of all assets of the defunct Shah as well as official
recognition as valid of the action of the government of Iran in
exercising its sovereignty to expropriate the assets of the defunct
Shah and his close relatives, which assets, according to the laws of
Iran, belong to the Iranian nation, the issuance of an order by the
American President that these assets be identified and frozen, and
the taking of all administrative and legal measures necessary for
436
transferring these assets and possession to Iran.
The United States negotiators found this demand to be
particularly troublesome. They recognized that the return of the
Shah's assets was an issue of great political and symbolic importance
to Iran, but they questioned its practical significance, since they
"doubted that any substantial portion of [the Shah's] estate
remained" in the United States. 437 Further, as a matter of principle,
they could not agree to any proposal that would simply confiscate the
438
Pahlavis' United States assets and return them to Iran.
Consequently, the United States negotiators repeatedly conveyed to
Iran that, under the United States Constitution, the transfer of private
property from one party to another can be ordered only pursuant to
procedures which afford due process of law. 439 Thus, they advised
Iran that the only entity within the United States Government that
could order the transfer of allegedly stolen property was the United
States courts, so that Iran's only means for recovering any such
property was to bring suit in those courts. The United States did
promise, however, to facilitate Iran's litigation efforts in certain,
limited ways;440 these promises would later, with some minor
modifications, become the obligations that the United States assumed
in Point IV of the General Declaration.
435. See supra text accompanying notes 67, 76.
436. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 16.
437. Owen, supra note 47, at 304; CARTER, supra note 41, at 586 ("I would guess [the
Pahlavi assets amounted to] approximately one-thousandth as much as the Iranians claim
the value to be-maybe $20 to $60 million maximum (probably none of it in the United
States), compared to $20 to $60 billion that the Iranians have claimed.").
438. Owen, supra note 47, at 304.
439. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 30 (testimony of Warren
Christopher).
440. Owen, supra note 47, at 304.
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The negotiations concerning the Pahlavi assets seemed to be

progressing satisfactorily, when, on December 19, 1980, in a
development described by one of the United States negotiators as a
lowpoint in the negotiations, 441 Iran demanded, among other things,
that the United States provide a "$10 billion cash guarantee to ensure
that the [Pahlavi] wealth would be returned to Iran."'442 The United
States categorically rejected this demand, 443 and Iran seemed to
retreat from it in a December 21 communication that it conveyed to
the United States.444 A few days later, the New York Times published
Iran's December 21 communication and, a few days after that, it
published the United States' November and early-December
communications. 445 These publications must have given the Pahlavis
446
ample warning to remove their assets from the United States.

On December 30, 1980, United States negotiators delivered to
the Algerian intermediaries a draft of what would become the
General Declaration.447 The draft included five paragraphs in which

the United States promised, among other things, to freeze the assets
within the control of the estate of the former Shah and any of his

close relatives served as defendants in United States litigation
brought by Iran to recover those assets, and the United States

promised to require persons within its jurisdiction to submit reports
.441. House Foreign Affairs Hearings, supra note 40, at 141 (testimony of Warren
Christopher).
442. Owen, supra note 47, at 309-10; John Kifner, Iran Proposes U.S. Create a Bank
Fund to Cover Frozen Assets, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1980, at Al. This demand was so
demoralizing that the United States negotiators considered abandoning negotiations and
leaving them for the incoming administration. See Owen, supra note 47, at 310-11;
Symposium, The Settlement with Iran, 13 U. MIAMI J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (1981) (statement of
Mark Feldman); Bernard Gwertzman, U.S. Said to Consider Halting Exchanges on
Hostages in Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1980, at Al.
443. John Kifner, Iran Proposes U.S. Create a Bank Fund to Cover Frozen Assets, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 1980, at Al; Owen, supra note 47, at 310; CARTER, supra note 41, at 590,
592.
444. See Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 22. Symposium, The Settlement with Iran,
13 U. MIAMI J. INT'L L. 1, 5-6 (1981) (statement of Mark Feldman).
445. Text of the IranianResponse to the U.S. on Terms for Release of the Hostages,N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 1980, at A14; FirstAmerican Response and Second American Response,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29,1980, at A10. See also Case No. All, supranote 412, para. 23.
446. For this reason, one would have thought that Iran would have had the most to gain
by keeping the negotiations secret, yet it was Iran that first made public its December 17,
1980 demand and two of the United States' communications. Bernard Gwertzman,
FormalProposalson Hostage Release Made Public by U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1980, at
Al. See also John Kifner, Iran Gives No Explanationfor Publicizing Documents, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 29,1980, at All.
447. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 24.
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about those assets, with all reported information to be transmitted to
Iran. Iran suggested no modifications to those paragraphs; thus, on
January 19, 1981, they were adopted verbatim as paragraphs 12-16 of
the General Declaration. 448 In total, they read:
12. Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the
certification described in Paragraph 3 above, 449 the United States
will freeze, and prohibit any transfer of, property and assets in the
United States within the control of the estate of the former Shah or
of any close relative of the former Shah served as a defendant in
U.S. litigation brought by Iran to recover such property and assets
as belonging to Iran. As to any such defendant, including the estate
of the former Shah, any freeze order will remain in effect until such
litigation is finally terminated. Violation of the freeze order shall
be subject to the civil and criminal penalties prescribed by U.S. law.
13. Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the
certification described in Paragraph 3 above, the United States will
order all persons within U.S. jurisdiction to report to the U.S.
Treasury within 30 days, for transmission to Iran, all information
known to them, as of November 3, 1979, and as of the date of the
order, with respect to the property and assets referred to in
Paragraph 12. Violation of the requirement will be subject to the
civil and criminal penalties prescribed by U.S. law.
14. Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the
certification described in Paragraph 3 above, the United States will
make known, to all appropriate U.S. courts, that in any litigation of
the kind described in Paragraph 12 above the claims of Iran should
not be considered legally barred either by sovereign immunity
principles or by the act of state doctrine and that Iranian decrees
and judgments relating to such assets should be enforced by such
courts in accordance with United States law.
15. As to any judgment of a U.S. court which calls for the transfer
of any property or assets to Iran, the United States hereby
guarantees the enforcement of the final judgment to the extent that
the property or assets exist within the United States.
16. If any dispute arises between the parties as to whether the
United States has fulfilled any obligation imposed upon it by
Paragraphs 12-15 inclusive, Iran may submit the dispute to binding
448. Id. paras. 24-25.
449. Paragraph 3, among other things, provided that the Government of Algeria would
make a certification to the Algerian Central Bank once the fifty-two American hostages
had safely departed from Iran. General Declaration, supra note 17, para. 3, reprinted in 1
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 4.
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arbitration by the tribunal established by, and in accordance with
the provisions of, the Claims Settlement Declaration. If the
tribunal determines that Iran has suffered a loss as a result of a
failure by the United States to fulfill such obligation, it shall make

by
an appropriate award in favor of Iran which may be enforced
450
Iran in the courts of any nation in accordance with its laws.

On the day he signed the Algiers Declarations, President Carter
also issued a series of executive orders, including Executive Order
12284 which implemented Point IV.451 The Executive Order
appeared to conform in all relevant respects with paragraphs 12-16 of
the General Declaration. Of particular relevance, it appeared to
order the immediate freezing of the assets within the control of the
estate of the former Shah or of any close relative that Iran served as a
452
defendant in United States courts.
450. General Declaration, supra note 17, paras. 12-16, reprintedin 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. at 7-8.
451. Exec. Order No. 12,284,46 Fed. Reg. 7929 (Jan. 23,1981).
452. Id. Section 1-101 of the Executive Order reads:
1-101. For the purpose of protecting the rights of litigants in courts within the
United States, all property and assets located in the United States within the
control of the estate of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the former Shah of Iran, or
any close relative of the former Shah served as a defendant in litigation in such
courts brought by Iran seeking the return of property alleged to belong to Iran, is
hereby blocked as to each such estate or person until all such litigation against
such estate or person is finally terminated.
Id. (emphasis added).
The remaining relevant sections read:
1-102. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed (a) to promulgate
regulations requiring all persons who are subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States and who, as of November 3, 1979, or as of this date, have actual or
constructive possession of property of the kind described in Section 1-101, or
knowledge of such possession by others, to report such possession or knowledge
thereof, to the Secretary of the Treasury in accordance with such regulations and
(b) to make available to the Government of Iran or its designated agents all
identifying information derived from such reports to the fullest extent permitted
by law. Such reports shall be required as to all individuals described in 1-101 and
shall be required to be filed within 30 days after publication of a notice in the
Federal Register.
104.The Attorney General of the United States having advised the President of
his opinion that no claim on behalf of the Government of Iran for recovery of
property of the kind described in Section 1-101 of this Order should be
considered legally barred either by sovereign immunity principles or by the act of
state doctrine, the Attorney General is authorized and directed to prepare, and
upon the request of counsel representing the Government of Iran to present to
the appropriate court or courts within the United States, suggestions of interest
reflecting that such is the position of the United States, and that it is also the
position of the United States that Iranian decrees and judgments relating to the
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(2) The Reagan Administration'sImplementation of Point IV

In many ways, the ultimate resolution of Iran's demands
concerning the Pahlavi assets provided the United States with its most
obvious negotiating victory. Iran had repeatedly demanded that the
United States confiscate and return the Pahlavi assets located in the
United States;453 in the end, however, Iran was willing to bring its own
lawsuits to United States courts and to settle for some very limited
assistance in those lawsuits-essentially a promise to freeze and
require reporting about the United States assets within the control of
the estate of the Shah and his close relatives; a promise that the
Executive Branch would provide to the courts its opinion that Iran's
claims should not be barred by principles of sovereign immunity or
act of state; and, a promise that Iranian decrees and judgments
relating to the above assets would be enforced in United States courts
"in accordancewith United States law," the quoted phrase limiting the
United States' promise to providing Iran with little more than is
available to any other litigant in United States courts. At the same
time, the fact that Iran was willing to settle for such limited
obligations, and, in particular, that it accepted the United States'
December 30, 1980 proposal regarding the Pahlavi assets without
suggesting a single modification (while, at the same time, aggressively
negotiating on other issues), can be understood as confirming what
the United States negotiators had suspected all along: that the
question of the Pahlavi assets was of great symbolic and political
454
importance for Iran, but not of great financial importance.

assets of the former Shah and the persons described in Section 1-101 should be
enforced by such courts in accordance with United States law.
1-106.This Order shall be effective immediately.

Id.
453. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 30 (testimony of Warren
Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State, Carter Administration) ("Throughout the crisis,
Iran attempted to insist on a return of the wealth of the former Shah and his family.");
Owen, supra note 47, at 310.
454. In an affidavit submitted in Case No. All, supra note 412, Warren Christopher
stated:
[A]s we expressed to our Algerian intermediaries several times during the
negotiations, I and the other U.S. negotiators believed that the significance was
not financial, but political and symbolic. It was our best judgment that the
former Shah, his estate and his family simply would not have left substantial
assets in the United States, if in fact there had ever been any there, in the face of
the Ayatollah Khomeini's constant public demands for confiscation and return of
such assets.
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The Carter Administration officials who had negotiated the

Algiers Declarations recognized the very limited nature of the
obligations the United States had assumed in Point IV. Indeed, the
negotiators believed that the whole of Point IV gave Iran little more

than any other litigant would ordinarily enjoy in United States
courts.455

During hearings before the United States Senate and

House of Representatives, the Carter Administration negotiators
were repeatedly queried as to the nature and scope of Point IV, and
they repeatedly and consistently emphasized that the United States'
obligations were narrowly drawn.456 The Reagan Administration
officials who testified did not disagree, so there appeared to be no

obvious dispute between the Carter and Reagan Administrations
regarding the implementation of Point IV. Nor, during that time, was
there apparent any substantial lobbying of the Reagan
Administration by the Pahlavis or by their United States friends and
associates with respect to the implementation of Point IV. Although
Affidavit of Warren Christopher, Doe. 117, Ex. 1, para. 32, Case No. All, supra note 412
(on file with author).
455. Senate Banking Comm. Hearing,supra note 62, at 54 (testimony of Roberts Owen,
the Carter Administration's Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State and one of the lead
drafters of the Algiers Declarations) ("[W]e were careful to insure that we were not giving
Iran anything substantially more than they would have enjoyed as a litigant in our courts
anyway."); Owen, supra note 47, at 304 (noting that the United States' negotiating offer
"would not provide Iran with any significant litigating advantage that it would not
otherwise have enjoyed"); Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 30-31
(testimony of Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State, Carter Administration)
(noting that "even in the absence of a governmental freeze order, a court would place
approximately the same restrictions on the property in litigation by judicial order" and
that "the information to be furnished to the Treasury is the same kind that would be
available to a plaintiff under the normal civil 'discovery' procedures in our Federal
courts"); see also Trooboff, supra note 49, at 150-51 ("[TIhe United States agree[d] to
make known to the U.S. courts no more than what the U.S. Government thought that the
courts probably would have ruled anyway-i.e., that the act of state and sovereign
immunity defense should not legally bar the Iranian claim to these assets.").
456. Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 19, at 30 (testimony of Warren
Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State, Carter Administration) (describing the United
States' obligations as "carefully circumscribed"). Further, Mr. Christopher explained:
I do not think it is fully appreciated that the commitment to prohibit the transfer
of the Shah-related property will arise only when Iran has filed a lawsuit against
and served legal process on individuals who it claims are close relatives of the
Shah, and only then will the property be temporarily frozen. Such a freeze order
will remain in effect only until the litigation is terminated.
L; see also id at 50 (testimony of Warren Christopher) (defending the Declarations
against the severe criticism of Republican Senator Hayakawa and describing Point IV as a
"very limited provision"); Senate Banking Comm. Hearing,supra note 62, at 54 (testimony
of Roberts Owen, Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State, Carter Administration)
(describing the burden on the United States as "very slight" if any).
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numerous United States nationals with claims against Iran testified
457
during the Senate and House hearings, no Pahlavi was heard from.
For these reasons, one might have expected the Reagan

Administration's implementation of Point IV to have been
straightforward and uncontroversial. Indeed, it seemed headed that
way on February 24, 1981, when, as noted above, President Reagan

issued Executive Order 12294, ratifying President Carter's executive

458
orders, including Executive Order 12284 implementing Point IV.
President Carter's Executive Order 12284 appeared to order the
immediate freezing of assets located in the United States within the
estate of the former Shah or of any close relative that Iran had served

as a defendant in United States courts.

However, the Reagan

Administration either did not read it to do so or ignored that feature

of the Executive Order because, on that same day, the Office of
Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury
("OFAC") issued a regulation, 31 C.F.R. § 535.217 titled "Blocking of
property of the former Shah of Iran and of certain other Iranian
nationals," which was made retroactive to January 19, 1981. The first

sentence of paragraph (a) of § 535.217 repeats, almost verbatim,
Section 1-101 of President Carter's Executive Order 12284, but it

omits the suggestion of an immediate freeze.459 Moreover, the second
sentence imposed on Iran a burden not previously discussed: that of
furnishing to OFAC proof of service on a defendant before OFAC
would freeze that defendant's assets. Finally, and most importantly,

paragraph (b) of § 535.217, which was to contain the names of the
457. See Trooboff, supra note 49, at 150 ("Most of us have little direct interest in the
Iranian claim to certain of the former Shah's assets or the disposition of that issue under
the Algerian Declarations.").
458. Exec. Order No. 12,294 § 8,46 Fed. Reg. 14111 (Feb. 24, 1981).
459. Executive Order 12,284, 46 Fed. Reg. 7929, states that the assets are "hereby
blocked" while 31 C.F.R. § 535.217(a) describes the assets as "blocked" and conditions
that blocking on the obligation it imposes on Iran in the second sentence of § 535.217(a).
The whole of paragraph (a) provides:
For the purpose of protecting the rights of litigants in courts within the United
States, all property and assets located in the United States in the control of the
estate of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the former Shah of Iran, or any close
relative of the former Shah served as a defendant in litigation in such courts
brought by Iran seeking the return of property alleged to belong to Iran, is
blocked as to each such estate or person, until all such litigation against such
estate or person is finally terminated. This provision shall apply only to such
persons as to which Iran has furnished proof of service to the Office of Foreign
Assets Control and which the Office has identified in paragraph (b) of this
section.
31 C.F.R. § 535.217(a).
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defendants whose assets were to be frozen, initially included no
names; that is, at the outset, the Reagan Administration froze no
property. Likewise, the Reagan Administration initially did not
require reporting about any property; indeed, it did not even
promulgate a regulation concerning reporting requirements.
Two days after the Reagan Administration promulgated
§ 535.217, on February 26, 1981, Iran provided OFAC with proof of
service on the Shah, on Farah Diba Pahlavi, and on Ashraf Pahlavi
and requested that OFAC immediately freeze their assets. 460 When
OFAC failed to act, Iran reiterated its requests on March 2, 1981 and
on March 19, 1981. 461 However, OFAC, both then and subsequently,
declined to accept Iran's proffered proof with respect to the Shah and
Farah Diba. Instead, the Reagan Administration interpreted the
phrase "served as a defendant," appearing in Paragraph 12 of the
General Declaration, to mean that the defendant was uncontestedly
or validly served;46 2 because the Shah and Farah Diba had challenged
the validity of their service, OFAC did not consider them "served as a
defendant" under Paragraph 12 and declined to freeze or require
reporting about their assets. Indeed, OFAC never froze or required
reporting about the assets of the Shah and Farah Diba because the
validity of their service continued to be contested throughout the
463
course of their litigation, including while on appeal.
Ashraf Pahlavi had not challenged the validity of her service, yet
OFAC likewise failed to freeze or require reporting about her assets
for some months, without providing any reason for its failure and
despite Iran's repeated requests. Finally, on May 13, 1981, almost
three months after Iran's original request, OFAC amended 31 C.F.R.
§ 535.217(b) to add Ashraf Pahlavi's name, thereby freezing her
assets. 46 4 On the same day, the Reagan Administration promulgated
31 C.F.R. § 535.619, which required persons who had knowledge of or
who were in possession of assets belonging to a person listed in §
535.217(b) to report that information. Once Ashraf Pahlavi was
included in § 535.217(b), reporting was required as to her assets, and
in July 1991, OFAC transmitted the information that it had received
to Iran. These reports showed that the United States had frozen
460. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 34.
461. Id. paras. 35-36.
462. Id. paras. 62,127-30.
463. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 464 N.Y.S.2d 487, 490 (App. Div. 1983);
Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 467 N.E.2d 245 (N.Y. 1984).
464. Case No. All, supranote 412, para. 47.
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approximately $4 million worth of real property belonging to Ashraf
465
Pahlavi located in New York City.
Iran brought additional cases against other Pahlavis, but the
Reagan Administration held fast to the pro-Pahlavi interpretation of
"served as a defendant" that it had unveiled in Iran's litigation against
the Shah and Farah Diba, and it continued its dilatory
implementation of Point IV, first seen in Iran's litigation against
Ashraf Pahlavi. For instance, on December 17, 1981, Iran filed a civil
lawsuit in New York state court against Fatemeh Pahlavi, another of
the Shah's sisters, and against fifty-nine other relatives and associates
of the Shah.466 The following day, Iran obtained an ex parte order
from the New York court authorizing service upon the defendants by
publication and certified mail.467 Iran effected service by publication
three months later, in March 1982,468 and six months later, on
September 29, 1982, Iran notified OFAC that the sixty defendants
had been served in New York trial court. Iran asked OFAC to freeze
and require reporting about their assets. 469 OFAC apparently never
470
responded even though service was uncontested at this point.
Another three months elapsed when, in December 1982, one of the
defendants did move to vacate the service by publication and to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as to all of the defendants. 471 The court
never decided that issue, instead dismissing Iran's complaint on July
31, 1984 on grounds of forum non conveniens.472 When litigation
finally terminated, OFAC had neither frozen nor required reporting
about the assets of Fatemeh Pahlavi and her fifty-nine co-defendants.

465. Id. para. 48.
466. Id. para. 54. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Fatemeh Pahlavi and 59 Others, No. 81

Civ. 0186 (S.D. N.Y. Jan. 13, 1981); Iran had brought the same suit against the same
defendants eleven months earlier in United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 53. Iran did not attempt to serve any
of the defendants and voluntarily dismissed the suit on December 16, 1981. Id. paras. 53-

54.
467. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 55.
468. Id.
469. Id. para. 56.

470. Id. Iran contended, and the United States did not deny, that OFAC made no
response to Iran's request. Reply of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Statement of
Defense of the United States of America, Doc. 58, at 46, Case No. All, supra note 412 (on
file with author); Iran's Hearing Memorial and Evidence on the Issue of Liability, Doc.
105, at 48-49, Case No. All, supra note 412 (on file with author).
471. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 57.

472. Id. para. 58.
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Finally, Iran brought three lawsuits against Shams Pahlavi,
another sister of the Shah, but issues concerning service arose
primarily in the first suit, which Iran filed in Los Angeles Superior
Court on June 30, 1981. 473 Iran obtained an ex parte order from the
Superior Court permitting service by publication in December
1981, 474 and it effected service by publication five months later, in
May 1982. 47s During the interim, on April 22, 1982, Shams Pahlavi
filed a Motion to Quash Summons, challenging the ex parte order.476
On June 7, 1982, Iran notified OFAC that Shams had been
"served as a defendant" and requested that OFAC freeze her United
States assets. 477 OFAC did not, so one month later, Iran reiterated
the request. Five months later, in December 1982, OFAC finally
informed Iran that because "the validity of the service is contested
and has not been established,"'478it was "not prepared to block the
defendant's assets at this time.
On May 24, 1983, the trial court granted Shams Pahlavi's motion
to quash service, 479 and the California Court of Appeal upheld that
ruling. 48 0 Iran apparently took no further action for six years; then,
on October 17, 1990, Iran effected personal service on Shams Pahlavi,
and the California Court of Appeal upheld that service in December
1990.481 In April 1991, six months after it had effected service, Iran
notified OFAC that it had done so. Two months later, in June 1991,
Iran further informed OFAC that the Court of Appeal had upheld
service on Shams Pahlavi and asked OFAC to freeze her United
States assets.482 Two additional months elapsed before OFAC added
Shams Pahlavi's name to paragraph (b) of 31 C.F.R. § 535.217,
thereby freezing and requiring reporting about her United States
assets. 48 3 Her assets remained frozen until March 1, 1996, the day
after she died, even though the final suit against her terminated
fifteen months earlier, in November 1994.484
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.

Id para. 59.
Id para. 60.
1& para. 62.
Id.para. 61.
Id.para. 62.
Id
Id para. 63.
Id para. 64.
1d para. 65.
Id. para.66.
56 Fed. Reg. 40553 (Aug. 15,1991) (amending 31 C.F.R. § 535.217(b)).
31 C.F.R. § 535.217 (1996); Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 81.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52

As a result of the Reagan Administration's interpretation of
Paragraph 12's phrase "served as a defendant," OFAC never froze or
required reporting about the assets of Farah Diba Pahlavi or of
Fatemeh Pahlavi and her fifty-nine co-defendants; it did freeze and
require reporting about the assets of Shams Pahlavi but only after the
validity of service was litigated in trial court and on appeal. Further,
as a result of what might be seen as either carelessness or pettiness,
the United States delayed three months before freezing and requiring
reporting about Ashraf Pahlavi's assets even though she never
contested service, 485 and it delayed four months before freezing
Shams Pahlavi's assets after it learned that the California Court of
Appeal had upheld service upon her.
Looking beyond the service question to the resolution of Iran's
cases, we find that Iran failed entirely in its efforts to obtain the
return of Pahlavi assets through United States litigation. After the
Shah died, Iran petitioned the New York trial court in which it had
filed its suit against the Shah and Farah Diba to appoint an
administrator to represent the Shah's estate. 486 The court denied this
request, finding that Iran had failed to establish that the Shah owned
any property in New York.487 The court found service on the couple
to have been proper, but it dismissed the suit against them on grounds
of forum non conveniens.488 On appeal to both the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court and to the New York
Court of Appeals, Iran sought to reverse the forum non conveniens
dismissal while Farah Diba Pahlavi sought to reverse the
489 Both parties failed,490
determination that service had been proper.
and Iran's case against the Shah and Farah Diba Pahlavi terminated
when the United States Supreme Court denied Iran's petition for
491
certiorari.
Ashraf Pahlavi also moved to dismiss Iran's complaint against
her, inter alia, on grounds of forum non conveniens,492 but the New

485. Case No. All, supra note 412, paras. 269, 272.
486. Id. para. 37.
487. Id. para. 39.
488. Id. para. 38.
489. Id. paras. 40,41.
490. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 464 N.Y.S.2d 487, 488 (App. Div. 1983);
Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 467 N.E.2d 245,247 (N.Y. 1984).
491. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985); see also Case No. All,
supra note 412, para. 42.
492. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 45.
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York trial court denied her motion.493 However, in March 1984, the
Appellate Division reversed the trial court's decision and dismissed
Iran's suit on grounds of forum non conveniens, following its earlier
decision in the case against Farah Diba.494 In February 1985, the New
York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. 495
Although litigation against Ashraf Pahiavi was finally terminated with
that decision, it was not until six years later, and on the same day that
name
it froze Shams Pahlavi's assets, that OFAC removed Ashraf s 496
from § 535.217(b), and thereby unfroze her United States assets.
Iran's litigation against Fatemeh Pahlavi and the fifty-nine
codefendants met a similar fate. In July 1984, the New York trial
court sua sponte dismissed Iran's complaint on the ground of forum
non conveniens, citing the cases against Farah Diba and Ashraf
497
Pahlavi, and Iran did not appeal.
Iran's litigation against Shams Pahlavi took a more circuitous
route but proved equally unsuccessful in the end. In its first lawsuit
against Shams Pahlavi, Iran's original complaint charged her and her
co-defendants with conspiring with the Shah to embezzle and
otherwise divert to their personal use money belonging to the
government of Iran. 498 In August 1991, however, Iran amended its
complaint, abandoning all of its original causes of action and
replacing them with a single cause of action: to enforce the February
28, 1979 Decree of Imam Ruhollah Khomeini, which sought to
confiscate all Pahlavi property. Iran maintained that the Algiers
Declarations required the United States courts to enforce Iranian
decrees and judgments. 499 In January 1992, Shams Pahlavi asked Iran
to produce the original 1979 Decree and to respond to a set of
interrogatories. Iran refused,500 and it subsequently refused to
comply with a court order compelling discovery. 501 So, in September
493. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 455 N.Y.S.2d 987, 994 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982); see
also Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 49.
494. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 473 N.Y.S.2d 801 (App. Div. 1984); see also
Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 50.
495. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 476 N.E. 2d 338 (N.Y. 1985); see also Case No.
All, supra note 412, para. 51.
496. 31 C.F.R. § 535.217 (1991) (adding Shams Pahlavi's name to subsection (b) and
removing Ashraf Pahlavi's name from that same section).
497. Case No. All, supranote 412, para. 58.
498. Id. para. 59.
499. Id. para. 69.
500. Id. para. 73.
501. Id. para. 76.
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1992, the court dismissed Iran's suit for failing to comply with the

503
court's order, 502 and the dismissal was upheld on appeal.
Iran brought its second suit against Shams Pahlavi in July 1981
when it and Bank Mellat filed a complaint in Los Angeles Superior
Court charging Shams with defaulting on a $5 million loan. 5°4 Upon
Shams Pahlavi's motion, in February 1984, the court dismissed Iran's
complaint on grounds of forum non conveniens.5 5 The California

Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal, 50 6 and Iran was not able to
obtain review in either the California Supreme Court or the United
507
States Supreme Court.
Finally, Bank Melli Iran and Bank Mellat filed suit against

Shams Pahlavi in September 1992 in the United States District Court

for the Central District of California, seeking to enforce a series of
default judgments that Tehran courts had rendered against her

between 1982 and

1991.508

On Shams Pahlavi's motion, the court

dismissed Iran's complaint, holding that at the time the judgments
were entered, she could not have obtained due process in the courts

of Iran.509 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, 510 and the
United States Supreme Court denied Iran's petition for certiorari. 51 '
(3) Iran's Case before the Tribunal

In January 1982, long before most of the events recounted above
took place, Iran filed suit in the Tribunal claiming that the United
States had breached its Point IV obligations. The briefing in the case
took numerous years, so by the time the Tribunal heard the case, in

502. Id. para. 78.
503. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal, id. para. 79; the
California Supreme Court denied Iran's petition for review, id. para. 80; and the United
States Supreme Court denied Iran's petition for certiorari. Islamic Republic of Iran v.
Pahlavi, 513 U.S. 1001 (1994); see also Case No. All, supranote 412, para. 80.
504. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 82.
505. Id. para. 86.
506. Id. para. 87.
507. Id. para. 88; Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 479 U.S. 804 (1986) (denying
certiorari).
508. Case No. All, supra note 412, paras. 89-90. One of the judgments was for the loan
default that had been at issue in Bank Mellat's suit against Shams in Los Angeles Superior
Court. Id. para. 89.
509. Id. para. 93.
510. Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Case No. All,
supra note 412, para. 94.
511. Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 516 U.S. 989 (1995); see also Case No. All, supra note
412, para. 95.
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February 1998, Iran's litigation against the Pahiavis had ended and all
of the relevant facts were available.
Iran, as had been its practice in previous cases, accused the
United States of violating Point IV in virtually all conceivable ways,
most of which were frivolous. For instance, Iran alleged that Point IV
obligates the United States to ensure the return of all Pahlavi assets,
so that the United States violated Point IV by failing to return
them. 51 2 The Tribunal rejected that argument, seemingly without

difficulty, holding that no such United States' obligation could
reasonably be inferred from the text, context, or negotiating history

of Point IV or of the General Declaration as a whole.513 Iran also
contended that the Algiers Declarations prevent United States courts

from dismissing Iran's claims on any procedural or jurisdictional
ground, including forum non conveniens; that is, that Point IV
obligates the United States to make available to Iran a United States
forum in which Iran can pursue its claims against the Pahlavis on the
merits. 514 The Tribunal rejected that claim as well, stating that
"nowhere in the text of Point IV did the United States expressly
obligate itself to provide Iran with access to United States courts for

the consideration of Iran's Pahlavi-assets claims on the merits" and
concluding that no such obligation could be inferred.5 15 With respect
to the forum non conveniens dismissals in particular, the Tribunal

noted that the Shah and Farah Diba Pahlavi had raised the defense of
forum non conveniens long before the Algiers Declarations were
signed; thus, Iran was on notice that the defense could be raised, yet it

did not attempt to address it in any way in Point V.516

512. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 184.
513. Id paras. 186, 193-99, 204.
514. I& paras. 243-44.
515. Id para. 245. The Tribunal noted, among other things, that Paragraph 14 requires
the United States to inform its courts that two defenses-act of state and sovereign
immunity-should not apply to Iran's claims against the Pahlavis. The inclusion of those
two defenses indicates the intention to exclude all other defenses. Id
516. Id para. 246. There is a certain perverse irony in the fact that the United States
clearly invited Iran to bring its Pahlavi-assets litigation to United States courts, yet the
courts subsequently dismissed four of Iran's six cases for forum non conveniens; that is, on
the ground that United States courts were not convenient fora to hear the cases. However
bad a taste that might leave, the Tribunal's conclusion in favor of the United States was
clearly the correct one: the bottom line is that Point IV gave Iran very little, and one thing
it definitely did not give it was immunity from forum non conveniens dismissals and from
other procedural and jurisdictional defenses.
The Tribunal also rejected some more plausible arguments that Iran advanced
pertaining to its litigation against the former Shah. Recall that Paragraph 12 requires the
United States to freeze "property and assets within the control of the estate of the former
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In contrast, the Tribunal appeared to have just as little difficulty
determining that the Reagan Administration violated Paragraph 12
and 13 in its interpretation and implementation of those paragraphs

with respect to the former Shah's close relatives. 5 17 As noted above,
the Reagan Administration interpreted Paragraph 12's "served as a
defendant" requirement to mean "effective service as determined by
the court. '5 18 That is, according to the United States, Iran's service
on a defendant had to be either uncontested, or if contested, upheld
by the highest court presented with the issue before the United

States' obligation to freeze and require reporting about that
defendant's assets was triggered. 5 9 That interpretation, of course,
would and did completely eliminate what little value Iran may have
derived from Paragraphs 12 and 13. By insisting that service on a
Pahlavi defendant be uncontested before freezing that defendant's
assets, the Reagan Administration gave the Pahlavi defendants the

power to prevent the United States freeze merely by contesting
service (regardless of how frivolous that contest might be) and thus

Shah or of any close relative of the former Shah served as a defendant in U.S. litigation."
General Declaration, supra note 17, para. 12, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. at 7.
As noted above, the New York trial court denied Iran's Petition for Letters of
Administration, Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 39, so no estate for the former Shah
was ever created and, because no estate was ever created, the United States never froze or
required reporting about property and assets "within the control of the estate of the
former Shah," id. para. 125. Iran claimed that the United States should have frozen those
assets on the date the Algiers Declarations were signed. Id. para. 97. First, Iran
maintained that the phrase "served as a defendant" in Paragraph 12 modifies the close
relatives of the former Shah but not the former Shah himself so that Iran did not need to
serve process on the former Shah to trigger the United States' obligation to freeze his
assets. Id. para. 100. Second, Iran contended that the phrase, "estate of the former Shah"
simply means the property or assets left by the deceased Shah, id. para. 104, so that the
United States should have frozen "the property and assets within the control of the estate
of the former Shah" and not required a formally constituted decedent's estate acting
through a court-appointed executor to be established, see id. para. 105. The Tribunal
rejected Iran's interpretation of the term "estate," reasoning that "litigation cannot be
bought against 'property and assets,' as such, left by a deceased." Id. para. 207. In light of
that conclusion, the Tribunal determined that it did not need to address whether the
service requirement applied to the estate of the former Shah in addition to his close
relatives. Id. para. 216.
517. One of the American arbitrators, Richard Mosk, dissented from the Tribunal's
conclusions, Separate Opinion of Richard M. Mosk, Case No. All, supra note 412, 2000
WL 394320, but the other two American arbitrators, George H. Aldrich and Charles T.
Duncan, voted with the majority.
518. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 130.
519. Id. para. 224.
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gave them ample time to transfer out of the United States any assets
5 20
that may have been located there.
These facts were not lost on the Tribunal. Noting both that Iran
and the United States could have required "uncontested" service had
they wished and that such a requirement would void Paragraph 12 of
any significance, 521 the Tribunal held that Paragraph 12's requirement
that a close relative of the former Shah be served as a defendant in
United States litigation is satisfied if service "reasonably appears to
comply with the applicable law of the forum... [which] ensure[s] that
the method of service used is reasonably calculated to give the
defendant actual notice of the lawsuit and to afford him an
'5
opportunity to present his defenses." 22
The Tribunal next turned to the timing of the United States'
freeze obligation and held that because the purpose of the obligation
is to prevent Pablavi defendants from removing assets from the
jurisdiction of the court, the Algiers Declarations impliedly obligated
the United States to issue freeze orders promptly after the conclusion
of the Algiers Declarations with respect to any "close relative covered
by Point IV whom the United States knew had previously been
'served as a defendant' in United States litigation and promptly after
Iran has furnished the required proof to OFAC that any other such
close relative has been 'served as a defendant' in United States
litigation. '' 523 The Tribunal found the same timing requirement to
5 24
apply to Paragraph 13's information-reporting obligation.
As a consequence of these interpretive holdings, the Tribunal
determined that the United States had repeatedly violated
Paragraphs 12 and 13. In particular, it held that since the United
States was aware that Farah Diba and Ashraf Pahlavi had been
served as defendants in New York litigation in apparent compliance
with the applicable law of the forum prior to the Algiers
Declarations. 52 the United States violated Paragraphs 12 and 13 by
failing to freeze and require reporting about their assets promptly

520. Indeed, because the question of service continued to be litigated on appeal in the
cases against Farah Diba Pahlavi and Shams Pahlavi, the United States' interpretation of
Paragraph 12 gave these defendants some years to transfer their assets out of the United
States. Id. paras. 40-41, 65.
521. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 227.
522. Id. para. 228.
523. Id para. 220.
524. Id. para. 241.
525. Id. paras. 266,273.
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after those Declarations were concluded on January 19, 1981.526
Further, the Tribunal held that the United States violated Paragraphs
12 and 13 by failing to freeze and require reporting about the assets of
Fatemeh Pahlavi and her co-defendants promptly after September 29,
1981, the date Iran furnished the required proof of service to
OFAC, 527 and by failing to freeze and require reporting about the
assets of Shams Pahlavi promptly after June 7, 1982, the date Iran
furnished the required proof of service in that case to OFAC. 528 Since
the Tribunal had earlier bifurcated the liability phase of the case from
the remedies phase, 52 9 it determined that it would hold further
proceedings to decide upon Iran's loss, if any, resulting from the
0
United States' violations. 5
(4) Preliminary Conclusions
This article has described several instances in which the Reagan
Administration's interpretation and implementation of the Algiers
Declarations was later determined by the Tribunal to violate those
Declarations. This article has further attempted to place the choices
the Reagan Administration made and the determinations the
Tribunal made into their relevant contexts; that is, it has examined
the text and context of the Algiers Declarations, critiqued the
Tribunal's holdings when appropriate, and attempted to bring to light
the various pressures placed on the Reagan Administration as well as
the likely consequences it and United States nationals would have
suffered had it made the choices the Tribunal concluded it should
have made. Undertaking a similar task with respect to the Reagan
Administration's implementation of Point IV proves far simpler
because the Tribunal's holdings are clearly correct and because there
appears little that one can say to explain, let alone to justify, the
Reagan Administration's interpretation and implementation of Point
IV. While negotiating the Algiers Declarations, Iran presented the
Carter Administration with a very burdensome demand; yet, in the
end, the Carter Administration convinced Iran to accept the most
minimal of United States' obligations. However, despite the meager
burden that those obligations placed on the United States and on the

526.
527.
528.
529.
530.

Id. paras. 267,274.
Id. para. 279.
Id. para. 290.
Id. para. 4.
Id. paras. 268, 275,280, 291.
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Pahlavi defendants, 531 the Reagan Administration nonetheless
interpreted Paragraphs 12 and 13 in a way that vitiated what little
value Iran might have derived from them.
Further, the Reagan Administration did so in the face of a
relatively clear treaty text and Carter Administration executive order,
while seemingly under little or no political pressure, and with virtually
nothing to gain. Whereas the Administration's rather self-interested
treatment of standby letters of credit and property subject to liens, for
instance, can be understood as resulting from an ambiguous text, an
onslaught of influential lobbying, and a genuine desire not to impose
substantial financial costs on United States nationals, its treatment of
Point IV, by contrast, appears petty and motivated largely by spite.
Very little was at stake in Point IV for anyone. The Reagan
Administration's interpretation benefited, at best, a few members of
the dethroned Iranian dynasty-people who, many believe, emptied
Iranian coffers for their own gain, and who, whatever their merits,
had little connection with the United States and who should have had
little political clout, despite their association with Henry Kissinger
and David Rockefeller. 532 In fact, the Reagan Administration's proPahlavi interpretation of Point IV did not provide the Pahlavis much
assistance for the simple reason that the obligations of Point IVinterpreted correctly-are largely coextensive with ordinary discovery
and attachment procedures available to all litigants in United States
courts. It was only because Iran's attorneys failed to make use of
those discovery and attachment procedures that Iran did not obtain
all the information it desired about any Pahlavi assets within the
United States and attachments thereon.
In addition to its unjustifiable legal interpretation of Paragraphs
12 and 13, the Reagan Administration also exhibited a certain
pettiness in its dilatory implementation of Point IV. For example, on
531. That the burden on the Pahlavi defendants was indeed minimal is shown by the
fact that OFAC failed to lift the freeze on Ashraf Pahlavi's assets until six years after
litigation against her terminated, 31 C.F.R. § 535.217 (1991) (adding Shams Pahlavi's name
to subsection (b) and removing Ashraf Pahlavi's name from that same section), and it
failed to lift the freeze on Shams Pahlavi's assets until fifteen months after the litigation
against her terminated and one day after she died. 31 C.F.R. § 535.217 (March 4, 1996);
Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 81. One can only assume that Ashraf and Shams
Pahlavi never bothered to ask OFAC to lift the freezes.
532. Cf STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS,
97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., IRAN: THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE HOSTAGE SETrLEMENT
AGREEMENT v (Comm. Print 1981) ("Mr. Rockefeller... was personally acquainted with
the Shah [but] was not an intimate associate to the degree that is often assumed.").
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February 26, 1981, Iran notified OFAC that Ashraf Pahlavi had been
served as defendant and asked OFAC to freeze her assets; however,
despite Iran's repeated reiterations of that request and even though
Ashraf had never contested service, OFAC delayed for nearly three
months before finally freezing her assets on May 13, 1981. 533 Such a
delay provides a motivated defendant ample time to transfer property
and assets out of the country. Similarly inexcusable was the Reagan
Administration's delay in freezing and requiring reporting about the
assets of Fatemeh Pahlavi and her codefendants and the assets of
Shams Pahlavi. Iran notified OFAC on September 29, 1982 that it
had served Fatemeh Pahlavi and her co-defendants, and at that time
service was uncontested, 534 yet Iran contended (and the United States
535
did not deny) that OFAC made no response to the request; it
certainly did not freeze the defendants' assets, and at that time, it had
no justification for failing to do so even on its own interpretation of
Paragraph 12's service requirement. Further, in April 1991, Iran
notified OFAC that it had effected personal service on Shams
Pahlavi. This service had been upheld by the California Court of
Appeal and was no longer contested, yet it still took OFAC four
months to freeze and require reporting about Shams Pahlavi's
assets.5 36 Such delays are entirely contrary to the purpose of the
freeze obligation, which was to prevent the Pahlavi defendants from
removing their assets from the United States, and were clearly not
necessary as an administrative matter: the United States had been
able to freeze approximately $12 billion of Iran's assets in the span of
a few hours in November 1979 after the hostages were taken, so it did
not need three months to add Ashraf Pahlavi's name to
§ 535.217(b).

537

533. See Case No. All, supra note 412, paras. 271-72.
534. Id. paras. 56-57.
535. Reply of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Statement of Defense of the United
States of America, Doc. 58, at 46, Case No. All, supra note 412 (on file with author);
Iran's Hearing Memorial and Evidence on the Issue of Liability, Doc. 105, at 48-49, Case
No. All, supra note 412 (on file with author).
536. Case No. All, supra note 412, paras. 66-67. OFAC exhibited similar discourtesy
during the period in which Shams Pahlavi was contesting service. Iran initially notified
OFAC that it had served Shams Pahlavi as a defendant in United States litigation on June
7, 1982. Id. para. 62. OFAC apparently made no response. On July 7, 1982, Iran
reiterated its request, and again OFAC did not respond. Indeed, it was only five months
later, on December 14, 1982, that OFAC sent Iran a letter, informing it that it would not
freeze Shams Pahlavi's assets because she contested service. Id.
537. But see STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS,
97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., IRAN: THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE HOSTAGE SETTLEMENT
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As unjustifiable as it was, the Reagan Administration's
implementation of Point IV is unlikely to result in the imposition of
any damages against the United States. Iran must show in subsequent
proceedings that it suffered a loss as a result of the United States'
violations of Paragraphs 12 and 13,538 and that will be a difficult
showing to make. To obtain damages, Iran presumably will have to
show that, had the United States fulfilled its Paragraphs 12 and 13
obligations, relevant assets would have been found and Iran would
have prevailed in some or all of its lawsuits and would have obtained
the return of some or all of the assets of the close relatives of the
former Shah.
One of Iran's suits against Shams Pahlavi was dismissed because
Iran failed to comply with a court order compelling discovery, and
another-to enforce Iranian judgments against her-was dismissed
because the court concluded that she could not have obtained due
process of law in the courts of Iran. The United States' failure to
freeze and require reporting about Shams Pahlavi's assets would
these dismissals and thus to have
seem to have no connection to
539
caused Iran no pecuniary harm.
Iran's four remaining cases were dismissed on grounds of forum
non conveniens, and although Iran might argue that the United
States' failure to freeze and require reporting about assets located in
the forum caused or at least contributed to those dismissals, that
argument is not well-supported by the language of the relevant court
opinions. Those opinions emphasized, not the defendants' lack of
assets in the forum, but that the events complained of occurred in
Iran and would have to be analyzed under the laws of Iran, with the
assistance of witnesses who would be Iranians beyond the subpoena
power of the forum. 540 Indeed, the New York trial court noted that
AGREEMENT 17 (Comm. Print 1981) (describing a General Accounting Office report
criticizing OFAC's "inability to maintain control over blocked assets in carrying out a
number of freezes involving countries other than Iran, as well as the most recent effort in

Iran").
538. Case No. All, supra note 412, paras. 268,275,280,291.
539. Indeed, the suit to enforce Iranian judgments may not even fall under the purview
of Point IV since the judgments in question were based on claims for breach of contract
while Point IV covers litigation "'to recover' ... Pahlavi assets 'as belonging to Iran."' See
id- para. 310 (the Tribunal noting that it is unable to decide that question on the current
record).
540. See, e.g., id. para. 38 (quoting the New York trial court's forum non conveniens
dismissal of Iran's suit against the Shah and Farah Diba Pahlavi); Islamic Republic of Iran
v. Pahlavi, 464 N.Y.S.2d 487, 489-90 (App. Div. 1983); Iran's Hearing Memorial and
Evidence on the Issue of Liability, Doc. 105, Ex. 5, Case No. All, supra note 412, (Los
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the only connection between New York and the case against the Shah

and Farah Diba was "the suggestion that the Shah deposited funds in
banks located in" New York. 541 Thus, the court acknowledged the

possibility of property and assets in New York but by no means found
it sufficient to prevent the forum non conveniens dismissal; therefore,
a United States freeze which confirmed the existence of such assets
542
would not likely have changed the result.

More importantly, any argument that the appropriate United
States' freezing and reporting of assets would have averted Iran's
forum non conveniens dismissals is undermined by the forum non
conveniens dismissal that Iran suffered in its case against Ashraf
Pahlavi. In May 1981, the United States did freeze and require

reporting about approximately $4 million worth of real property in
New York belonging to Ashraf Pahlavi. 543 Despite that, the New

York Appellate Division still dismissed Iran's case on grounds of
forum non conveniens, concluding that the case did not bear a
substantial nexus to New York but rather sought "to burden New

York courts and taxpayers with an action involving billions of dollars
in assets located throughout the world, with the gravamen of the

lawsuit being allegations as to [a] foreign monarch's rule over the past
several decades."'544 The court did indicate that, in dismissing the suit,
it relied on its earlier forum non conveniens dismissal of Iran's case

against Farah Diba Pahlavi, whose United States assets, if any, had
not been frozen or reported upon. However, the court took specific
note of Ashraf's New York property and nonetheless concluded that
"the actual causes of action do not truly differ from the ones
Angeles Superior Court Memorandum decision, Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, No.
WEC 070089 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1984) dismissing Iran's suit on grounds of forum non
conveniens) (on file with author).
541. Case No. All, supra note 412, para. 38. Similarly, the New York Appellate
Division stated that "[a]lthough the list of assets does include some assets with a relation
to New York, this is not a case of a dispute as to the ownership of specific property in this
state." Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 464 N.Y.S.2d 487,490 (App. Div. 1983).
542. Likewise, in dismissing Iran's second suit against Shams Pahlavi, the Los Angeles
Superior Court reviewed the "25 points" articulated in past cases to determine if the suit
should be dismissed for forum non conveniens. Examination of virtually every point
supported the forum non conveniens dismissal, Iran's Hearing Memorial and Evidence on
the Issue of Liability, Doc. 105, Ex. 5, Case No. All, supra note 412, (Los Angeles
Superior Court Memorandum decision, Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, No. WEC
070089 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1984) (on file with author); thus, it is unlikely that Iran would have
secured a different result had it been able to make the court aware that Shams owned
property or assets in the United States.
543. Case No. All, supra note 412, paras. 47-48.
544. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 473 N.Y.S.2d 801,802 (App. Div. 1984).
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presented in the [case against Farah Diba], upon which we concluded,
'[t]his is not a case of a dispute as to the ownership of specific
property in this state."' 545
Further, even if Iran is able to convince the Tribunal that the
United States' Paragraphs 12 and 13 violations led to Iran's forum
non conveniens dismissals, Iran will still have to prove that it could
have withstood additional procedural or jurisdictional challenges, and
most importantly, that it would have prevailed on the merits of its
claims and obtained a money judgment. And, even satisfying these
hurdles will do Iran no good unless it can also show that the Pahlavis
held assets in the United States at the time Iran pursued its claims.
That showing may be particularly difficult given that the Algiers
Declarations received substantial publicity prior to their conclusion,
so that the Shah's close relatives would have had ample warning that
their assets were not safe in the United States.
Finally, in the remedies phase before the Tribunal, Iran will
likely have to contend with accusations regarding its complete failure
to mitigate damages. 546 Iran could almost certainly have obtained,
through ordinary discovery and attachment procedures, a freeze on
the Pahlavi assets similar to that promised in Paragraph 12 and the
information required by Paragraph 13, yet Iran did nothing. Indeed,
Iran appeared to show what little value it placed on the United States'
Paragraphs 12 and 13 obligations by its own substantial delays in
seeking their fulfillment. For instance, after serving Fatemeh Pahlavi
and her 59 co-defendants, Iran delayed six months before notifying
OFAC that it had done so.547 It likewise delayed six months after
effecting personal service on Shams Pahlavi before notifying
OFAC.548 Iran either did not believe that the United States'
obligations were crucial to the success of its claims or it recognized
how dim were its prospects of ultimately prevailing on the merits of
its claims regardless of those obligations; if Iran had cared about
preventing the Pahlavi defendants from transferring assets out of the
United States, it would have, at the least, sought Paragraph 12 freezes
545. Id. (quoting Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 464 N.Y.S.2d 487, 490 (App. Div.

1983)).
546. See International Law Comm'n, Paragraph 2 of Draft Article 6 bis of the Draft on
State Responsibility (Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, Special Rapporteur), reprinted in [1993] 2
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 58, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1993/Add. 1 (Part 2) ("In the
determination of reparation, account shall be taken of the negligence or the willful act or
omission of... the injured State ... which contributed to the damage.").
547. Case No. All, supra note 412, paras. 55-56.
548. Id. paras. 65-66.
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at the earliest opportunity and, when that effort failed, it would have
pursued alternate means of accomplishing the same end.
In summary, the Reagan Administration violated several
provisions of the Algiers Declarations, as this article has detailed, but
its violations of Paragraphs 12 and 13 can be considered its least
justifiable. Under little political pressure and with even less to gain,
the Reagan Administration adopted a highly implausible
interpretation of the phrase "served as a defendant" and otherwise
implemented the relevant provisions in a dilatory manner that was
disdainful of the rights Iran had acquired in the Algiers Declarations.
Be that as it may, the Reagan Administration's violations are not apt
to cost the United States any monetary damages. The United States
did not guarantee to Iran the return of the Pahlavi assets; rather, it
promised to take certain, limited steps to facilitate Iran's efforts to
obtain the return of those assets through litigation in United States
courts. The United States failed to take some of those steps, but
those failures did not likely cause Iran any pecuniary loss; Iran's suits
almost certainly would have failed even if the United States had
entirely and conscientiously fulfilled its obligations.
Final Conclusions
President Clinton left office amid a "blizzard" of last-minute
domestic lawmaking, 549 but lame-duck lawmaking in international
affairs continues to be a rarity. In the summer before he left office,
President Clinton did attempt to negotiate amendments to the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty, 550 but his efforts, as a lame duck, did not
generate great controversy because Republicans, by and large, favor
amending or, better still, withdrawing from the treaty. 551 Still, Clinton
was urged, by Republicans and Democrats alike, to let his successor

549. Raum, supra note 109.
550. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435. See False Missile Deadline, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2000, at A26.
The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty has been described as "the 'cornerstone' of the United
States and the Soviet Union's arms control policy." Edward Grogan, PowerPlay: Theater
Ballistic Missile Defense, National Ballistic Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty, 39 VA. J.
INT'L L. 799, 803 (1999).
551. See Missile Defenses: A Shield in Space, THE ECONOMIST, June. 3, 2000, at 19
(noting that a United States' withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty "would
delight Republicans in Congress"); Steven Lee Myers, Choice of Rumsfeld Creates Solid
Team for Missile Shield, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29,2000.
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missile defense system,552 advice
decide whether to build a national
55 3
President Clinton eventually took.

President Clinton also authorized the signing of the Rome
Statute for the International Criminal Court55 4 a few weeks before he
left office,555 but Clinton could not defer making that decision
because the treaty was open for signature without prior ratification
only until December 31, 2001,556 the day that Clinton authorized the
signature 5 7 In any event, Clinton's action was largely symbolic since
the treaty must be ratified by a two-thirds' majority of the Senate to

be binding on the United States.558 In addition, Clinton, who refused
to endorse adoption of the treaty in 1998, reiterated his concerns
about its "significant flaws" and stated that he would not submit the
treaty to the Senate for ratification or recommend that Presidentelect Bush do so. 5s9 The signing was nonetheless denounced by
attempt by
Republican Senator Jesse Helms, who called it "a blatant
560
a lame-duck president to tie the hands of his successor.
While Helms's overblown rhetoric is inaccurate, President
Carter's adherence to the Algiers Declarations on the day before he
left office did to some degree tie the hands of his successor, Ronald

Reagan, but in implementing the Algiers Declarations, Reagan
managed by and large to remain true to the principles he advanced on
the campaign. President Reagan came to office promising a new,

more aggressive approach to foreign affairs. 561 Reagan believed that

552. Elizbeth Becker & Eric Schmitt, Clinton Urged To Delay Missile Decision, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Jan. 21, 2000, at 3; Helen Dewar, Clinton Urged To Defer Missile Shield to
Successor, WASH. POST, July 14, 2000, at A18.
553. Brian Knowlton, Clinton Postpones Decision on Building Missile Shield, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Sept. 2,2000.
554. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.

A/Conf.183/9.
555. Steven Lee Myers, Clinton Approves War Crimes Court, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Jan. 2,2001, at 1.
556. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 125, U.N.

Doc. AIConf.183/9.
557. Myers, supranote 555, at 1.
558. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. Under international law, however, a state that has signed
a treaty subject to subsequent ratification is obliged "to refrain from acts which would
defeat" its "object and purpose." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23,
1969, art. 18, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 336.
559. Thomas E. Ricks, U.S. Signs Treaty on War Crimes Tribunal,WASH. POST, Jan. 1,
2001, at Al.
560. Myers, supranote 555, at 1.
561. KYvIG, supra note 68, at 5 ("During his four-year quest for the presidency,
Reagan constantly advocated a foreign policy of strength and assertiveness.").
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the United States had suffered a disastrous and unnecessary decline
in international stature during the 1970s as a result of its timidity and
weakness.5 62 Consequently, he believed that the United States
needed to hold its ground, strengthen its defenses, and respond

5 63
forcefully to challenges to its authority and stature.
These views were manifest in Reagan's positions as to a variety

of foreign affairs issues, 564 and, particularly to the Iranian hostage
crisis and the resulting Algiers Declarations. As a candidate, Reagan
pointed to the hostage crisis as exemplifying all that had gone wrong
in American foreign policy, and he made clear that, as President, he
would take a stronger stand against terrorists.5 65 Fortunately for him,
he was not called upon to demonstrate the effectiveness of these

more assertive tactics 566 but rather had only the more mundane task
of implementing the Algiers Declarations before him.
President Reagan's belief in "a foreign policy of strength and
assertiveness, '567 however, did inform the decisions that he was called

upon to make in implementing the Declarations.5 68 Specifically, the

562. Id.
563. Id. at 4; Smist & Meiers, supra note 19, at 301 ("In 1980, candidate Ronald Reagan
pledged to restore American resolve in foreign policy by being tough on the nation's
international foes.").
564. KYVIG, supra note 68, at 5 (noting, for example, that Reagan opposed the Panama
Canal treaties as well as second strategic arms limitation treaty of the 1970s (SALT II),
which he considered "a ratification of a 'decade of neglect' of American defenses and a
further widening of the 'window of vulnerability"'); MOSHER ET AL., supra note 15, at 224.
565. KYVIG, supra note 68, at 5. In greeting the returning hostages, President Reagan
vowed: "Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international behavior are violated,
our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution." Michael M. Gunter, Dealingwith
Terrorism: The Reagan Record, in PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THE WORLD 167, 167 (Eric
J. Schmertz et al. eds., 1997).
566. The subsequent Iran-Contra debacle calls into question Reagan's commitment to
his campaign rhetoric. See Smist & Meiers, supra note 19, at 301 (describing "the tough
pledges against terrorism made by Ronald Reagan during his 1980 campaign and as
president, and how Iran-Contra... broke those pledges"). The Reagan Administration's
actions also diverged from its campaign rhetoric with regard to the Panama Canal treaties
and the SALT II treaty. MOSHER ET AL., supra note 15, at 225.
567. KYvIG, supra note 68, at 5.
568. And it certainly informed the rhetoric surrounding his implementation. For
instance, he showed disdain for the restrictions imposed by international law by making
abundantly clear that he chose to implement the Declarations at all, not because
international law required the United States to do so, but because doing so proved to be in
the best interest of the United States. Reagan Administration Statement Regarding the
Settlement with Iran, 81 DEP'T ST. BULL. No. 2048 at 17 (1981); Symposium, The
Settlement with Iran, 13 U. MIAMI J. INT'L L. 1, 55 (1981). In a similar vein, the Reagan
Administration's opinion of the United Nations might be summarized by a 1983 statement
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Reagan Administration elected to interpret certain provisions of the
Declarations in ways that were highly favorable to United States'
interests but equally improbable as a matter of treaty interpretation.
And, as a result, the Tribunal has repeatedly held the United States to
have breached the Algiers Declarations.
But although that is the end result, it is only the beginning of the
analysis. First, to the Reagan Administration's credit, it did reject the
most unreasonable of the interpretive positions put forward by
United States claimants.569 and some of the positions that it did
accept, while arguably not supported by a fair reading of the
Declarations' text, were both compelling from the claimants' point of
view and possessing of substantial equitable appeal. For instance, it
was clear to all that Iran had made and would continue to make
fraudulent calls on letters of credit. Given that fact, should the
proceeds of such letters be considered "assets" required to be
transferred pursuant to the Algiers Declarations? A fair reading of
the Declarations suggests that they should, but such a transfer would
have been greeted with such outrage from United States claimants
who stood to lose hundreds of millions of dollars that even the most
internationalist of administrations would have paused for thought.
Similarly, an objective reading of the Declarations suggests that they
do not permit United States claimants to bring counterclaims against
Iran in United States courts, but again, the perceived inequity of
permitting Iran to waltz into United States courts to bring claims
against United States nationals while prohibiting United States
nationals from responding with legitimate counterclaims could not
made by the Administration's Deputy United States Representative at the United
Nations:
If in the judicious determination of the members of the United Nations, they feel
that they are not welcome and that they are not being treated with the hostly
consideration that is their due,... then the United States strongly encourages
such member states seriously to consider removing themselves and this
organization from the soil of the United States. We will put no impediment in
your way .... The members of the U.S. mission to the United Nations will be
down at dockside waving you a fond farewell as you sail into the sunset.
Richard Bernstein, U.S. Aide Suggests Members Take The U.N. Elsewhere if Dissatisfied,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20,1983, at Al.
569. For instance, the Reagan Administration did not permanently terminate letters of
credit in favor of Iran, as some claimants advocated, Senate Banking Comm. Hearing,
supra note 62, at 84 (prepared statement of Joseph R. Creighton, Vice President-General
Counsel, Harris Corp.), and, over some claimants' objections, it nullified the attachments
that claimants had obtained against Iran even though the Tribunal would ultimately find
some of the underlying claims to fall outside its jurisdiction. See supra text accompanying
note 354.
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help but motivate the Reagan Administration to "rectify" this
inequity in its implementation.
Not all of the Reagan Administration's interpretive decisions can
be justified by compelling equitable considerations, however. For
instance, with respect to standby letters of credit, once the Reagan
Administration permitted United States account parties to establish
substituted blocked accounts on their books, it did not need also to
5 70
authorize litigation seeking to enjoin banks from making payment.
Further, as noted above, the Reagan Administration's refusal to
freeze and require reporting about certain Pahlavi assets is virtually
impossible to justify in any way; fulfilling its obligations would have
placed very little burden on the United States and failing to do so
advanced no obvious or important United States' interests.
So, some of the Reagan Administration's decisions were
supported by good reasons, others by less good reasons, but all of
them were complicated by the immense uncertainty surrounding the
Tribunal-the body that would eventually pass on the Reagan
Administration's implementation. If Oliver Wendell Holmes and
subsequent legal realists were correct that interpreting legal texts
consists of nothing more than predicting a court's subsequent
decisions, 571 then the Reagan Administration had before it a very
difficult task, for it must have been nearly impossible to predict the
572
decisions of the Tribunal.

570. Of course, the Reagan Administration could have authorized the litigation while
eliminating the possibility of substituted blocked accounts, but this would have provided
United States account parties with less protection. The substituted blocked accounts
provided United States account parties with inexpensive and certain protection whereas
claimants seeking injunctions in United States courts must incur litigation costs and may
be unsuccessful.
571. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, reprinted in 110 HARV. L. REV. 991,
991-92 (1997); see also KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND
ITS STUDY 3 (1951); Felix Cohen, The Problem of a FunctionalJurisprudence,MOD. L.

REV. 1, 16 (1937) (opining that "any... legal question may be broken up into a number of
subordinate questions, each of which refers to the actual behavior of courts.... The law,
as the realistic lawyer uses the term, is the body of answers to such questions.").
572. The U.S. Iranian Hostage Settlement, Remarks by Roberts Owen, 75 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 236, 236 (1981) (noting that "in drafting the clauses, the negotiators asked
themselves how these clauses would be interpreted by the parties, by the U.S. courts, and
most importantly, by the International Arbitral Tribunal which would be established"
pursuant to the Algiers Declarations.); James H. Carter, The Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal: Observationson the First Year, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1076, 1077 (1982) (noting
that after a year in operation, it is still "far too early to predict whether the procedures
ultimately established will be in all respects fair to all parties, what answers might be given
by the Tribunal to the many complex substantive legal issues, whether all claimants with
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Indeed, it was open to question in 1981 whether the Tribunal
would render any decisions at all, let alone any decisions as to the
United States' implementation of the Declarations. The history of
international claims arbitration contains many examples, going back
to the Jay Treaty commissions, of tribunals that broke up after
completing only a small fraction of the task set before them,573 and
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal faced particularly worrisome
obstacles as a result of the hostility that characterized Iran-United
States relations. The United States and Iran have had no diplomatic
relations during the entire period of the Tribunal's operation, and, in
addition, actual hostilities have occasionally erupted between the
countries over the years.5 74 Such hostility spilled over into the
Tribunal itself in 1984 when two Iranian arbitrators physically
attacked Judge MangArd, one of the third-country arbitrators.5 75 The
Iranian arbitrators perpetrated the attack as a means of putting
pressure on their government to withdraw from the Tribunal. 576
Normal Tribunal proceedings were halted for some months, but
fortunately, Iran recalled the two Iranian arbitrators after the United
States challenged them, and the Tribunal resumed its business with
two new Iranian arbitrators.5 77 Thus, although the Reagan
Administration could not have foreseen the particular events that
ensued, it could easily have predicted that the Tribunal would occupy
a precarious position, and that recognition must have encouraged it to
"insure" against the Tribunal's failure by adopting pro-United States'
interpretations of Algiers Declarations' provisions.
Doing so also enabled the Reagan Administration to foist
responsibility for the unpopular obligations the United States had
assumed onto the Tribunal. States often seek to shift responsibility
meritorious claims will have them satisfied out of the security fund or otherwise, or how
long the entire procedure may take).
573. Decisions of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal,Remarks by Ted L. Stein, 78
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 221, 230 (1984). See generally J.L. SIMPSON & HAZEL Fox,
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 1-24 (1959).
574. See CHARLES N. BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES

CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 657 (1998) (listing "military confrontation between the two countries
in the Gulf in the late 1980s, [which] resulted in the sinking of the Iran Ajar, an attack on
offshore Iranian oil platforms,... the downing of an Iranian Airbus [and] the persistent
American belief that Iranian authorities were responsible at least in part for the prolonged
detention of American hostages in Lebanon, and the Iran-Contra debacle").
575. See ALDRICH, supra note 33, at 24-27 (providing eye-witness description of the
attack); Magraw, supra note 37, at 19-20.
576. ALDRICH, supra note 33, at 27.

577. Id. at26.
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for unpopular decisions to external bodies, 578 and the Algiers
Declarations allowed the Reagan Administration to take credit for

looking out for United States' interests while postponing any
unfavorable consequences and laying the blame for them, when they
579
finally came, at the feet of an international organization.
Further facilitating the Reagan Administration's nationalistic
tendencies was the Algiers Declarations' vague and skeletal text. The
Carter Administration negotiators began by drafting lengthy, detailed

legal documents but had to abandon those efforts when it became
clear that they could not survive translation into French and Persian

and be understood by the Iranian negotiators, many of whom had
little or no training in the law. 580 So, the Carter Administration
negotiators drafted what Roberts Owen, the Carter Administration's
Legal Adviser, called "the world's simplest papers. ' '581 These

succeeded in securing the release of the hostages and setting forth the
bare bones of the agreement reached by the two states, but their

necessary ambiguity582 also allowed the Reagan Administration to
take positions that were highly implausible but not expressly
foreclosed by the text.
Indeed, this article has at several points contrasted the Carter

Administration's contemporaneous understanding of certain Algiers
Declarations' terms with the Reagan Administration's subsequent
more pro-United States' interpretation; however, it is not at all clear

how the Carter Administration would have proceeded on any of these
issues had it remained in office and faced head-on the pressures that
instead were brought to bear on the Reagan Administration.
Although the norms of international law are understood to stand
578. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act through Formal
International Organizations,42 J. CONFLICr RESOL. 1, 22-23 (1998) (noting that binding
international arbitration often proves more acceptable to states because neither state can
be accused of yielding to the other).
579. Of course, the Reagan Administration also shifted the costs of the unpopular
obligations from the relatively small number of United States nationals, who had had
business dealings with Iran and who benefited from the Reagan Administration's
interpretations, to United States taxpayers, whose tax dollars fund the damages that the
United States must pay to Iran for its treaty violations.
580. Negotiation of the Algiers Accords, in REVOLUTIONARY DAYS, supra note 19, at
61 (comments of Roberts Owen). For instance, Iran's lead negotiator was an electrical
engineer. See Testimony of Behzad Nabavi, Transcript at 73 (Sept. 13, 1995), Case No.
A15(IV)/A24, supranote 328 (on file with author).
581. Owen, supra note 47, at 312.
582. See THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, 1981-1983 vii (Richard B.
Lillich ed., 1984).
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isolated from and above those of national law and domestic politics,
the officials who make the decisions implementing international law
are elected by, and accountable to, a domestic constituency;
consequently, we cannot be surprised when those elected officials
take into account the impact, both real and perceived, of the
implementation on that constituency.5 83 Further, even if the Carter
Administration had been able to maintain what appeared to be its
more balanced interpretation of the Declarations, that interpretation
itself did not fully accord with the Tribunal's subsequent conclusions.
For instance, the Carter Administration believed General Principles
A and B to impose no obligations independent of those set forth in
the specific provisions of the Algiers Declarations. The Tribunal
disagreed, determining that the General Principles embody "broad
legal commitments."' 5 14 Consequently, when the United States was
held to have breached General Principle A in Case No. A15(I:C)
involving letters of credit, it was held to have breached a provision
that the drafters of the document intended to embody no legal
5
obligation. 5
Finally, if one puts aside any theoretical objections to the Reagan
Administration's implementation of the Algiers Declarations and
considers only its ultimate consequences, one finds little to complain
about. First, although the Reagan Administration's positions resulted
in several findings of United States' treaty violations, those positions
provided certain United States claimants with much-needed
protection and have not yet and probably will not result in the
The Tribunal significantly
imposition of substantial damages.
reduced the United States' damages for standby letters of credit by
holding moot a large portion of the standby-letter-of-credit
disputes. 8 6 The Tribunal's finding of a breach in Case No. A24 was
largely symbolic since the Foremost case was seemingly dormant
during the period of potential United States' liability. And, the
Reagan Administration's least justifiable breach-that occurring in
583. See MOSHER ET AL., supra note 15, at 22.

584. Case No. A15(I:G), supranote 245,12 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 46-47 para. 17.
585. Of course, even if the Tribunal had agreed with the United States that the General
Principles contain no independent obligations, it might still have found the Reagan
Administration's authorization of substituted blocked accounts to violate one of the
General Declarations' specific provisions concerning asset transfer.
586. Case No. A15(I:C), supra note 205,25 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 262 para. 36; see
5 No. 20 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 3 (1990) ("Iran's victory on the letter of credit issue
was somewhat hollow" as a result of the Tribunal's conclusion that most of the letter-ofcredit claims were moot).
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relation to the Pahlavi assets-will probably not cost it a dime. The

United States' potential liability in Case No. A15(II:A), involving
tangible property that the United States failed to order transferred, is
still unclear, but its overall monetary loss for all of these cases is
arguably slight in comparison with the domestic political damage that
it would have incurred by interpreting the Declarations in the way the
Tribunal ultimately determined that it should have.
Second, the Tribunal, which has had many changes of arbitrators,

has not been altogether consistent in its decision-making 587 and in
particular has been accused of excessive compromise, 588 or what
might be called "splitting the baby."

Some commentators have

suggested that this tendency might result in part from the fact that
virtually all of the claims the Tribunal has been called upon to decide

were filed by United States claimants against Iran, which might create
in the third-country arbitrators a desire "to 'say yes' to Iran from time
to time.1589 Ironically, then, if such views are accurate, the Reagan

Administration's treaty breaches allowed the Tribunal justifiably to
say "yes" to Iran, thereby providing it a much-needed balancing
effect, at relatively little cost to the United States and at considerable
gain to certain vulnerable United States claimants.

Finally, while

in

many

situations,

a self-serving

treaty

implementation will cost a state party the trust and goodwill of the
other state party to the treaty, the United States had little to lose in
that regard from Iran. Iran signalled its clear desire to terminate
relations between the two countries when it held United States

hostages for more than fourteen months.5 90 Iran's enmity for the
United States remained undiminished through the negotiations of the

587. See, e.g., ALDRICH, supra note 33, at 43 (noting that the Ebrahimi Award's grant
of full compensation without reference to the Treaty of Amity does not "square with
Tribunal precedent"); Mark B. Feldman, Book Review, 26 GEO. WASH. J.INT'L L. &
ECON. 451,455 (1992) (reviewing JOHN A. WESTBERG, INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS
AND CLAIMS INVOLVING GOVERNMENT PARTIES: CASE LAW OF THE IRAN-UNITED

STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL (1991)) (noting that Tribunal "decisions are uneven and
difficult to evaluate objectively").
588. Magraw, supra note 37, at 29 (noting that some commentators have asked
"whether the Tribunal, in its efforts to keep the countries from walking away from the
process, has compromised its decisionmaking-not in the sense of trying to reach a
reasonable accommodation of different policy or legal concerns, but rather in the sense of
engaging in horse trading").
589. BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 574, at 661.

590. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 553 (holding Iran in violation of international
law).
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Algiers Declarations, during which Iran refused to negotiate directly
with the United States, insisting insfead on the Algerian
intermediaries 591 Iran also refused to sign a treaty with the United
States, thus necessitating the invention of Declarations that "would
be issued by the government of Algeria and to which each of the two
antagonists would then 'adhere."' 592 Under these circumstances, the
Reagan Administration had little to gain in terms of goodwill by a
more balanced implementation of the Algiers Declarations.
Indeed, one wonders whether Iran would even have noticed had
the Reagan Administration effected a more balanced implementation
given how hell-bent Iran appeared to be on finding fault with
everything the United States did or did not do in implementing the
Algiers Declarations. Iran brought claims before the Tribunal
challenging virtually every aspect of the United States'
implementation, and most of its claims were patently frivolous. Thus,
the United States not only lost no goodwill by virtue of the Reagan
Administration's implementation, it also incurred no unnecessary
litigation costs since Iran appeared determined to haul it repeatedly
before the Tribunal regardless of the choices it made.
Other instances of bad-faith behavior on the part of Iran and its
arbitrators also help to contextualize and put into perspective the
Reagan Administration's record of implementation. Although the
physical attack on Judge Mangtrd was perpetrated by two Iranian
arbitrators who, by all accounts, were acting without the
authorization of their government,5 93 the government of Iran has
repeatedly challenged and sought the removal of third-country
arbitrators on frivolous grounds. 594 Iran's most recent challenges
targeted the Tribunal's current President, Krzysztof Skubiszewski,
and these were especially malicious and meritless5 95 All of Iran's
591. Owen, supra note 47, at 307.
592. Id at 311.
593. ALDRICH, supra note 33, at 26.
594. Id.at 9-11, 38-39 (describing Iran's challenges to Judge Mangard and Judge
Arangio-Ruiz and to President Briner).
595. See Challenge to Judge Krzysztof Skubiszewski, President and Chamber Two
Chairman of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. May 20, 1999); Statement
on the Second Challenge to Judge Skubiszewski (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. June 15, 1999). In its
first challenge to President Skubiszewski, Iran maintained that there existed doubts about
President Skubiszewski's impartiality and independence as a result of an inquiry that the
Deputy Secretary General, who also serves as Skubiszewski's legal adviser, made of the
N.V. Settlement Bank of the Netherlands. In particular, the Deputy Secretary General
inquired into the balance of the Security Account in order to prepare an up-to-date bench
memorandum for the President in a case involving Iran's obligation to replenish the
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challenges have been soundly rejected, 596 but the threat of them may

nonetheless subtlely influence the Tribunal's decision-making. The
Iranian arbitrators, while arguably placed in a difficult position by
their government, have also been accused of employing tactics of
intimidation 597 and engaging in other inappropriate behavior. 598 At

the very least, their nearly universal refusal to vote for a position

Security Account. Iran claimed that the President had authorized this inquiry and that the
inquiry constituted improper collection of evidence.
The Tribunal's Appointing
Authority, Sir Robert Jennings, summarily rejected Iran's claim, holding that the balance
in the Security Account was not an issue in the case; rather, it was a simple question of fact
as to which there was no dispute between the parties. The Appointing Authority
concluded:
The notion that any interest of the President in the state of the balance could be
evidence of a lack of "impartiality and independence" is not free from absurdity.
One cannot be partial, or impartial, about a Bank's statement of the amount of
the balance of an account. A point of view does not arise. In fact the whole
construction of the First Challenge is artificial and fragile and it simply does not
withstand examination.
Decision of the Appointing Authority on the Challenge to Judge Skubiszewski (Iran-U.S.
Cl. Trib. Aug. 25, 1999).
Iran's second challenge to President Skubiszewski was related to its first challenge; in
its second challenge, Iran contended that the President either lied or caused the Deputy
Secretary General to lie about the inquiry of the Bank. Again, the Appointing Authority
summarily rejected Iran's claim. He concluded that there was "no ground whatsoever for
any justifiable belief that the President told a lie or that [the Deputy Secretary General]
was told to tell a lie." Id. Indeed, according to the Appointing Authority, "the allegation
that the President lied about this routine and normal matter is not only unjustifiable but
smacks of absurdity." Id.
596. Re Judge N. Manghrd, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 111 (Jan. 15, 1982) (rejecting
challenge to Judge Manghrd); Decision of the Appointing Authority on the Challenge to
Judge Briner, 21 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 384 (Sept. 19, 1989) (rejecting challenge to Judge
Briner); Decision of the Appointing Authority on the Challenge to Judge Briner, 21 IranU.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 396 (Sept. 25, 1989) (rejecting challenge to Judge Briner); Decision of
the Appointing Authority on the Challenge to Judge Arangio-Ruiz, 27 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 328 (Sept. 24, 1991) (rejecting challenge to Judge Arangio-Ruiz); Decision of the
Appointing Authority on the Challenge to Judge Skubiszewski (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 25
Aug. 1999) (rejecting challenge to Judge Skubiszewski).
The Iranian parties to Case No. 55 sought to remove Judge Briner in that case on the
ground that, until 1987, he had been a member of the Board of Directors of a Swiss
company, which was owned by a company that appeared before the Tribunal as an expert
witness for the United States claimants. Although Judge Briner did not believe the
challenge to be meritorious, he withdrew from further proceedings in that case. See
Challenge Documents, 20 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 175-330; ALDRICH, supra note 33, at 38.
597. Magraw, supra note 37, at 19.
598. ALDRICH, supra note 33, at 35-37 (describing delay tactics and leaking of
confidential information to Iran); Arthur W. Rovine, The Role of the United States Agent
to the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, 1981-1983, 3 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 223, 230 (1992)
(describing leaking of confidential information to Iran).
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advanced by an American claimant or respondent 599 arguably has had
since the American
a skewing effect on Tribunal deliberations
6°°
arbitrators do not resort to similar tactics.
To a great extent, the Reagan Administration treated the Algiers
Declarations in the way that many incoming Presidents have treated
the eleventh-hour products of their predecessors' administrations.
The Reagan Administration approached the Algiers Declarations
with a skeptical eye as the product of a weak and ultimately
dangerous foreign policy philosophy. The Reagan Administration's
ideological inclinations coincided with the intense lobbying of United
States claimants and with widespread anti-Iranian public opinion and
resulted in a somewhat self-serving implementation of the
Declarations. However, a fair assessment of that implementation
cannot be reached without an understanding of the more nuanced
and contextual aspects of the contemporaneous and subsequent
events. Although international lawyers might argue that any treaty
breach disturbs the normative framework of international law, here
the costs of the Reagan Administration's implementation proved
relatively minimal for both state parties and the normative
framework has survived passably well. No more can be expected
from international law in a context so highly charged.

599. ALDRICH, supra note 33, at 43; Andreas Lowenfeld, The Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunak An Interim Appraisal, 38 ARB. J. 14, 23 (1983) ("[T]he Iranians nearly always
[act] as a bloc and [refuse] to go along with any decision favorable to the American
side . . ").
600. See Correspondence to the Co-Editors in Chief (letter of Richard C. Allison, 92
AM. J. INT'L L. 469, 488-89 (1998) (noting that the American arbitrators voted against the
American party on all of its claims in more than 30% of contested Tribunal cases and
voted against the American party on at least one of its claims in more than 60% of
contested Tribunal cases).

